Toward a Theology of Nature

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We live in a scientific civilization . . . . Behind our manipulation of nature . . . there exists a certain way of seeing the world, a peculiar perspective which molds nature into a specific form . . . . Somewhere in [the] dim ages [of the distant past] human beings began to think symbolically. Their thoughts about nature were pure inventions of their human minds . . . . This was truly a momentous change; science since then has been one or another variation in the means of representing nature, both in thought and in action . . . . If this unique blend of imposing our symbols upon nature and transforming what we perceive accordingly is the hallmark of *homo sapiens*, we can thus assert that science has been around from the very beginning of the species. (Alioto 1987, 1, 3)

Culture is the artificial, secondary environment which [the human being] superimposes on the natural. It comprises language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization, inherited artifacts, technical processes, and values. This Asocial heritage, this Areality sui generis, which the New Testament writers frequently had in mind when they spoke of Athe world, which is represented in many forms but to which Christians like other [human beings] are inevitably subject, is what we mean when we speak of culture. (Niebuhr 1951, 32)

I

There is little that comes easier to us than fixing a line of demarcation between nature and culture. The things lying outside us though there firstCare now simply there for us, we think; we have the means and the motive and the opportunity: to manipulate them, to transform them, to tame them, to harness them, to exploit them, to make them ours, to adopt them, to give them our name. Knowledge, we say, is power. Thus what are naturally trees and stones become a house; what is naturally a river becomes a generator of electricity; what is naturally blind impulse becomes eloquence, competition, human resource management. We who are different from nature sink our handsCour freedom, our rationality, our creativity into nature, and behold a new creation:

Aculture. Nature is waiting over there, culture is over here with us.
We who are inclined to be Christian have little to add. God created nature, we say; we have created culture. Nature is good; culture is infected with the defects that plague our lives. Of course, God created us as well. Indeed we were created in the image of God and with a cultural mandate to make good things of the good things God made. Unfortunately, we fell—we violated the plan of God—and suffered the consequences. Corrupt, perverse, our work upon nature now is but an ugly caricature of what it otherwise had been. That is what we say.

II

Though this is hardly a new way of thinking, it is a rather modern one. Long ago in the morning of Western civilization there was no such neat division between nature and culture. Nature, *physis*, embraced everything without exception, including the ways of earth’s rational animals. Thus Homer and Hesiod, Parmenides and Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle all agreed: there is no way to separate meaning from reality, form from being, culture from nature. *AtThe decisive question was not why something existed, but how it could exist meaningfully, that is, in orderly form. Real being begins with intelligible form, with a multiplicity rendered harmonious through unity* (Dupré 1993, 22). Even the gods were integrally connected with all else within the whole. And so, such integrity suggested definiteness to the Greeks. The cosmos is circumscribed by its own inherence (21). Here everything is. There can simply not be any outside; certainly not an outside from which a human being might fashion or refashion its own wares.

All of this, however, changed. The first sign of trouble came with this tradition’s encounter with Christianity and in particular the Hebrew and Christian conception of a
transcendent Creator, one who remained outside the cosmos (Dupré 1993, 3; cf. 22, 29, and 126 B 127).

An all-inclusive concept of kosmos such as the Greeks knew did and could not exist in Israel. The whole of creation manifested Yahweh’s power and presence, but it never attained the kind of self-sufficient unity that the Greek kosmos possessed.

Moreover, the later Christian idea of a world created from nothing [ex nihilo] and hence devoid of intrinsic necessity would have conflicted with the divine character of Greek nature. (Dupré 1993, 29 B 30)

Indeed the danger of this encounter was great. As Christianity rose to prominence, it could well have rejected the ideas that were so endemic to the ancient Hellenistic world. But that was not to be. Whether due to an inevitable pagan seepage or to the surrender of an eschatology that had previously made it homeless in this world or to an outgoing hospitality written into its liturgy, creeds, and scriptures, Christianity found a way to reconcile apparently irreconcilable Hebrew and Hellenistic ideas. Of course, Christians could not say with pagans that the universe is inherently divine, but they did come to maintain that it has upon it the fingerprints left by the creator-God. None of nature is simply to be explained in itself, of course; a transcendent God made it all that it is. Yet nature, for these Christian metaphysicians, has come from God and so, it is said, God must be re-presented in it. It is the human physis, the image of God, that is this re-presentation most completely (Dupré 1993, 30 B 31).
And so, though perhaps marking a significant deviation from the church’s earlier trajectory, Christian intellectuals gradually appropriated pagan synthetic thinking. However, it was a difficult history. The new Christian metaphysics had much behind it in the ancient Greeks and in particular in the ancient Greek ideas of form and nature, but its forward march was less certain; it had to endure some severe crises. Indeed

How could a cosmic symbolism prefigured in and centered around one individual—the Christ—conform to the universal Greek idea of form? Moreover, if God had definitively revealed himself in the Aman of sorrows, how could one continue to regard the splendor of the universe as the image of a God who had appeared in the form of a slave? (Dupré 1993, 31)

Therefore, one finds throughout the church moves made that emphasize the difference between the things of this world and the things of God.

Though Christian metaphysics persistently advanced, employing as it does the notions of form and nature, a dramatic change occurred, a change opening a new and uncertain era. And it occurs with a singularity that signals its own peculiarity. The unassuming revolutionary is Francis of Assisi. His revolutionary act is his gazing nakedly upon the particularity of the human Jesus. Yet he was an ambiguous revolutionary. Initially, the image of his rapt attention to Jesus mixed well with the growing sense of the connection between the human microcosm and the macrocosm in which it resides. Parallel to the revelatory specificity of Jesus, item after natural item was understood in its direct particularity as a symbol of the great meaning of the whole. Nothing was simply a brute fact. Everything was bursting with interpretable symbolism (Dupré 1993, 36 B 38). However, it is the second way that Francis came to be heard that was of the greatest moment and which had the most destabilizing affect on late medieval synthetic thinking,
thinking that thought first to the universal and only on the universal=’s terms to the particular. Francis pointed differently.

His devotion to Jesus of Nazareth, the individual, opened a new perspective on the unique particularity of the person. Francis upset an intellectual tradition which he hardly understood and which he certainly had no intention of challenging. If the Image of all images is an individual, then the primary significance of individual form no longer consists in disclosing a universal reality beyond itself. Indeed, the universal itself ultimately refers to the singular. (Dupré 1993, 38)

It is William of Ockham who brings Francis=’ piety to massive philosophical fruition. According to Ockham Plato, Aristotle, and the long tradition of medieval thought through even Duns Scotus have failed the individual. They are still assuming that nature (i.e., each entity before us) carries within itself literally the power and patterns of being understood, that entities are woven together out of the very fibers of a universal, overarching meaning. Understanding an entity is thus actualizing those powers and patterns, bringing nature=’s inherent meaning to light, making nature=’s own intelligibility come to resonate with the knower=’s intelligence, stepping from the particular to the form it exemplifies. It is this that Ockham rejects and his rejection brings with it the dawning of the modern world.

