

John Wesley on Economics

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As with virtually all John Wesley's social thought, that which had to do with the realm of economics represented an ethical critique of problems rather than a theory of economic relations. England in the eighteenth century was a nation in economic transition. At the beginning of the period the country was largely agricultural, though commerce was a major factor. During the first half of the century, the English were feverishly accumulating "those great capital reserves which were destined to play so dominant a role in world history." The economic geography of England continued to be determined largely by the sea and by navigable rivers, with the result that financial control was passing to London.¹ In the rural areas, however, away from the few commercial centers where trade and manufacture were important, the peddler's pack afforded the people's only contact with the riches of commercial England. The seventeenth century, too, had bequeathed a variety of problems—the enclosure process in agriculture, transition from trade guilds to the system of domestic industries, monopolies and monopolistic practices, the expansion of colonial trade, and the Elizabethan Poor Law to take care of the increasing hordes of paupers.² The life of

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the nation during the period was characterized and complicated by lack of economic unity.

Society in England was stratified, with a disproportionate number of people on the bottom. Local landlords and magistrates were both the political and the economic leaders of their communities. The boroughs in England and Wales were dominant in the political struggle, returning three-fourths of the members of Parliament. "In most boroughs the immediate control lay with a small urban oligarchy of attorneys, bankers, merchants and brewers entrenched in a self-electing corporation."³ It was against these men and their power that Wesley often fulminated.

The unpropertied masses (by far the largest segment of the population) provided the labor force, the backbone of the industrial system that developed in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The whole social structure of the nation was upheld by and closely entwined with the Church of England. It might be said that on the level of political ideology, the Tories were oriented toward the Church of England, while dissenting opinion formed the main force of the Whig party.⁴ This fact accounts in part for the success of Wesleyanism; it ministered primarily to the classes of people who were disfranchised politically, economically, and religiously. During the time when the working people in England were being dislocated and alienated (by the enclosure acts and by machine labor), the population also was increasing, and the situation made for an abundance of cheap labor. This factor, coupled with the accumulation of capital, set the stage for the advent of the Industrial Revolution. Then, as Kathleen Walker MacArthur points out, "Out of these conditions came hosts of problems centering around the psychological reconditioning of the people in character and morale."⁵

It was into these conditions that John Wesley came with his religious movement, and it was to these people that he addressed himself. While the specific economic order that

confronted Wesley may have been peculiar to the eighteenth century, the way in which he dealt with it may be interpreted as a constant in the continuing evaluation of the ethical consequences of an economic system. In a very real sense, Wesley recovered the reform tradition of England. His was the approach of Wycliff, rather than that of the continental Reformation, and he brought it to some measure of fulfillment in the disinherited classes of England.⁶

Wesley's economic views, like all his social thought, were based on his ethics and theology. The two general concepts of greatest importance were his ideas of God and of humanity. To Wesley, God functions in two roles—as Sovereign (or Creator) and as Governor. God as Sovereign is omnipotent, but God as Governor imposes self-restrictions. From God's role as Sovereign comes all God's grace. This includes the whole of creation, both physical and social. Power and authority in such human institutions as church and state are grants made by God to his corporate representatives on earth.

In the concept of God's role as Governor, Wesley sought an answer to the problem of freedom. In order for God's revelation in Jesus to make sense, human beings need to be free, for without freedom they simply are not responsible. Thus human responsibility arises out of human freedom and conscience, which are functions of prevenient grace. In the human's ability to respond freely to God lay Wesley's synergism—that is, the cooperation between God and human beings—and this contributes the individualistic, subjective elements of Wesleyan theological and political thought. Prevenient grace is granted by God to humans, enabling them to differentiate between good and evil. If we can in reality distinguish between good and evil, this ability makes sense only if we can choose, or fail to choose, God. Thus, Wesley said, grace is resistible. Moreover, people can participate in God's love. We have this capacity because God

first loved us. As a result of God's love, humans are able to love both God and their fellow human beings. Out of this conception of love arose (in part) Wesley's ideas of ethics, justice, and Christian perfection. The love concept itself was a social idea and was related to Wesley's thesis that Christianity is essentially a social religion.

