Chapter 6

CONSENSUS AND RECEPTION

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"For many years I have been tossed by various winds of doctrine, exclaimed John Wesley."[1] "In this labyrinth I was utterly lost, not being able to find out what the error was, nor yet to reconcile this uncouth hypothesis either with Scripture or common sense."[2] ". . . when they interpreted Scripture in different ways I was often much at a loss."[3] Wesley was able to cut through his intellectual perplexities in a moment of trust when his heart was "strangely warmed," and the course of his life was changed. He was able afterwards to rely on his insight and to understand his faith in the light of it. But he was also aware that personal experience is not enough. The Christian life is not to be lived in solitude. "You must have some companions in the way; for how can one be warm alone?"[4] The companionship of the Christian community is a shared experience, which extends to our understanding of our faith.

At the time when Wesley was still searching for certainty, he came across Vincent of Lerins' dictum about consensus: *quod ab omnibus, quod ubique, quod semper creditum* (what has been believed everywhere, always, and by everybody). He found the underlying principles helpful, but he soon discovered practical difficulties about seeking for a faith held by all Christians everywhere and always. He notes the danger of getting "antiquity" out of balance with Scripture, misunderstanding the evidence of the past, imputing universality to local decrees and failing to take account of contemporary circumstances.[5] Here he was heir in part to a debate which had arisen with some vigor in the sixteenth century, and which has had significant consequences for the shared understanding of our faith until the present.

In the preface which he wrote to the *Acta* of the meeting in Ratisbon in 1541,[6] Melanchthon proposes a theory of the Church's teaching authority. The Ratisbon article *de potestate interpretandi Scripturae* has, he explains, three prongs. It equips the Church with the "power of interpreting" envisaged on a human model (*humano more*), that is, on an analogy with

the magistrate's authority to interpret the law. It does not allow that individuals or a minority can correct the judgment of the majority, nor dissent from their view. It asserts that the decrees of Councils must be obeyed. Melanchthon's primary objection is to the transference of a political frame of reference to the Church. He had made the same point in Article 28 of the Augsburg Confession.[7] In a kingdom the king or magistrate has the power to interpret law. And this authority must be obeyed. A magistrate's rules and opinions are valid as reasonable judgments of one to whom God has entrusted an office.[8]

In the church things are very different. "Let us set aside for a moment that image of a human polity, and think of a dispersed community which truly calls on God, is governed by the Holy Spirit, spreads the pure doctrine of the Gospel and is defended amidst dangers by wonderful works of God." In this *coetus* (assembly) power is not fixed in certain persons or a certain group,[9] but is a gift to some; it is a gift of divine light by which they understand the wisdom handed down in the gospel. There is a huge gap (*ingens intervallum*) between this gift and that "magistrate's power" which is attributed to bishops or councils.[10] Those individuals who have the mandate of God (*mandatum Dei)* must speak up against the majority opinion and against errant rulers. Luther dared to do it. Our congregations (*nostrae ecclesae*), says Melanchthon, follow him rather than the *consensus* of so many centuries, popes and academics.[11]

The question of what is duly constituted authority in establishing doctrine was a particularly vexed one in the last medieval centuries and the Reformation period. Writing on the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England in 1579–8, Thomas Rogers speaks of the notion of an "ordinary power annexed to the state and calling of popes, bishops and clergyman,"[12] which guarantees right interpretation and right teaching. Luther had argued, along the same lines as Wyclif, that no such special power is bestowed with orders, and the people of God in their local congregation have the right and the power to judge all teaching.[13] Indeed, it is the duty of a Christian congregation to resist impositions upon them contrary to the teaching of Scripture.[14] Rogers, like Melanchthon, believes that "to interpret the word of God is a peculiar blessing, given by God only to the Church and company of the faithful, though not to all and every one of them."[15]

The threads of Melanchthon's argument are familiar enough in the debates of the sixteenth century to be individually unremarkable. But when he weaves them together he creates a fabric in which the strains can clearly be seen. His first concern, which he makes the warp of the material, is to get away from the civil and political model, with its implications that power is something imposed from above and that authority goes with office and order. The difficulty of rethinking these assumptions even in the secular