The impact of nominalism is terrific upon the high medieval ontotheological synthesis. There is here no longer any form inherent in the natural world. Form, meaning, resides in the human mind, the human mind alone. What is more, there is no longer any inherent continuity between the natural world and God, for it had been the world=’s form that had linked it to the divine (Dupré 1993, 40 B 41).

Where the implications of Ockham=’s arguments are most felt, form continues to play an important role, but it does so only in relation to a formless nature, a nature
stripped of its own meaning. The human mind is now the home of that. Form can make an impact upon nature now only by being expressed out of the independent human mind toward nature through speech and writing and art and technology. The mind in fact comes to occupy the place once held not only by Greek nature, but also by God. When theology ceased to guarantee that meaning and value would be given with the world, it fell upon the mind to define or invent them. Such a move inevitably resulted in a separation between a meaning-giving mental subject and a physically given but meaning-dependent world. This was the option actually chosen by modern philosophy and science. (Dupré 1993, 58; cf. 63 B 64)

Thus in the seventeenth century one finds the division between the meaning that the mind might bestow and the nature that might receive it reaching clarity in terms of human power. When Francis Bacon defines knowledge as power, he bears witness to a will to exploit. There is no knowledge for the sake of knowledge, no knowledge for the sake of the virtue of the human soul and community. The quest for that kind of Aidle knowing was the original sin, Bacon believes. To say that knowledge is power is to commit oneself to the early vocation of the Adam and Eve of the Garden, viz., the vocation Ato dominate nature. Nature has no native telos. Human beings have been charged with imposing one upon it (Dupré 1993, 71 B 72).

When the motive of knowledge becomes practical, the epistemic process tends to become restricted by the boundaries of what is conducive to productive action. Method acquires a meaning it never had before. . . . With Bacon and most seventeenth-century philosophers, method turns into a screen imposed upon the subject matter that restricts the investigation to what will most effectively and most speedily yield reliable results. . . . [Thus the idea of science to which the seventeenth century gave birth] gave rise to a characteristically modern belief in the unlimited human ability to conquer nature by rational methods combined with an unshakable confidence in a state of universal happiness that would follow from this conquest. (Dupré 1993, 73 B 74)
To say that nature has no telos is not to say that nothing is going on in nature. It is only that nature moves by the force of external pressure, viz., efficient causation, moving mechanistically toward no goal of its own, i.e., simply moving because it has been pushed. To impose meaning on what is otherwise a blind flood of force is to harness it, to control it, to make it our servant. That is the raison d'être of modern technology. Implicated in that program is a vision of a machine-like universe, a closed system, one that has decisively and utterly broken for the first time from the metaphysics of the Greeks (Dupré 1993, 74 B 76).

A meaning-imposing being divorced from nature and yet bent upon controlling it is a consciousness thrown toward what it is not, a subject trained upon an object. The mind is so constituted that it can reflect within itself the objects it encounters, as a mirror might. It does so by arranging its own ideas so that the world outside the mind is represented truthfully.¹ It is Descartes who most clearly shows how important it is to the modern mind to gain mastery over modern nature. The procedure of Descartes turns finally upon the certainty of the subject, the res cogitans, the A.I. Indeed Descartes is so dependent upon the subject that it is fair to say that his is a new ontotheology, a metaphysics resting upon an unshakable solid-rock foundation, upon an ultimate reality, the substantial self.² Everything knowable finds its place in this A.I. that may have limitations of knowledge, but which has absolutely no limitations of (formal) will.³

With the stripping of form/meaning from nature came the removal of God from involvement in the natural world in any terms other than those of efficient causation. God is thought to be a center of power not unlike the human subject who created the
world of nature from a position above the natural, i.e., as an extrinsic reality. Of course, since God remains the (supernatural) creator of nature, intelligent creatures can find evidence of God’s work (i.e., God’s efficient causation) by studying the world (as one might find evidence of a watchmaker’s work by studying a watch) (Dupré 1993, 178 B 179). Such natural theology, however, is little more than a polite tip of the hat in the direction of a departing old acquaintance. In fact the supernatural became an emptier and emptier category. Nature came to be understood to be so radically independent that it was thought now (not only by Spinoza) to exist simply in itself. As the concept of nature lost its transcendent orientation, the assumptions on which natural theology came to be based contained the seeds of late-modern atheism (Dupré 1993, 181).

And so, here we stand: nature is an empty object technologically controlled and imposingly named by an isolated and empty though power-hungry subject; God is relegated to supernatural irrelevance; all that exists is pressed together in a closed system of efficient causation. This is the legacy of the modern age. And no one likes it.

III

The poverty of a natural theology that is captivated by modern nature does not foreclose the prospect of a theology of nature with a difference. Nature need not be abandoned by theology; but it must be approached in a very new way, to be rethought from the beginning. The history that we’ve considered begins with the ancient Greeks. Perhaps thinking physis once again, but not entirely in the same way this time, might provide new direction. The boldest and most inviting rethinking of the Greeks in general and of physis in particular may well be Martin Heidegger’s.
Heidegger's resolve to think the meaning of being (Sein) has a notoriously devotional tenor. Thus he speaks of such thinking as Ameditative, as an openness to the mystery, as a kind of Athanking, as a Acalling (see, e.g., Heidegger 1966, 54 B 57; 1968, 138 B 147, and passim). Furthermore he approaches the task of thinking being as a pilgrimage to a distant, forgotten place that lies buried under centuries of systematic neglect. Insight into the meaning of being, he says, came with the dawning of Western thought; but with the rise of metaphysical thinking, especially in Plato and his heirs (and his heirs are the whole of the history of metaphysics), that original insight came to be disregarded. The task of thinking that original insight and thinking it beyond its first moments, however, is no romantic dismissal of all that has transpired since then. Heidegger is not leaping across over two millennia of history to get back to some golden age. Rather he is thinking through that history, thinking through it to think what remains buried in it. And if he is right that this original insight is buried in the very thought of the Western world, it remains buried in your thought and in mine and in his. To think it would thus be a destructuring move that would unsettle our greatest confidences, our greatest rational securities, our firmest foundations.

Again, nature has come to be understood as the object of plotting calculation and technological control. We stand over-against it and press our plans upon it as if it were nothing but available raw material, present-at-hand, awaiting our exploitation. The earliest Greeks, Heidegger says, saw all of this quite differently. There is no cold calculation, no detachment from the complexities of life in the world, life on the earth. For the Greeks, physis concerns what is happening, a happening in which we are involved, about which we are concerned. It is all about coming and going, labor and
growth, life and death. Using his idiosyncratic and highly metaphorical prose, Heidegger says that for the Greeks \textit{physis}

denotes self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres in it; in short, the realm of things that emerge and linger on. According to the dictionary \textit{phyein} means to grow or make to grow. (Heidegger 1959, 14)

Such an emergence and lingering is the occurrence of \textit{A}being itself. To say that something is is to say that it emerges and lingers. And so, \textit{physis} is an opening up and inward-jutting-beyond-itself \textit{(in-sich-aus-sich-hinausstehen)}. Again, \textit{A}Being as a whole reveals itself as \textit{physis}, \textit{>nature,=} which here does not yet mean a particular sphere of beings but rather beings as such as a whole, specifically in the sense of upsurgent presence \textit{(aufgehendes Anwesen)}. (Heidegger 1993a, 126).