The other major theological problem concerned human nature. Wesley's perspective was premised upon the Christian doctrine of original sin, which claims that human nature is corrupted as a result of Adam's Fall. All people are equally infected. The revelation of God gives to us all the possibility of salvation, though we are always capable of knowingly contravening the will of God. Sin, therefore, has a twofold character. It is, on the one hand, conceived in terms of the very depravity of human nature which originated in Adam; on the other hand, it is thought of as the transgression of divine law. The impulse to break God's law, however, comes partly as a result of the ongoing influence of original sin, even after justification. It is as a result of sin, in both senses, that the problem of evil arises; and Wesley found ample evidence of the reality of evil in war, class exploitation, and other social problems. Because of human sinfulness, government has the rather explicit ethical imperative to preserve order. Wesley's ethical assumptions rested upon the twin foundations of human responsibility and the creativity of divine and human love. Grounded in these is his conception of righteousness and an ethic that is inevitably both personal and social. Also related to the love concept were his ideas of social justice and Christian perfection.

The process through which perfection is realized is sanctification. Sanctification makes righteousness possible—not good and gracious acts themselves, but the operation of God in us produces these acts.

The goal of the process of sanctification is perfection in this life—that is, the perfect possession of the perfect

motive—love of God and love of others. Thus Wesley stated that when a person is justified, “he is ‘born from above,’ born of the ‘Spirit,’ which, although it is not (as some suppose) the whole process of sanctification, is doubtless the gate of it.” Wesley continued, indicating that this new birth implies “as great a change in the soul, in him that is ‘born of the Spirit,’ as was wrought in his body when he was born of a woman: Not an outward change only [though this is to be expected] . . . but an inward change from all unholy, to all holy tempers.” In the final analysis, sanctification is God working in us to make us just and righteous. Therefore “nothing will avail without the whole mind that was in Christ, enabling you to walk as Christ walked.”⁷

The Social Ethics of Sanctification

In applying this position of Christian perfection to the relationship of the individual to society, Wesley insisted on the inseparable relationship between the love of God and the love of others. The love of which Wesley speaks is completely inclusive, extending to all classes and states of people. This love underwrites the fundamental egalitarianism implicit in Wesley’s thought: “For [the perfected Christian] loves every soul that God has made; every child of man, of whatever place or nation.”⁸

The doctrine of perfection was at once profoundly theological and ethical, which led his thinking into the problems of political and social reform. The love concept was first a social concept, rather than an individualistic one, and as such led to social and political criticism.

Social Ethics and the Economic Order

How did Wesley translate the love ethic, as elaborated in the doctrine of sanctification, into a perspective on the economic system? In order to better understand Wesley’s

approach, we should consider several specific economic issues that were of concern to him, and which may be conveniently summarized in three categories—the nature of property, general economic problems, and issues of humanitarian reform.

Property

A significant aspect of Wesley’s political economy was his concept of property, which involved elements of his theology associated with both God and the human condition. Unlike John Locke, whose ideas dominated much of the eighteenth-century political and economic thought, Wesley refused to elaborate a theory for the absolute protection of property rights. Both Locke and Wesley agreed that God gave the earth to the whole of humankind in common. Locke sought to show, however, that persons “might come to have property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.” Locke argued that individuals mixed labor with the grant of nature that had been provided, and the product “excluded the common right of other men.” The reason for this is that “labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what [it] is once joined to, at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.”⁹ As a result of these assumptions, for Locke, property became an inalienable right which must be defended.