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sphere is evident in the *Landesordnung* of the Tyrolean revolutionary Michael Gaismair (1526): "You will ... act in unity and always by mutual decision," he says, but also "You will faithfully obey the authority set over you."[16] Melanchthon calls for a rethinking of the nature of the Christian community itself, and therefore of the quality of authority within it. Here, too, difficulties presented themselves early on. In a notable comment on Luther's progression, one modern Lutheran scholar remarks:

> Even as Luther had, in his struggles with the fanatics and sectarians, recognized the impossibility of turning over the Church, like the civil government, to "Mr. Everyman," so he now recognized also the deeper reason as far as the Church is concerned. The Church does not exist as a result of the goodwill of the believers but solely because of the real presence in word and sacrament of the exalted Christ, who has authoritatively set the ministry of proclaiming the word in opposition to the authority of "Mr. Everyman."[17]

Melanchthon was as wary as Luther would soon become of mass, majority, or mob rule in Christian as in civil communities. He gives the authority in interpretation and doctrinal decision making to the few who are called by God and not to the community as a whole. But that leads him into contradiction of a position he states in one of his sermons. That *coetus* is catholic, he says, which embraces the *consensus* of the Church.[18] The *doctrine* of the word of God which we embrace is that to which "the Church bears witness."[19] In Melanchthon's preface to the Ratisbon *Acta* the truth into which the Holy Spirit has led German Christians through Luther is set over against the *consensus* of a majority of Christians over the centuries.

The root of the problem was that the dictum of Vincent of Lerins was being put under intolerable stress by recent events. Melanchthon could not have subscribed in 1541 to the statement of a recent twentieth-century Lutheran-Roman Catholic Commission, that "a theological teaching remains a theory of individuals as long as it is not affirmed and adopted by the whole people of God."[20] It is on the point of *consensus* that we come to the weak place in his fabric.

What is the authority of consent? Aristotle saw it as a principle of verification.[21] For Euclid and Boethius alike, the *communis animi conceptio* is a truth attested by universal acceptance.[22] In Christian doctrine there is an ultimate test in Scripture. The Christian community cannot by its *consensus* overrule the Word of God.[23] But when it is in harmony with God's Word it has a force which is of an altogether higher order than the sort of *consensus* Cicero envisaged as an indication that what all peoples accept is natural law.[24] Hincmar of Rheims in the ninth century sees it as a sign of the unity of the communion of the church that there should be consent and *consonantia*.[25] Thomas More speaks of the *consentientis authoritas*, the

authority of consent, and Erasmus thinks it wrong to dissent from the *sententia consensuque Ecclesiae*.[26] The general principle is not in dispute in the sixteenth century. But pointing to universal consent was another matter in an age when there were rival claimants to be the "true Church" and it had become a commonplace of polemic that the leaders of the Church of Rome had sought to impose false teaching on the people of God for their own ends. The three criteria into which Vincent of Lerins broke down the notion of universal consent: time, place, and unanimity are all seen as important in a recent definition of reception by the Lutheran Church in America. Reception is described as "a process involving all parts of the Church, all believers" and as taking place over time.[27] All three are discussed in the sixteenth century debates.

The first and most obvious sense in which the dictum was being tested concerns "place." Luther argued for the importance of the local congregation, a community (*gemeyne*) in which the pure gospel is preached.[28] Thomas More, in his *Responsio* to Luther, says that the Church of God is one (*una est ecclesia Dei*) and those who separate themselves from it, even if they form a congregation, can be no more than a *conciliabulum diaboli* (council of the Devil).[29] He describes an enquirer, "E," who sets out to verify what he hears preached in one local church by travelling through many Christian nations to see if he finds everywhere "the same faith, the same teachings regarding what is necessary for salvation."[30] If Luther says that the Christians of Italy, Germany, Spain, France, and so on are outside the Church, he is either arguing that the church is nowhere, or, like the Donatists, he is reducing it to a gaggle of two or three heretics whispering in a corner.[31] But More concedes that it is not easy to find a "perfyte perswasyon and byleve" which is "receyved thrughe crystendom," although Christians in many places may concur.[32] The argument from what is received everywhere had, for practical purposes, temporarily broken down, and the best which can be advanced by way of warrant from ubiquity is some such formula as "Hereunto subscribe the churches in Helvetia, Wittemberg, Bohemia,"[33] or that this is "the judgment of our godly brethren in foreign countries."[34]