The painfully difficult thing about understanding what Heidegger is saying here is that, since he is asking us to think \textit{A}nature otherwise than as we have come to think it, we must begin by stepping through and beyond our most comfortable conceptions in order to learn to think not only new ideas, but think them in a new way.

\textit{Physis} for the early Greeks, Heidegger says, is an ontological term. It speaks of being. However, it does not speak of being abstractly. If anything, our difficulty thinking what he understands the Greeks to have thought is that \textit{we} are the ones who want to think abstractly; they do not. We imagine that they look at all the manipulable items in their world and abstract from them a hyper-universal category, \textit{A}being. He says no, this is not what the Greeks are doing. When they come to think \textit{physis} as \textit{being}, they do not put themselves in the kind of privileged outside position required to engage in abstraction. \textit{Physis} is a concurrence of all events; not as if each were lost in a kind of
uniformity, but as if each occurrence happened in such a way that each other
occurrence and emphatically the human being who is open to them were entailed.

Hence physis originally encompassed heaven as well as earth, the stone as well as
the plant, the animal as well as the human, and it encompassed human history as a
work of [humans] and the gods; and ultimately and first of all, it meant the gods
themselves as subordinated to destiny. (Heidegger 1959, 14)

Heidegger is saying that for the Greeks physis is not just some static, heavy settling-into-
place, some inert duration. As a specific way of attending to being, the word physis
combines both what we ordinarily think of as Abeing with what we ordinarily think of
as Abecoming. There is certainly something particular here, for physis has everything
to do with what it means for an entity to be and thus to Astand; but it stands in the
process of a-rising as a kind of Aemerging, An emerging of what is otherwise
hidden. Further, that emerging does not occur except in its connection with every
occurrence that similarly comes to stand. Thus physis CbeingCis a specific happening of
the totality of occurrences (Heidegger 1959, 14 B 16).

In this way the Greeks think being as a kind of presence (ousia, parousia), i.e.,
what emerges and stands is precisely what is present. Furthermore, what is present is
what has emerged and come to stand from concealment. Thus a happening of being,
an entity, is what is revealed, not as something subsequent to be-ing, but precisely as
be-ing. There is here no binary opposition between the real and the ideal or the
objective and the subjective. A happening of being is an emergence of what comes to
stand, an emergence from concealment, an emergence that appears and is present
(Heidegger 1959, 101 B 102). This movement out into presence is truth, *aletheia*, unconcealment.

Since the [happening of being] as such is, it places itself in and stands in unconcealment, *aletheia*. We translate, and at the same time thoughtlessly misinterpret, this word as Atruth.@ . . . For the Greek essence of truth is possible only in one with the Greek essence of being as *physis*. On the strength of the unique and essential relationship between *physis* and *aletheia* the Greeks would have said: . . . The power that manifests itself stands in unconcealment. In showing itself, the unconcealed as such comes to stand. Truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to being. (Heidegger 1959, 102)

*Physis* and *aletheia*, emergent standing and unconcealment, A*nature* and Atruth.@ concur.

Of course, such *aletheia* does not come easily. *Physis* is not simply available to the casual observer. To think the truth of being requires one to give oneself in a certain way Ato being as it opens around [one],@ to give oneself to the entities here and there not as items that one might indifferently take or leave, but as happenings of being. If one does so, if one lets emergent standing and unconcealment concur, one comes to be oneself a kind of site of the revelation of being, what Heidegger calls Dasein (Heidegger 1959, 110). Dasein is there, then, as the togetherness of the totality of the happenings of being as it all concurs in the specific happening of being that Dasein thus thinks. That kind of Atogetherness@ is, again, no blending, no dissolution, of differences. It is rather Aa gathering of conflict and unrest, . . . the belonging-together of antagonisms@ (Heidegger 1959, 134, 138). Thus it is quite hard for a human to let the truth of being happen as it happens, so much that is so varied happens in such thought, there is so much to let go of (cf. Heidegger 1966, 54 B 57). But according to the Greeks, that is the human calling, Heidegger says; so much so that the human being
Abelongs to this appearing. . . And since apprehension accepts apprehension of what shows itself to such appearing, it may be presumed that this is precisely what determines the essence of being-human (Heidegger 1959, 139 B 140).

However, Heidegger understands that accepting apprehension is something that must be wrested away from the ordinary. It never comes simply as a matter of course. Human life is strange in this way, it finds its destiny only in violence:

But [the human] is the strangest of all, . . . because [the human] departs from [its] customary, familiar limits, because [it] is the violent one, who, tending toward the strange in the sense of the overpowering, surpasses the limit of the familiar [das Heimische]. . . . But woven into one with this violent excursion [Aufbruch] upon the overpowering sea is the never-resting incursion [Einbruch] into the indestructible power of the earth. Here the earth is the highest of the gods. Violently, with acts of power [gewalt-tätig] [the human] disturbs the tranquility of growth, the nurturing and maturing of the goddess who lives without effort. Here the overpowering reigns not in self-consuming wildness but without effort and fatigue; from out of the superior tranquility of great riches, it produces and bestows the inexhaustible treasure that surpasses all zeal. Into this power bursts the violent one; year after year [it] breaks it open with his plows and drives the effortless earth into [its] restless endeavor. Sea and earth, departure and upheaval are joined . . . . (Heidegger 1959, 151, 154)
This is the way human beings are called to be. They break out and break up, capture and subjugate, and so open up the happening of being, e.g., as sea, as earth, as animal (Heidegger 1959, 157).

The strangest (the human) is what it is because, fundamentally, it cultivates and guards the familiar, only in order to break out of it and to let what overpowers it break in. Being itself hurls [the human] into this breaking-away, which drives [it] beyond [itself] to venture forth toward being, to accomplish being, to stabilize it in the work, and so hold open the [happening of being] as a whole. (Heidegger 1959, 163)

What constitutes knowledge for the Greeks, Heidegger says, is thus to be understood as a violent movement of power that is a certain kind of ontological work: they call it technê. The Greeks also speak of art and the work of art as technê, because art is what most immediately brings being (i.e. the appearing that stands there in itself) to stand, stabilizes it in something present (the work). What makes something a work of art has little to do with a representation of some objective state of affairs or some expression of the artist=s ideas or feelings. A work of art is a work of art only because:

it brings about the phenomenon in which the emerging power, physis, comes to shine [scheinen]. It is through the work of art as [the being of the happening of being] that everything else that appears and is to be found is first confirmed and made accessible, explicable, and understandable as being or not being. (Heidegger 1959, 159)

But it is also important to understand that art (even in its visual, auditory, and tactile forms) is essentially poetry, the art of language (Heidegger 1959, 185). Even when one sculpts, one speaks, not representationally or expressively, but as a receptive act of violence. Technê is the work that yields itself in speech to the happening of being and does so with the violence that makes human being homeless, strange, at the same time
that it brings human being into the midst of the totality of the happenings of being, as a kind of convergence point, a kind of Abetween, where being is tended.