For Wesley, on the other hand, property was never an inalienable right; any person holds property only as a steward of God, and God can at any time take the property away. Thus God, in his capacity as sovereign, makes the final choice as to the disposition of property. Because God is sovereign, “he must be the possessor of all that is,” and because he holds title to all that is, he may resume his own property at any time.¹⁰ People may use property only for

those purposes that God has specified, and those who fail to use it as God directs have no moral right to it. It is possible, though by no means clear, that Wesley thought a person's legal right to property should be questioned if, in the use of the property, God's law is contravened. Thus, for Wesley, a person is not an owner, but rather a trustee or steward of property.¹¹

The charge Wesley directed at the rich was, "Be ye 'ready to distribute' to every one, according to his necessity."¹² This is essentially what Wesley meant when he counseled that people should gain all they can, save all they can, and give all the can.¹³ In its highest development, this concept of distribution according to need refers to what, in Wesley's thought, is the highest concept of economic organization—primitive communism, the kind of organization he thought existed among the earliest Christians.¹⁴ The outcome of Christian love was to be a society in which all things would be held in common. Thus in the early church, "so long as that truly Christian love continued, they could not but have all things in common."¹⁵

Wesley went so far as to advocate the practice of a community of goods among Methodists. His objective was to bring them as close as possible to the practices of primitive Christianity. The evidence for this position is clear. Among the rules set down for the Select Societies by the first Conference (1744) was the following: "Every member, till we can have all things common, will bring once a week, bona fide, all he can toward a common stock."¹⁶

Apparently there was a good deal of opposition to the goal Wesley had in mind. One Richard Viney reported in his diary on February 22, 1744, that Wesley "told me of an intention he and some few have of beginning a Community of goods, but on a plan which I told him I doubted could not succeed."¹⁷ According to Viney, the plan was to be carried out by the formula that later appeared in socialist thought—from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. The fact

that Wesley did not seriously promote this scheme after 1744 suggests that the opposition was great enough to dissuade him. The three rules of gain, save, give, constituted a compromise developed after 1744, between what Wesley considered as ideal and what apparently was possible.¹⁸

This is not to argue that Wesley was an early English socialist; he did not try to force Methodists into the kind of framework he had once contemplated. The facts presented, however, do illustrate the lengths to which he thought the principle of the stewardship of property should go.

The attempt to read Wesley, therefore, in terms of the so-called Protestant ethic is not justified. Max Weber wrongly contends that Wesley's theology and ethics simply fostered the notion that the number of possessions a person has demonstrates the extent to which God's grace has fallen upon that individual.¹⁹ Wesley objected to the "duty of getting a good estate."²⁰ Any interpretation of Wesley to the effect that the "presence of success indicates a state of moral soundness" is impossible to maintain, in the context of the totality of his writings.²¹ In this sense Wesley represents an exception to the general Protestant ethic of Calvinism, which influenced the eighteenth century so greatly.²²

The point is that Wesley did not accept the view of a sacred and inviolable right to property, but rather that the right to property was bound up with its proper use. His original notion that property is a gift of God, his contentions about its purposive use, and his rejection of the Protestant ethic, justify this interpretation. Wesley's concern with property led him to protest the monopolization of farms, and on one occasion he advocated, as a means of encouraging or compelling the redistribution of land, not allowing any farm to rent for more than one hundred pounds a year.²³ Apparently he was willing under some circumstances to accept governmental regulation of property.

The result of Wesley's view of property was a cooperative spirit in Methodism. As H. Richard Niebuhr noted, "Among

the poor members of the societies it fostered, as all such movements have done, a high degree of mutual aid and cooperation and laid the foundations for popular education."²⁴ Wesley described one example of this kind of cooperation.

I rode through one of the pleasantest parts of England to Hornby. Here the zealous landlord turned all the Methodists out of their houses. This proved a singular kindness: For they built some little houses at the end of the town, in which forty or fifty of them live together.²⁵

Whether Wesley's three rules can be put to use in the twentieth century, or for that matter, whether they were realistic for his own time, is a moot question. Our objective is simply to demonstrate that Wesley did not hesitate to apply his theological and ethical principles to concrete political and economic circumstances, as will become even more evident as we turn to the issues of poverty, unemployment, inheritance, labor relations, and business ethics; and to Wesley's ventures to overcome human distress, such as work projects, lending stock, relief, and the Strangers' Friend Society.