In the case of time we come up against Luther's contention (endorsed vigorously by Calvin),[35] that "in the matter of judging teachings" one "should not care at all about . . . old precedent, usage, custom"[36] even if it "lasted a thousand years."[37] The kind of thing he had in mind is More's argument that the cult of saints and images which has been allowed for generations by common consent is warranted by usage, and that this custom is a stronger proof even than miracles that such worship is right.[38] More argues in reply that Christians are bound by the past. Where past generations have arrived at consensus we must remain true to their position,

however many now want to abandon it.[39] He cites Augustine's view that what is held by the whole Church as a matter of invariable custom is rightly held to have been handed down by apostolical authority.[40] In a later generation the English recusant Edmund Lechmere insisted that we must follow "the direction of the Church . . . which all times could point at."[41] More looks to find continuity from the time of Christ's Passion *in haec usque tempora* (even to the present time), the Church remaining in unity of faith *per tot secula* (through all generations).[42] Luther's community is not only a "rivulet" flowing away from the universal church but a break in continuity. Where does Luther think the church has been in the ages before him? When in the past have Luther's views been the church's views.[43] Nowell, in his Catechism of the 1570s speaks of "custom" as "at this day received in our churches" as something derived from "the ordinance of the apostles and so of God himself."[44]

This shake-up of assumptions about continuity of *consensus* in time forced new thinking which has borne fruit since. In More's *Dialogue* there is already some recognition that opposing views may have coexisted in the church for centuries and then merged in a single voice which must be heard as that of Christ. For that reason a recent consensus may be no less binding than an old one. "Yf there were any thyng that was peradventure such that un the chyrche sometyme was doubted and reputed for unreveled and unknowen; yf after that the holy chyrche fall in one consent upon the one syde eyther by common determynacyon at a generall counsayle or by a perfyte perswayson and byleve . . . receyued thrughe crystendome" it is established as Christian truth.[45] In a notable nineteenth century usage of the term "reception" Pusey spells out one implication in a letter to Manning. The Council of Trent "might," he postulates, "by subsequent reception, become a General Council." That would mean that "it might be so now virtually, although 'as yet' unrecognized as such by the whole Church, but in a state of suspense."[46] A simpler expression of the same idea, with a broader application, is to be found in the Final Report of ARCIC I. The process of reception may be "gradual" (that is, running through time) "as . . . decisions come to be seen in perspective through the Spirit's continuing guidance of the whole Church."[47]

A similar shaking out of assumptions is to be seen in the case of the principle of unanimity. Wyclif states comfortably that it is the nature of every creature to know God to be his *superior* and to want to help other creatures to work together as one.[48] More describes the Holy Spirit's method of bringing about *consensus* among his people, as he "enclyneth thyr credultye to consent in the byleuying all in one poynt whiche is the secret instyncte of god."[49] Heretics do not disrupt this pattern, for their dissent is transient in the continuing history of the church.[50] Nor is it

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necessary for all Christian people to be present to vote in order to register their consent. A council is the church in microcosm; we cannot all meet but we can do so through our representatives.[51] But against this picture of a community in concord we need to set More's assertion that in no action of a multitude is unanimous consent required.[52] Edmund Lechmere goes further. The truth of the community's assertions, he says, "dependeth not upon the approbation of everie one that is in her communion . . . if some of them do chance to forgoe the truth and leave it, there is power in the rest to define the matter and condemn them."[53] The existence of dissenters is no serious threat to the principle of consent if Lechmere is right, and indeed the church had got along well enough in the confidence which he and More expressed, namely, that the wrong view will simply be outvoted. But as we saw in Melanchthon's discussion of the Ratisbon *Acta,* the Reformers were breaking with tradition in claiming that it may sometimes be the case that an individual or a small group is mandated by God to speak the truth against centuries of accepted teaching and a majority view in the church. In a philosophical treatise on establishing certainty, a sixteenth century *Grammar of Assent*, Sebastian Castellio criticizes Lutherans and Calvinists for wrong thinking on this point.[54] And the Reformers questioned in the same breath the idea that Councils speak for the community and therefore represent the consensus of the majority in their decrees.[55]

These breaks with what we may call the three "unities" of time, place and unanimity in the understanding of reception created difficulties because of the underlying assumption Lechmere voices when he speaks of "power in the rest to define the matter." He implies that the *consensus* of the community is not merely an indication where the truth lies, a principle of verification in the Aristotelian and Ciceronian sense, but a creator or legitimizer of truth. The Final Report of the first Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission suggests that reception "does not create truth or legitimize the decision." Rather "it is the final indication that such a decision has fulfilled the necessary conditions for it to be a true expression of faith."[56]