The violence of poetic speech, of thinking projection, of building configuration, of the action that creates states is not a function of faculties that [the human] has, but a taming and ordering of powers by virtue of which the [happening of being] opens up as such when [the human] moves into it. This disclosure of the [happening of being] is the power that [the human] must master in order to become [itself] amid the [happening of being], i.e. in order to be historical. (Heidegger 1959, 157)

The history from Greek physis to modern nature, Heidegger thinks, is a decline of the very destiny of human being. What was once the glory of an intense engagement that is simultaneously a kind of letting go of control and an openness to mystery, has become by way of a thoughtless, forgetful, rote memory of words on pages a scrambling after correctness, accuracy, and the logic of logistics. In the Greeks’ physis there is a fellowship of the occurrences of being. In modern nature there are only isolated, exploitable objects.

III

There is no direct entry from Heidegger’s account of physis to a theology of nature that moves with the currents of Christian tradition. Though the word stands prominently in early trinitary and Christological thinking, it is not specifically the physis of the ancient Greeks. By the fourth and fifth centuries God was understood by the church to be quite different from the network of relations that is Greek being. Talk of physis here could simply not have the interest of the Greeks at heart. Certainly all of what the Greeks have agonized their way to know is entailed here, is conscripted, is advocated, but effectively toward the advent of what remained unknown to them.
It is in particular in relation to the Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries and their relative resolution in the Council of Chalcedon (451) that Anature (physis) enters seriously into the vocabulary of the church. The Creed of Chalcedon maintains first that Aour Lord Jesus Christ is identical in deity to God Athe Father@ and at the same time is identical in human-ness to human being. This confusing combination becomes even more so when the Creed in the closing words of its first paragraph speaks of Mary as theotokos not in respect of our her son=s deity, but Ain respect of his human-ness@

As the second paragraph begins, the phrases of the first, homoousion tô patri and homoousion hçmin, give themselves now to the phrase Atwo natures [duo physesin]CChrist, it is said here, is the concurrence of the nature of God and the nature of the human. Neither of these two natures is dissolved into the other or divided from and taken as separable from the other. They happen together. Though different, they stand in relation to each other, i.e., without indifference: God occurs here; the human occurs here; God and the human concur here. There are, then, two: the happening that is human and the happening that is God. But it is also said that there is one: the prosôpon, the hypostasis, the Aperson@: Athe one and only and only-begotten Logos of God, the Lord Jesus Christ.@

Prosôpon is a highly relational term. It is the Greek equivalent of the Latin persona. It means Amask or Aface, the area around the eyes. It is the word for the way one stands in relation to others, as when one=s face is turned toward or away. Yet the word also speaks of what is peculiar, what is unique, as unique as is a face.
**Hypostasis**, literally A standing under (as the Latin *substantia*), is a word that suggests reality, being. It is in fact often used precisely in this sense. Thus without denying relationality, **hypostasis** stresses reality just as **prosòpon**, without denying reality, stresses relationality. To say that the one and only and only-begotten Logos of God, the Lord Jesus Christ is this **prosòpon**, this **hypostasis**, does not yet resolve the question of what Chalcedon is saying, but it does clearly proclaim that the particular place that we find the concurrence of the **physis** of God and the **physis** of the human is in this one Areal relation. And yet, who is this one? What or whom does this word **prosòpon**, this word **hypostasis**, announce?

It is on the basis of certain documents closely associated with the Creed of Chalcedon that some answer to those questions begins to come to light. Cyril of Alexandria and Pope Leo I stand at the center of the controversy that gave rise to the Council. Two of Cyril’s letters and one of Leo’s were in fact published with the Creed. What the Creed says is said (at least in part) in them, but differently (Norris 1980, 26 B 31). The incarnation, Cyril says, was not the transformation of the eternal Logos of God into a human being. The nature of the Logos remained the nature of God. The nature of Jesus of Nazareth remained the nature of the human. Yet, Awhile the natures which were brought together into a true unity were different, there is nevertheless, because of the unspeakable and unutterable convergence into unity, one Christ and one Son out of the two. The initiative, Cyril says, is with the Logos: what takes place as unity here is not a balanced accord of the divine on the one side and the human on the other, but a taking up of . . . humanity into God, as the Quicunque Vult says (706). A
united to [itself], in his hypostasis, flesh enlivened by a rational soul, and in this way became a human being; or more emphatically, the Logos united human reality hypostatically to [itself] (Cyril 1980a, 133; cf. 1980b, 143). Leo says this:

Since, therefore, the characteristic properties of both natures and substances are kept intact and come together in one person, lowliness is taken on by majesty, weakness by power, mortality by eternity, and the nature which cannot be harmed is united to the nature which suffers . . . . The impassible God does not disdain existence as a passible human being, and the immortal does not disdain to submit . . . to the laws of death. (Leo I 1980, 148, 149)

For Leo as well as for Cyril and thus for Chalcedon it is because of the outgoing movement of the eternal Logos of God, spoken, begotten, eternally of the Father, moving out into and assuming all the vulnerability and mortality of the human flesh, that two natures—what happens as God and what happens as the human—happen together. Not only everything that is God, but truly also everything that is human occur here. However, there is one prosopon, one hypostasis. And so, it is in this sense that the catholic church lives and grows by the faith that in Christ Jesus there is neither humanity apart from real divinity nor divinity apart from real humanity (Leo I 1980, 154). The physis that is God and the physis that is human become one event as the face of God turns decisively to the world.

IV

There yet remains some ambiguity even with this more nuanced reading of Chalcedon. It is not entirely clear where to situate the one person with which the Creed is concerned. It is quite possible, however, to think it in trinitary terms very precisely as the person of the outgoing, eternal Son of God. This is exactly what is affirmed by Leontius of Jerusalem. His formal position in brief is that Jesus has no
independent human hypostasis. Although there is nothing in particular lacking in his human being, i.e., he is in no way other than as human, all that he is as human is given to the movement of God that performs the incarnation. That is, whatever might have been his own human A person is in fact a transparency to the outgoing eternal Logos. To look at him is indeed to see a human being, but a human being that is nothing but a capacity filled with God=s love. Jesus Christ is thus to be said to be one hypostasis, that of the Logos, but one as human nature is yielded to the nature of God. Two natures (ours and God=s), one hypostasis (the Logos).

What does this mean?

The event that is the human being, Jesus, is an event of the absolute self-abandonment of the whole of the relationality of this human being to the event of God. The event of God, however, is an event in which the eternal Logos of God faces and goes out to the world. In Jesus the human faces the irruption of God into the world and, moving out into God=s coming, gives itself up to all that is happening here as God. In this way Jesus= human hypostasis is abandoned, it is nothing but an A...Can A onto= Cin relation to God=s hypostasis, the incoming Logos (Grillmeier 1995, 291 B 294). There are two A... here the happening of the human and the happening of God but finally only one set of relationships, those of God=s incarnation for the very life of the world (cf. Wesche 1986, 63).