General Economic Problems

Poverty and unemployment are two sides of the same economic coin; one is usually found in the company of the other. In Wesley's day some thought poverty was the will of God or that it happened to some individuals because they had been unworthy. Rarely did the eighteenth century see poverty and unemployment as results of social inequity. In this sense it may be said that "Wesley discovered the poor," for he was able at least to see past these superficial analyses.²⁶ While he did not perceive all the social causes of economic distress, he declared that it was "wickedly, devilishly false" to say that people are poor only because

they are idle. A more honest evaluation, he said, would recognize that people are in want "through scarcity of business."²⁷

Perhaps the most extended analysis made by Wesley of the causes of poverty and unemployment at any particular period was in a letter to the editor of *Lloyd's Evening Post*, published in December, 1772, and brought out the next month in a slightly expanded form as a tract entitled *Thoughts on the Present Scarcity of Provisions*.²⁸ This period was characterized by war, high prices, bad harvests, and general distress. The letter opens with a description of the hardships Wesley had seen among the people of England, and it then asks, "Why is this? Why have all these nothing to eat? . . . They have no meat because they have no work." Employment was declining, said Wesley, because goods and services were not being purchased as a result of the increasing price of necessities, especially food. Due to reduced consumption, employers were not able to retain personnel, and "many who employed fifty men now scarce employ ten."²⁹

Why were prices high and going higher? Here Wesley launches into an analysis that involves an oddly connected sequence of interrelated problems, including the misappropriation of grains, lands, and so forth. High taxes are major causes of high prices, according to Wesley, and these in turn are the result of war and the national debt. Therefore he advocates ridding the nation of the national debt (a plea similar to that of Jefferson in the United States). How are these evils to be remedied? First, people need to go back to work. By obtaining expanded markets for their goods, employers could hire more people. Second, the prices of food and other essential commodities must be lowered so that the people will be able to afford other goods and services.³⁰

Wesley was always on the alert for indications of economic distress among the people. In a letter to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies, written in

August, 1775, Wesley detailed the woes of the people and pleaded for relief.³¹

A second problem to which Wesley gave attention was inheritance. Inherited wealth was a prime evil, he said, "for it will be certain to injure those who receive it."³² "Have pity upon them and remove out of their way what you may easily foresee would increase their sins, and consequently plunge them deeper into everlasting perdition!" If a man had a considerable fortune to leave, Wesley said he should will to his family just enough to provide for them and "bestow all the rest in such a manner as would be most for the glory of God."³³

Labor relations and business ethics, the two final examples of Wesley's attitude toward economic problems, are manifestly related, and Wesley was concerned with both. "Workers who migrated to centers where economic opportunity offered a livelihood constituted the "very social material Methodism was wont to lay hold upon."³⁴ Because of this attribute of Methodism, the employing classes were fearful lest Wesley should encourage a working-class movement, and some employers discharged workers for espousing or showing sympathy toward the Wesleyan movement, despite the fact that Methodism often made a person a more dependable worker.³⁵ For Wesley, the "labor relationship was an ethical one."³⁶ The other aspect of this situation was Wesley's attitude toward business integrity. His primary question was, "In what spirit do you go through your business? In the spirit of the world, or in the spirit of Christ?" And he added,

I am afraid thousands of those who are called good Christians do not understand the question. If you act in the spirit of Christ, you carry the end you at first proposed through all your work from first to last. You do everything in the spirit of sacrifice, giving up your will to the will of God; and continually aiming, not at ease, pleasure, or riches, not at anything "his short-enduring world can give," but merely

at the glory of God. Now, can anyone deny, that this is the most excellent way of pursuing worldly business?³⁷

Thus Wesley regarded the whole realm of business and labor as one in which the Christian ethic ought to be given an opportunity to function. If this were done, he believed society would be able to solve the problems posed by those elements of the economy. It should be noted that Wesley rejected here and elsewhere the concept of free enterprise, in the sense of unbridled competition.