This is of some importance in the light of a picture of Christian authority which has begun to emerge in recent ecumenical discussions. A central conception of *koinonia* in the New Testament sees it as a communion of individuals who have a relationship to Christ as their head and a relationship to one another which is dependent on that primary relationship.[57] That sets at the very center of the Church's being a unifying structure formed by living relationships, out of which proceeds all Christian ministry. Because its source is God himself, this ministry is authoritative. Jesus spoke of his Father as the one who has sent him into the world and gave him authority. He himself entrusted that authority to his disciples as he sent

them out in their turn (John 16:4, 27 and 17:2, 18, 20–21). The sending is also a commissioning, a gift of authority to do the work which is needed (John 20:21–3). The essence of authority thus derived is that it is never cut off from its source. God's authority flows into the world perpetually through his people in the continuing life of the church.[58]

The ordained ministry, and *a fortiori* those who have a ministry of oversight, are part of the community. They have authority "within" and "among" the Christian faithful, and "over" them only from "within."[59]

These new elements in the understanding of Christian authority make a significant difference to the relatively crude model with which sixteenth century thinkers were working when they debated power and jurisdiction. And they have important implications for the concept of *magisterium* (to use an anachronistic term) and the question of authority in the church's structures of decision making in matters of faith on which the Ratisbon talks came to grief and with which we have seen sixteenth-century thinkers struggling.

Wyclif assumes with the majority of medieval scholars that one and the same truth is taught by Christ and the apostles, by the Fathers and by General Councils, and that it is not only *recta* (right) and *eadem* (consonant) but also complete.[61] Details may be explained as controversies make it necessary, but Christian truth is essentially fixed and finite. As Nowell puts it in his Catechism of 1570, "it were a point of intolerable ungodliness and madness to think, either that God hath left an imperfect doctrine, or that men were able to make that perfect, which God left imperfect." On this view, councils and ecclesiastical assemblies and preaching "serve either to the expounding of dark places of the word of God, and to take away controversies that rise among men" or "to the stablishing of the outward governance of the Church."[61] On this basis distinction was widely made among the reformers between additions which carried only human authority and the central truths to which nothing could be added,[62] which encouraged a separation of human and divine in the Church's authority, and it was argued that there could be no obligation for any Christian to accept the former. Again, we are dealing with a relatively crude model. These points were insisted on by Reformers in an age when it seemed that ecclesiastical authority was seeking both to add to Christian truth and to impose on Christian people the duty to believe what was added. The fight for gospel truth, for apostolic simplicity, went on everywhere in reforming communities.

The concept of an authority flowing always and directly from God through his church and acting from within the body of the faithful puts these anxieties in a different light. Truth is recognized by the people of God where they "discern a harmony between what is proposed to them and the

sensus fidelium of the whole Church," on the one hand, and "the apostolic faith," on the other hand,[63] and that perception is made possible by the action of the Holy Spirit. Whether the definition is framed by a council or a primate or a commission or an individual, and formally accepted by a democratic vote, whether unbroken historical continuity can be established, whether the formulation has been accepted all over the world, are important indications, but they do not create truth or legitimize a decision or in themselves authorize its acceptance.

The nature of Christian authority is such that it "involves" rather than "imposes on" minds and hearts. The notion of reception as an active welcoming rather than a passive acquiescence is adumbrated in the Middle Ages. The conception of an active "receiving" is put forward in the eleventh century by Anselm of Bec. In his *De Casu Diaboli* he tries to answer the question how some angels were able to persevere in righteousness while others were not. If God gave some perseverance and not others, it would seem that he condemned some to fall, and that would make him the author of evil. Anselm's explanation is that God gave perseverance to them all, but only some accepted it; that is, it was by their own active response that they received it.[64]

Although the word "receive" was in use in the sixteenth century in the general area of what we should now call "reception,"[65] it was not yet a fully established technical term. But the notion of an active "embracing" is clearly present. "In general councils, whatsoever is agreeable unto the written word of God we do reverently embrace."[66] "Whatsoever also is grounded upon God's written word, though not by our common and vulgar terms to be read therein, we do reverently embrace."[67] "We must not only hear and understand . . . but also with steadfast assent of mind embrace . . . heartily love . . . yield ourselves desirous and apt to learn, and to frame our minds to obey."[68]