Furthermore for Leontius a hypostasis (a Person) is not a A product of a physis, but that in which a physis occurs (Meyendorff 1987, 77; Wesche 1986, 51, 55).
Christ's two natures concur finally in and as the one hypostasis of the Logos, and as they concur, they are not closed spheres, but open movements. The human nature of Jesus Christ, which lacks nothing that is human, is no blockage to the nature of the radically other God as it goes forth in the hypostasis of the Logos. God is bound neither by what is proper to human, nor to divine nature. In the hypostasis of the Logos God is open to what God is not, the hypostasis of the Logos admits the possibility of divine acts outside of the [divine] nature, the possibility that God can personally and freely assume a fully human existence while remaining God, whose nature remains completely transcendent (Meyendorff 1987, 77). But the human hypostasis of Jesus Christ, as it is assumed by the Logos, is also open beyond itself to all that is human. The human hypostasis of Jesus Christ (now the hypostasis of the Logos) is not his own (idíkç), it is rather a fellowship (koinç) with everything human (Meyendorff 1987, 74). Thus as the physis of God precisely in the hypostasis of the Logos moves out and receptively opens to the physis of the human, as the hypostasis of Jesus Christ in which that physis occurs each receives the other: the human hypostasis as capacious, the hypostasis of God as kenotic. The hypostasis of God here fills, becomes, what we are (without ceasing to be what it is) and thus the hypostasis of the human is filled by, becomes, what God is (without ceasing to be what it is). The human hypostasis is in this way not its own. It is, of course, there utterly for God. But it is also utterly for other human beings. It is deified by the irruption of the Logos, whose hypostasis takes on all that is weak and broken and wounded and suffering in human life without losing the
impassibility of the divine nature beyond which the Logos has opened (Meyendorff 1987, 78 B 79; Grillmeier 1995, 277, 291).

V

It is quite possible to think the Chalcedonian-Leontian tradition in the light of Heidegger’s account of ancient Greek thought; but not without some precarious navigation. In the one event that is the history, the \textit{prosōpon}, the \textit{hypostasis}, of Jesus Christ there comes to stand all that occurs, all that comes and goes, labors and grows, lives and dies, all that rises out of itself, thrusts forth from itself, all that comes to presence, all that is unconcealed, all that is and becomes, all that is involving, engaging. This is the event in which being happens, in which \textit{physis} happens, in which nature happens, in which the totality of the happenings of being come into play. Thus the one occurrent entity, Jesus Christ, is itself and the site of the occurrence of every other. However, this is to be said of every entity, according to Heidegger; and though every entity is unique, its uniqueness is not that of the Jesus Christ of Chalcedon. Furthermore, this account only directs attention clearly to one of Christ’s natures, and Chalcedon maintains that there are two. Given that one can think human nature in these terms, how is it possible to think the nature of God this way without subsuming God within a comprehensive network of relations that would deny God’s transcendence? But it must also be asked how it is possible to think God’s transcendence without making it an abstraction that never comes to stand before the world?
VI

It is the theology of John Wesley that leads in the direction of an answer to these questions. Wesley is as acutely interested in the deification, the sanctification, of life and particularly human life as is Leontius. What breaks forth in Wesley, however, is a radical understanding both that God is love and that the sanctification of the creature is love-loving as God loves. The world was created to be holy; above all, human life was created to be holy (Wesley 1985, 445 B 450; Wesley 1991b, passim; Wesley 1991d, 496). For a creature to be holy, according to Wesley, is for it to partake of the divine nature but to do so without losing anything that occurs as its creaturely e.g., human nature; i.e., it is to be what it is as not-God and concurrently a capacity for filling by God (Wesley n.d., 113). It is Jesus Christ that is the embodiment of this holiness: his life shines with the glory of God (Wesley 1991a, 446 B 450). What happens here is a double-movement a movement to God, to whom he prays, and a movement to his neighbor, with and for whom he lives and dies (Keen 1998, 140 B 147). Jesus Christ is in this way the salvation of the world, the one in whom the world is hallowed, the one whom the world follows to and in whom the world enters into the holy God:

For Christ does not give life to the soul separate from, but in and with, Himself. Hence His words are equally true of all [human beings], in whatsoever state of grace they are: AAs the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me: without (or separate from) Ame ye can do nothing.@ (Wesley n.d., 53; cf. Wesley 1991f, 433 B 435)

Yet for Wesley to say this is not to compromise God=s transcendence. God and world remain radically different precisely as God and world concur in Jesus Christ. What
occurs here cannot be thought simply as arising from and lodged in the midst of the
world. The concurrence of God and world arises from what is not the world what in
concurring with the world dislodges it. It is in fact only because the God who comes as
Jesus Christ is and remains radically other that this concurrence is an event of love. God
goes to what God is not, speaks a Ayes@ to it, Ais@ a Ayes@ to it. Thus this
transcendent one, this holy one, is for what is not God nothing but love (Wesley n.d.,
113; Wesley 1991b, passim). At the same time this love works love, it is not indifferent to
its other as it affirms it, it calls its other to itself, to a loving Ayes@ that pours itself out
to this God as this God has poured itself out to it. In this way God=s other is hallowed,
it is filled with the God who moves non-indifferently out into it, out into what is not and
cannot be God (Wesley 1991c, 179 B 180).

However, since this God is nothing but love, for what is not God to be hallowed is for
it to be filled with love, a love that orients all that happens as this event in the world first
to God, the love that fills it, and second orients it in and with this God to the world that
this God this love loves. This is the event that is the history of Jesus and it is the event
repeated though differently in us (Wesley n.d., 82 B 83, 107, 115, 117, 118).

Of course, being loved by and at once loving one who is radically other is a very
unique love. It has the flavor of an assurance built upon nothing under our control, a
confidence, a conviction, in what remains imperceptible. It is a love that is a faith that
is, say, a hypostasis cast forth into a future that yet comes (cf. Wesley 1991e, 374 B 375).
Thus this love is also a hope in what cannot arise out of what is and has been, that can
only come to it. Thus this love is a prayer, a receptivity, that calls out to what cannot be
commanded (Wesley n.d., 108 B 109). Everything one is calls out, is abandoned, is sacrificed to this other but with the freedom and ecstasy of one gifted by the grace of the freest of loves. Thus this love is joy. And since this love is free and hopeful and trusting and receptive and joyful, it is life. To love this God who is love is to turn to all that this God loves to turn to all that occurs and love it, love it to life, love it to the love, the movement, the coming, that we might say God is (Wesley 1991g, 468 B 470, 473).

VII

The natures of Christ declared at Chalcedon, explicated by Leontius, and implicitly clarified by Wesley invite entry into a theology of nature. The challenge in writing such a theology is not the explication of Christ’s human nature and thus of nature whenever it occurs. The challenge is in the explication of divine nature in any sense. The question remains how it is that one can speak of the nature of God without subsuming God under the dynamics of the world, i.e., without losing God’s transcendence. Wesley’s understanding of God’s love suggests an answer.