The essence of this "active welcoming" is that it is not an individual but a collective act of the people of God. It shifts the recent emphasis of the word *consensus* from its use in, for example, Aquinas, where it is merely an agreement of the will to sin or to marriage and so on, to the idea of shared understanding: *con-sensus*. Thus Melanchthon is able to define the church as: *homines amplectentes Evangelium*,[69] people collectively embracing the gospel. In the same spirit the Church of England's Thirty-nine Articles urge that the creeds "ought *thoroughly* to be received and believed."

This embracing is not only a consent of the believing mind and heart, as it were, a warm hug of faith; but an exercise of judgment. Again, the idea is present in embryo in the sixteenth century, but colored by an anxiety about the dangers of letting inferiors judge their rightful rulers. It is not

popular, says Wyclif, for the people to judge (*populum iudicare*), especially for them to judge ecclesiastical authority.[70] The question of judgment is inseparable in Luther's view from the dispute about "imposition" by duly constituted authority. What Thomas More calls the *ecclesiae iudicium in fidei causa* (judgment of the church in matters of faith)[71] involves for Luther judgment by the congregation. He argues from I Thessalonians 5:21 that Paul does not want to see any teaching or decree obeyed unless it is examined and recognized as good by the congregation which hears it. "Test everything but hold fast to that which is good." This examination, says Luther, is not to be done by teachers. The teachers may only state what is to be examined. Judgment is given to the Christian people.[72] He sees Christ as positively taking the right and power to judge teaching from bishops, scholars, and councils and giving it to all Christians equally (John 10:4: "My sheep know my voice").[73] The same linking of judgment and "imposition" is noticeable in Thomas Rogers' account. He argues that the "Papists" maintain that "the pope of Rome hath the power to judge all men and matters, but may be judged of no man,"[74] that judgment goes with orders, "the power to judge of religion and points of doctrine is either in bishops only . . . or in their clergy only. . . ."[75] He himself contends with Luther that "authority is given to the Church, and to every member of sound judgment in the same, to judge in controversies of faith."[76]

We can, then, see in the sixteenth-century debates the beginnings of the realization of a number of implications about reception which have become clear only in our own century, but which were first thrown into the field of discussion by the shake-up of the foundational assumptions of ecclesiology on which Vincent of Lerins' dictum was based. Polemical considerations helped to shape the thinking of the day and made it difficult for the combatants to get away from the very analogy with human politics which was seen as a stumbling block by Melanchthon. The unique form of consensus which we call "reception" is peculiar to the Christian community. What, then, are the features of reception as they emerge in our own day in ecumenical discussion about Christian authority in matters of faith? Perhaps the salient features are exactly those to which the evidence we have been examining has been pointing us: It is a response, an active welcoming by the people of God. That is, it is not simply "the submission of obedience to a duly constituted authority," a "passive acquiescence,"[77] but both an intellectual consent ("an active exercise of the judgment") and a consent of the believing mind and heart,[78] in other words, it is a recognition. "By 'reception' we mean the fact that the people of God acknowledge . . . a decision or statement because they recognize in it the apostolic faith. They accept it because they discern a harmony between what is proposed to them and the *sensus fidelium* of the whole Church."[79] What is being recognized

is the voice of the Holy Spirit, "that through that definition, whether it was of a synod or a primate, the authentic, living voice of faith has been spoken in the Church, to the Church, by God."[80]

Because it is fundamentally an act of recognition, reception "does not create truth or legitimize the decision. It is the final indication that such a decision has fulfilled the necessary conditions for it to be a true expression of the faith."[81] But "our receiving has a positive, vital effect."[82] There is a living continuous process in tension with that which is eternal in Christian truth.

8. Paul Ramsey, *Who Speaks for the Church?: A Critique of the 1966 Geneva Conference on Church and Society* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967).

9. "Ouvi os clamores do povo," in *Los Obispos Latinoamericanos Entre Medellin Y Puebla* (UCA 1978), pp. 40–63; Eng. Trans.: "I Have Heard the Cry of My People," *Catholic Mind*, 72 (November 1974), pp. 39–64.