In the one occurrence of Jesus, being the coming to stand of all occurrence juts forth from itself, as the growth and lingering of presence. However, all that occurs here Call relations, all connections, all that is entailed between heaven and earth, between mortals and immortals, all that is brought forth into unconcealedness, all that is wrested away from and with the elusive strife that contends in and through everything, the whole totality of occurrences is abandoned to the one who loves without reserve, who thus sends it all back, to be repeated with a difference, with glory, hallowed. Thus
in Jesus Christ the nature that as it occurs in him is human nature goes out freely, lovingly to the outside of nature and is freely, lovingly sent back dispossessed, expropriated, but no less to be what it is. Thus it is very much nature happening here as the human event, Jesus Christ; but this nature is not his. It belongs to the outgoing love of God, the God who is not to be found in the midst of being except as otherwise than being, as an outside that has broken inside without ceasing to be outside. The nature as it is in itself becomes the nature of God and so is sanctified. But love=s possession is un-possessive and what is given to and received by love is concurrently given back. But to give oneself to love and by love to be oneself given is to be gifted by love, to be hallowed. One is oneself as this self-denial, thus not in oneself but only in God, only in the love that loves without coming to stand as an event of being. Jesus Christ is the event in which simultaneously human nature is abandoned to what eludes nature and given as human nature from this other. There are then two Anatures here: (1) the nature that is the human event itself and (2) that nature, that event, as it is gifted by God, nature=s other. Two natures happen here precisely as the love of God breaks into and disrupts all that happens. It is because nature gifted is gifted by love that it remains itself even as it is gifted, hallowed, Aothered. One nature is lost, a second nature is found, but this second nature is the first nature only with a difference. The difference is the hypostasis of God=s Logos (of love) going out into the world.

However, the human nature that is hallowed in Jesus Christ is not an isolated individuality, an atom. All occurrences of being are entailed here. In one sense for this life to be hallowed is for the totality of being to be hallowed. But life is to be lived and
remains at every step a task that has not yet been performed. The task of Jesus Christ is at once to give to God the whole of what emerges as any presence Cas nature Cand in God to give that nature to nature, i.e., to love it and thereby to love forth love there. Again, nature remains what it is, but with an unheard of difference. In the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ this task is performed ad infinitum uniquely so and it is in it that the whole of his life and the whole of every event of nature is to be situated.

What was and is and is to come as Jesus Christ remains the destiny and task of nature. Nature, by definition, is what it is. Yet the history of Jesus Christ declares that nature can indeed be not only what it is but also A what it is no longer in itself, but in an other, an otherwise than nature, i.e., in a love that calls it outside into love and in love outside itself into nature itself: thus to lose itself and find itself.

In a particular philosophical context the sense in which nature is being used can be brought out most clearly by insisting upon the question >What is nature (or the natural) being contrasted with in this context? In one group of cases the natural is contrasted with the artificial or conventional. This contrast requires some conception of how the object or organism would behave by reason of its immanent causality alone, the causal factors that are peculiar to that type of thing and make it whatever it is a stone, a fish, or a [human being]. The artificial and conventional are seen as interferences, modifying by an alien causality the characteristic patterns of behavior . . . In some contexts [the human being] is contrasted with nature . . . To set [the human being] against nature is to emphasize [her] distinctiveness [her] rationality, creativity, and freedom. But it may also support an unwarranted and distorting anthropocentricty. (Hepburn 1967, 454)

22 In Greek myths as well as in early philosophy, physis appears simultaneously as a primordial, formative event and as the all-inclusive, informed reality that results from this event. To be consists in partaking in an aboriginal act of expression. Nothing precedes that expression. As ontological ultimate it provides the definitive answer to the question how things came about. (Dupré 1993, 15)

3 For this reason, the cosmos is not infinite, but limited. Thus the standard translations
of the idiosyncratic Parmenides speaks in its own way for the intellectual heritage within and for which Parmenides never stops speaking: AIndeed, there is not anything at all apart from being, because Fate has bound it together so as to be whole and immovable. . . . Since there has to be limit, Being is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally balanced in every direction from the center. Clearly it cannot be greater in any direction that in any other, inasmuch as there is no not-being to prevent it from reaching out equally, nor is it the nature of Being to be more here and less there. The All in inviolable. Since it is equal to itself in all directions, it must be homogeneous within the limits.@ (Parmenides 1966, 98 [8: 34 B 41, 8: 42 B 49]) 4.

4This is not to say that the notion that there is evidence of God=s creative work is a coherently Christian position.

5In the East a remarkable simplification of icons downplays the relevance of Anatural beauty@ to the coming of God=s ineffably mysterious glory. The iconoclastic controversy bears witness as well to the East=s recognition of the otherness of God in relation to the cosmos. However, iconoclasts were not the only ones who wished to emphasize God=s transcendence. The church=s defense of icons stresses the openness of the icon to the mystery of God that will forever be other than the icon itself. (See Meyendorff 1987, 173 B 192.) Further, at the same time in the West an increasingly radical doctrine of sin highlights the Godlessness of the human being apart from grace. In other words, precisely as Greek and Roman synthetic thinking moves to center stage in Christian thought, there is a growing and contrary realization of the deep gulf that stands between pagan and Christian notions of the world (Dupré 1993, 31 B 33).

6For example, the idea that the Christ of the Gospel narratives was an oddity and beyond this world=s comprehension was countered forcefully and ambitiously. He, too, became an example of a metaphysical order, secondary to a cosmic system. Thus: Atoward the end of the eleventh century . . . a fresh awareness of the Incarnation as a cosmically transforming event suddenly dawned upon the entire civilization and spawned a new trust in nature . . . and for the first time a genuine Christian naturalism emerged@ (Dupré 1993, 33). That is, the saving event to which the church testifies comes to be regarded not as an outside that is born elusively inside the world, but as the true immanent center of the world. With this kind of God who is human comes a profound valuation of human being as such and a concomitant new confidence in the human subject. Indeed this may well be the moment in history when the subject, that center of self-consciousness so important to all of modern thought and life, is invented. AThe human microcosmos resides at the center of the macrocosmos, thus giving physical nature its definitive meaning@Cgiving meaning as one does before a passage in a book, say, a passage in the Holy Bible (Dupré 1993, 34 B 35): A>Some people read books in order to find God. Yet there is a great book, the very appearance of created things. Look above you; look below you! Note it; read it! God, whom you wish to find,
never wrote that book with ink. Instead, [God] set before your eyes the things [God] had made. Thus wrote Augustine. The metaphor was resumed in the twelfth century and resulted in Alain de Lille’s well-known verse: Omnis mundi creatura / Quasi liber et scriptura. (Dupré 1993, 102)

7. So thoroughly was all the world addressed in this way, even ancient pagan texts were understood to speak implicitly of God. One might say that it was simply taken for granted that all truth is God’s truth.

8. See Dupré’s (1993) discussion of the great import given to the particular human being in Christian thought from the very beginning: 94 B 97 (see also 148).

9. Ockham no longer takes such a built-in harmony between mind and nature for granted, which subjects God’s ways of creation to human norms. Even the assumption that in knowledge the mind shares a universal form with the real . . . is abandoned. . . . [Universals] exist neither in an independent realm outside the mind as Plato was believed to have held, nor even inside the singular reality as Aristotle had taught. (Dupré 1993, 39)

10. See Dupré’s second chapter for an explication of the struggle that continued after Ockham’s time between his strong nominalist position and a lingering naturalism.