10. "I Have Heard the Cry of My People," p. 63.

11. Ibid., pp. 61–2 (translation altered).

Chapter 5: Teaching Authoritatively Amidst Christian Pluralism in Africa

1. Ibadan, Nigeria: Daystar Press, 1968.

2. ACC: African Charismatic Churches, e.g., Aladura, founded and run by Africans. An association of these churches has decided that they be known as African Instituted Churches (AIC).

3. WCA: Western Churches in Africa, e.g., Roman Catholic, Methodist.

4. Jean-Marc Ela, *African Cry* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986), preface.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 6.

7. John E. Skinner, *The Meaning of Authority* (Washington: University Press of America, 1983), p. 3.

8. Richard Sennett, *Authority* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 16–19.

9. I.H. Mosala and B. Tlhagale, *The Unquestionable Right to be Free* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986); Mercy Amba Oduyoye, *Hearing and Knowing* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986); George V. Pixley, *God's Kingdom: A Guide for Biblical Study*, trans. Donald D. Walsh (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1981.

10. Adrian Harker, *Commentary on Agreed Statement* (ARCIC, 1976), p. 21.

11. Letty M. Russell, *Growth in Partnership* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 981); Idem, *Household of Freedom: Authority in Feminist Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986); Idem, *The Future of Partnership* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979).

12. Richard Sennett, *Authority*.

13. Letty Russell, *Household of Freedom*, p. 25.

14. Agreed Statements by ARCIC (Venice, 1976).

15. John E. Skinner, *The Meaning of Authority* (Washington: University Press of America, 1983).

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1. Journal for January 25, 1738, *Journals and Diaries*, 1:212.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. *Letters* (Telford), 7:54.

5. *Journals and Diaries*, 1:213.

6. *Corpus Reformatorum* 4, (Halle: C.G. Bretschneider, 1834ff.), cols. 664–76; here, col. 670.

7. Conveniently accessible in T.G. Tappert, ed., *The Book of Concord* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981). In Article 28 of the Augsburg Confession of 1530 an attempt was made to distinguish "the power of the Church" and "the power of the sword" in terms of their respective spheres of operation. The "power of the keys" or the "power of bishops" is a "power or command of God" to preach the Gospel, remit and retain sins and to administer the sacraments (28:5). The civil government must protect not souls but bodies (28:11). Both powers are to be held in honor and acknowledged as gifts and blessings of God (28.18). Both authorities are thought of as requiring obedience, and the issue is whether bishops may intrude upon areas of jurisdiction properly belonging to the state or impose rules and

requirements upon their people without reference to Scripture. The Augsburg conclusion is that any "civil" powers bishops may have are lent them by human not divine authority and that the obligation of Christian people is to refuse obedience to any episcopal order which is contrary to the Gospel.

8. *Corpus Reformatorum*, Col. 670, *partim propter probabilem rationem, partim propter autoritatem quam Deus attribuit ordini*.

9. Col. 670, *non potestas est alligata certis personis aut certae multitudini*.

10. Ibid., Col. 671.

11. Ibid.

12. Thomas Rogers, *An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, ed. J.J.S. Perowne (Cambridge: Parker Society, 1844), p. 194.

13. See especially the treatise of 1523 "That a Christian Assembly or Congregation Has the Right and Power to Judge All Teaching," *WA*, 11:408–16; *Luther's Works*, Vol. 39 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), pp. 305–14.

14. "Assembly," *Luther's Works*, 39:308–9.

15. Rogers, *An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 193.

16. Michael Gaismair, *Landesordnung*, ed. in W. Klaassen, *Michael Gaismair* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), p. 131.

17. W. Elert, "Lutherische Grundsätze fur die Kirchenverfassung," in *Ein Lehrer der Kirche*, ed. M. Keller-Hüschenmenger (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlaghaus, 1967), p. 103.

18. *Corpus Reformatorum* 24.398: *qui amplectitur communem consensum doctrinae propheticae et apostolicae iuxta sententiam verae ecclesiae.*

19. Ibid., *cui ecclesia dat testimonium*.

20. Lutheran-Roman Catholic statement on the Eucharist, 1978, in *Growth in Agreement*, ed. Harding Meyer and Lukas Vischer (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), p. 212.

21. On the history of consent, see K. Oehler, *Der Consensus Omnium, Antike und Abendland*, 10 (1961), 103–29.

22. Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus*, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (London, 1973), p. 40.