11. This is, of course, difficult and one of the tasks facing seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy is determining how one might know for sure that the world outside is as our minds have taken it to be (Dupré 1993, 79 B 80).

12. All ideas including the idea of God have their formal basis in the mind, which envisions all beings as cogitata. At least in that sense the self forms the foundation for the idea of God, and without that foundation the second ontological one, laid by God’s causal activity, would play no role in the soul’s reflection. God has to be proven, and to be proven on the basis of the prior certainty of the self. The thinking self, then, remains the ground though not the cause of the idea of God. (Dupré 1993, 117 - 118) Dupré comes to this from Marion’s work in Descartes. This is in fact Marion’s conclusion. One should not (and Marion does not) discount the role played by the idea of God in Descartes’ meditations. The idea of the infinite could have provided a disruption of Descartes’ new ontology (as it does, e.g., in Levinas and in Marion), but in the end even God here remains a component in a meditative move of self-mastery. (See Dupré 1993, 87; Descartes 1979, AMeditation III; Levinas 1998, 62 B 65; Marion 1991, 202 and passim in addition to his numerous treatises specifically on Descartes.)

Descartes: But there is a deceiver (I know not who he is) powerful and sly to the highest degree, who is always purposely deceiving me. Then there is no doubt that I exist, if he deceives me. And deceive me as he will, he can never bring it about that I
am nothing so long as I shall think that I am something. Thus ... the statement >I am, I exist= is necessarily true every time it is uttered by me or conceived in my mind.@

(Descartes 1979, 17 [II:25]) Descartes may not here know who this Adeceiver@ is, but it is clear not only from the first two meditations, but also from the third that this hypothesized being is omnipotent, one with unlimited power. (See, e.g., Descartes 1979, 24 [III:36])

1.13 Once Descartes establishes the existence of God (and concomitantly the nonexistence of the omnipotent deceiver) he examines the power of the subject to err and is led to consider the will, the power of judgment that so often oversteps the boundaries of knowing: Al cannot complain that I have received from God an insufficiently ample and imperfect will, or free choice, because I observe that it is limited by no boundaries. And it seems eminently worth noting that nothing else in me is so perfect or so great that I do not understand how they can be even more perfect or greater ... to the extent that the will is principally the basis for my understanding that I bear an image and likeness of God. ... [T]aken formally, will precisely as such, it does not seem greater [even in God] ... .@ (Descartes 1979, 37 [IV:56 B 57]). This is not to say that Descartes has no metaphysics of objective reality. He does. Indeed it is a metaphysics founded upon a transcendent God. Here Descartes understands that without God even the thinking substance could not be said to be. God is here the guarantor of all reality; but God is this, according to Descartes, only as the supreme efficient cause. So comprehensively does Descartes think of God as efficient cause that he speaks of God as the one self-cause, the causa sui, the one who could not have a cause outside of itself. This peculiar term, which Descartes coins, underlines the extent to which he thinks of God=s movement of power in causal terms (Dupré 1993, 87 B 88). Descartes thus exemplifies here too the modern break with the ancients: AWhile Greek philosophy of the classical age had defined being in terms of form and its dependence primarily (though never exclusively) in terms of participation, modern thought conceived of nature as a causal interaction of forces and of transcendence as a supremely powerful divine will which created and ruled all things by means of efficient causality.@ (Dupré 1993, 88)

114 Heidegger calls this Destruktion, or Adestructuring.@ (See Heidegger 1996, 22) Cf. also: AOur understanding of Being is restricted to a particular meaning that has been established historically. Whether we know it or not, we move within certain tracks that were first laid down in the beginning of Greek philosophy. (Polt 1999, 130)

11 It is not the purpose of the following exposition of Heidegger to lay out his position in any detail, but rather to lay out his account of certain early Greek texts. It is, however, Heidegger=s quest for being that leads him in every inquiry. Thus Heidegger does not idealize the Greeks. His work looks to what remains covered over even if suggestedCin their most Aprimordial@ texts.
But now let us... attempt to regain the unimpaired strength of language and words; for words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are. For this reason the misuse of language in idle talk, in slogans and phrases, destroys our authentic relations to things (Heidegger 1959, 13 B 14). Heidegger does not simply rest his position on what he finds to be said by the Greeks. However, it is precisely what he finds to be said by the Greeks that is of interest in this essay.

Dupré objects to this etymology (1993, 256 n. 2). However, in this case Heidegger’s word study is not idiosyncratic at all. See, e.g., Claiborne 1989, 69 (I quote this whole passage because of the numerous connections it makes with Heidegger’s texts): ABHEU-, [Germanic] BE or exist, also dwell, grow; [Latin] FUTURE [meaning] >what is to be. The >dwell= sense begot [Germanic] BUILD (a dwelling), BOOTH (a temporary building), HUSBAND (>dweller in the house=), and NEIGHBOR (someone dwelling near). A BOWER was originally a dwelling, and a servant (in the dwelling) was in BONDAGE (the word=s sexual sense is very recent). More remote [Germanic] descendants are BOUND for (>growing toward=) a place and possibly CBEAM, from a word [meaning] tree (? >growing thing=). The same root sense [became] [Greek] physis, growth, nature, which [became] PHYSICS-originally, the study of the natural world whence the idiomatic PHYSICAL. @ Dupré=s alternative does not contradict Heidegger, but rather distracts from the dynamics of his position.

In the initial disclosure of the being of the [happening of being], it was therefore necessary to oppose becoming as well as appearance to being. On the other hand, becoming as >emerging= belongs to physis. If we take them both in the Greek sense becoming as coming-into-presence and going-out of it; being as emerging, appearing presence; nonbeing as absence then the reciprocal relation between emerging and declining is appearing, being itself. Just as becoming is the appearance of being, so appearance as appearing is a becoming of being.

Thus for Heidegger the Greeks neglect the hiddenness, the concealment, that plays with every manifestation of being. (See Foltz 1995, 56 B 57.)
Heidegger’s discussion of appearance is relevant to this essay, but treating it would take us too far. It is important at least to note here, however, that it is in appearance, an appearance that always accompanies an occurrence of being, that one can be led to simple oppositions, say, between what something seems to be and what something really is. (See Heidegger 159, 98 B 115)

This is the concurrence of physis and logos, according to Heidegger: ALogos is the steady gathering, the intrinsic togetherness of the [happening of being], i.e., being. Therefore in [Heraclitus=] Fragment 1 kata ton logon means the same as kata phisin. Physis and logos are the same. Logos characterizes being in a new and yet old respect: that which is, which stands straight and distinct in itself, is at the same time gathered togetherness in itself and by itself, and maintains itself in such togetherness. Eon, beingness, is essentially xynon, collected presence; xynon does not mean the >universal= but that which in itself collects all things and holds them together. . . . [Thus] not a universal, not something that hovers over all and touches none, but the original unifying unity of what tends apart. (Heidegger 1959, 130 B 131).

Heidegger is citing Heraclitus in particular.

Heidegger 1959, 141: AApprehension is not a function that [the human being] has as an attribute, but rather the other way around: apprehension is the happening that has [the human being].

It is tempting to leave the translator=s masculine language as it is; it somehow in this case works.

Heidegger=s point here may be illustrated by perhaps his most eloquent passage, one in which he speaks of what is revealed to thoughtful attention in one of Van Gogh=s paintings of peasant shoes: AWe shall choose a well-known painting by Van Gogh, who painted such shoes several times. But what is there to see here? Everyone knows what shoes consist of. If they are not wooden or bast shoes, there will be leather soles and uppers, joined together by thread and nails. Such gear serves to clothe the feet. Depending on the use to which the shoes are to be put, whether for work in the field or for dancing, matter and form will differ.

Such statements, no doubt correct, only explicate what we already know. The equipmental quality of equipment consists in its usefulness. But what about this usefulness itself? . . . The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even aware of them. She stands and walks in them. That is how shoes actually serve. It is in this process of the use of equipment that we must actually encounter the character of equipment.
As long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, or simply look at the empty, unused shoes as they merely stand there in the picture, we shall never discover what the equipmental being of the equipment in truth is. From Van Gogh’s painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might belong. Conly an undefined space. There are not even clods of soil from the field or the field-path sticking to them, which would at least hint at their use. A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet.

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. The equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.

But perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice all this about the shoes. The peasant woman, on the other hand, simply wears them. If only this simple wearing were so simple. When she takes off her shoes late in the evening, in deep but healthy fatigue, and reaches out for them in the still dim dawn, or passes them by on the day of rest, she knows all this without noticing or reflecting. . . . By virtue of this reliability the peasant woman is made privy to the silent call of the earth; by virtue of the reliability of the equipment she is sure of her world. World and earth exist for her, and for those who are with her in her mode of being, only thus in the equipment. We say >only= and therewith fall into error; for the reliability of the equipment first gives to the simple world its security and assures to the earth the freedom of its steady thrust.@ (Heidegger 1993b, 158 B 160)

This Aviolence@ should not, however, be understood as a human assault against nature. Rather human Aviolence@ is but one of the ways that the strife that the happening of physis is all about. (McNeill 1991, passim; Heidegger 1993b, 41 B 47; Heidegger 1971, 200 B 205.

AThe Definition of Chalcedon: AFollowing, then, the holy fathers, we unite in teaching all [men and women] to confess the one and only Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. This selfsame one is perfect [teleion] both in deity [theotçti] and also in human-ness [anthrôpotçti]; this selfsame one is also actually [alçthôs] God and actually [human], with a rational soul [psychês logikês] and a body. He is of the same reality as [the Father] [homoousion tô patri] as far as his deity is concerned and of the same reality as we are
ourselves \(\text{homoousion hçmin}\) as far as his human-ness is concerned; thus like us in all respects, sin only excepted. Before time began \(\text{pro aiônôn}\) he was begotten of the Father, in respect of his deity, and now in these \(\text{last days,= for us and on behalf of our salvation, this selfsame one was born of Mary the virgin, who is God-bearer \(\text{theotokos}\) in respect of his human-ness \(\text{anthrôpotçta}\).}

We also teach] that we apprehend \(\text{gnôridzomenon}\) this one and only Christ\(\text{Son, Lord, only-begotten}\) in two natures \(\text{duo phyesin}\); [and we do this] without confusing the two natures \(\text{asunkutôs}\), without transmuting one nature into the other \(\text{atreptôs}\), without dividing them into two separate categories \(\text{adiairetôs}\), without contrasting them according to area or function \(\text{achôristôs}\). The distinctiveness of each nature is not nullified by the union. Instead, the \(\text{properties= \text{idiotçtos}}\) of each nature are conserved and both natures concur \(\text{suntrechousçs}\) in one \(\text{person}= \text{prosôpon}\) and in one \(\text{hypostasis}\). They are not divided or cut into two \(\text{prosôpa}\), but are together the one and only and only-begotten Logos of God, the Lord Jesus Christ. Thus have the prophets of old testified; thus the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us; thus the Symbol of the Fathers \(\text{N}\) has handed down \(\text{paradedôke}\) to us.@ (35 B 36)

This identity \(\text{@ (rather than, say, A similarity)}\) is indicated not only by the use of the prefix \(\text{homo-}\), but also by the use of variations of the words \(\text{teleios}\) (Aperfect\@) and \(\text{alçthôs}\) (Atrue,@@ Aactual,@@ Aunconcealed@@) in the paragraph as well as the tenor of the Creed as a whole.

Neither \(\text{prosôpon}\) nor \text{persona} is to be thought as involving Athe idea of self-consciousness nowadays associated with \(\text{person= and personal=}\) (Kelly 1978, 115).

AF. \text{pros to + ops, psp- eye, face}\@ (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. Prosopalgia).

See Keen (1999, 52 B 57) for a more extensive treatment of the implications of these terms.

The brief sections that follow need (even more than the sections that precede them) to be much more fully developed and much more carefully nuanced. Limitations of space and time kept that from happening here. However, I am convinced that the Aover-reading\@ (one might say Amisreading\@) of Wesley and Leontius that is found here can be shown to be invited by the texts themselves, even though it may not simply be exegeted from them. Leontius wrote sometime in the first half of the sixth century. He and the position he comes to define are often confused with Leontius of Byzantium and his work, for obvious reasons (among them that the latter uses identical obscure terminology, but in a
The allusion is, of course, to Kierkegaard 1983, 34 B 36.

It might be helpful to note that both of these references support the point I am making rather indirectly but I think especially effectively. In the first the holy creature is described as having made herself avoid before God. In the second the sermon as a whole speaks of the importance of distance from God (in this case in sin) in order for the intensity of one=s relationship with God to be perfected. Neither of these passages is making a specifically metaphysical point. However, that is even better; and the apparently merely rhetorical quality they exhibit may well be a move from the domain of modern nature to something more responsive to the otherness of God.

One might say in the phrase of Kierkegaard that God loves forth love (Kierkegaard 1995, 217).

See Levinas and in particular his work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (Levinas 1981). But also see Levinas 1969, 301 B 302 and passim, Levinas 1998, 55 - 78; and along a similar line Marion 1991, 53 B 107 and passim.

What the position of this paper means, e.g., for a conversation between a theologian and a scientist is yet to be determined and should no doubt not be worked out ahead of time, but wait for such a conversation to begin. Some suggestions of how Heidegger=s position might give rise to an environmental ethics is worked out by Foltz (1995). This is not yet a theological word and is not even implicitly so. However, it at least clears the ground for serious theological thought. As for the doctrine of creation and redemption, these, too, need to be rethought from the beginning without a presumptive acceptance of the notions chained to modern metaphysics and technology. The apocalyptic image of the coming reign and rule of God, the image front and center in the preaching, ministry, and life of Jesus in the New Testament gospels, is perhaps where helpful discussion could be carried forward. The reign and rule of God are God=s insuperable, infinitely de-totalizing irruption into the spatially and temporally unrestricted totality of occurrence. It is here that Anature as it is hallowed by God in Christ can be said to entail ever event without abstraction, i.e., with exhaustive concreteness.
Reference List


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