23. See, for example, representing a vast corpus of contemporary debate, Rogers, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, pp. 195, 198, 211.

24. Oehler, op. cit.

25. Ibid.

26. More, *Responsio ad Lutherum*, ed. J.M. Headley, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 198.27; Erasmus, *Epistolae*, ed. P. S. and H. M. Allen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906–58).

27. In *Churches Respond to BEM*, ed. Max Thurian (Geneva: WCC, 1986), 1:31.

28. Luther, "Assembly," *Luther's Works*, 39:305.

29. More, *Responsio*, p. 119.30–2.

30. Ibid., p. 191.

31. Ibid., p. 119.21–3.

32. More, *Dialogue*, ed. W.E. Campbell (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1927), p. 182.

33. Rogers, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 193.

34. Ibid., p. 190.

35. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), Prefatory Letter to the King of France, paragraph 5, p. 23–4.

36. Luther, "Assembly," *Luther's Works*, 39:306.

37. Ibid.

38. More, *Dialogue* (Campbell), p. 32.

39. Ibid., p. 111.

40. *On Baptism Against the Donatists*, IV. xxxiv.32.

41. Edmund Lechmere, *A Reflection of Certain Authors* (Douai, 1635), p. 3v, reprinted in *English Recusant Literature* (Menston: Scholar Press, 1973), Vol. 126.

42. More, *Responsio*, p. 191.

43. Ibid., p. 193.

44. Nowell, *Catechism*, ed. G. E. Corrie (Cambridge: Parker Society, 1853), p. 11.

45. More, *Dialogue* (Campbell), p. 111.

46. In R. H. Greenfield, "Such a Friend to the Pope," in *Pusey Rediscovered*, ed. P. Butler (London: SPCK, 1983), p. 174.

47. ARCIC A I (16), in *Growth in Agreement*.

48. Wyclif, *Opera Minora*, ed. J. Loserth (London: C.K. Paul, 1913), pp. 327:30ff.

49. More, *Dialogue* (Campbell), pp. 157–8.

50. Ibid., pp. 132–3.

51. More, *Responsio*, p. 626.

52. Ibid., p. 608.

53. Lechmere, op. cit., p. 4.

54. Sebastian Castellio, *De Arte Dubitandi*, ed. E. F. Hirsch (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), p. 3.

55. Luther became progressively more disillusioned about the authority of Councils.

56. Canon Law, 207.1.

57. See the Introduction to the *Final Report of ARCIC I*.

58. ARCIC A I (6).

59. Canon Law, 207.1.

60. Wyclif, *De Ecclesia*, ed. J. Loserth (London: Trübner, 1886), p. 112.

61. Nowell, *Catechism*, p. 115, and see p.v on its status.

62. Article 34, and cf. an important discussion of Melanchthon, CR 4362.

63. ARCIC A I, E1.3.

64. Anselm, *De Casu Diaboli*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Rome/Edinburgh: Seccovii, 1938), I. 235 ff., Chapters II–III.

65. More, *Dialogue* (Campbell), p. 111; Rogers, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 198.

66. Rogers, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 210–11.

67. Ibid., p. 201.

68. Nowell, *Catechism*, p. 117.

69. *Corpus Reformatorum* 24, col. 401, cf. 406 and 409.

70. Wyclif, *Opera Minora*, p. 314.12–3.

71. More, *Responsio*, p. 206.17–9.

72. Luther, "Assembly," *Luther's Works*, 39:308.

73. Ibid., pp. 306–7.

74. Rogers, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 191.

75. Ibid., p. 192.

76. Ibid., p. 190.

77. H. Chadwick, General Synod of the Church of England, *Report of Proceedings* (February, 1985), 16:I, p. 75.

78. Ibid.

79. ARCIC A I, E1.3.

80. Chadwick, loc. cit.

81. ARCIC A I, E1.3.

82. Chadwick, loc. cit.

Chapter 7: Toward the Common Expression of the Apostolic Faith Today

1. *Towards Visible Unity II*, ed. by Michael Kinnamon, Faith and Order Paper No. 113, (Geneva: WCC, 1982), p. 28ff.

2. *Gathered for Life*, Vancouver 1983, ed. by David Gill (Geneva: WCC, 1983), p. 48f. and 253.