Humanitarian Reform

Wesley's desire to help the poor manifested itself in a variety of ways. Particularly important were those that today would be labeled as humanitarian reform measures.

Wesley's characteristic response to poverty was to find work for the unemployed. When that was not possible, he established work projects and cottage industries of various sorts. For example, he trained and employed several people in the processing of cotton and established others in a small knitting industry.³⁸

Wesley also attempted to work out more long-range solutions to the economic problems that beset his people. He established a "lending stock"—a sort of credit union—from which people were able to borrow limited amounts of money without interest. This program was launched in 1747 and continued in operation for many years. Thus the old Foundery in London, for instance, became a veritable melting pot of projects—"a house of mercy for widows, a school for boys, a dispensary for the sick, a work shop and employment bureau, a loan office and savings bank, a bookroom, and a church."³⁹

The normal mode of relief, however, was the outright collection of money, either for direct distribution or for the purchase of clothes, food, fuel, and other necessities. The usual procedure was for Wesley or his stewards to deter-

mine systematically the needs in each local society and the appropriate method of relief, and then to raise the necessary money.⁴⁰

Another example of Wesley's attempt to relieve distress through humanitarian action was the formation of the Strangers' Friend Society. This organization was instituted in London in 1785 by a group of Methodists and was supported by Wesley. It was "wholly for the relief, not of our society, but for poor, sick, friendless strangers."⁴¹ Such societies soon spread wherever Methodism was established.

Much of the foregoing is a commentary on Wesley's view of the role of government in the economy of the nation. He believed that at times governmental planning and control are necessary to alleviate conditions of distress. Most significant in this regard was the expression of surprise evoked from Wesley in 1776, after reading a book that contained "some observations which I never saw before . . . that to petition Parliament to alter [prices and fix money policies] is to put them upon impossibilities, and can answer no end but that of inflaming the people against their Governors."⁴² Wesley did not name the book, but the view it set forth was typical of the laissez-faire philosophy of Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. Smith's *Wealth of Nations* was published in that year, while Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* had appeared ten years earlier. In the realm of economics, both Ferguson and Smith advocated governmental nonintervention.⁴³

Judging by the evidence, therefore, it would seem that Edwards' claim that nowhere in Wesley's works is there "an appeal for collectivist legislation" is too strong.⁴⁴ Clearly Wesley advocated governmental supervision, especially in times of economic crisis. He implicitly recognized that social institutions must be reformed through institutional and structural processes. Taken together, Wesley's concept of property and some of his specific proposals for alleviating unemployment, poverty, and other social inequities, re-

mained consistently opposed to the laissez-faire philosophy that developed in England during the latter part of his life.

Wesley's economic ideas are interesting and important, not because of the remedies he suggested or because of the particular theories he set forth, but for the humanitarian spirit they exemplified—a spirit that well might be emulated by the church in the twentieth century. In historical perspective Wesley's economic ideas may be designated as preindustrial; indeed, in some respects they may have been more medieval than modern. Even so, they were founded on sympathy for human need, and they prompted imaginative attempts to do something about that need. In Wesley's thought, if the social ethic of love—as developed in his doctrine of sanctification—were systematically applied, then the social order itself might be perfectible.⁴⁵

7. Spencer, *Social Statics* (London: John Chapman, 1851), p. 64; (New York: D. Appleton, 1865), p. 78.
8. William Butler Yeats, *A Vision* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1962), p. 25.
9. John Hick, ed., *The Myth of God Incarnate* (London: S.C.M. Press, 1977; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), p. 202.
10. John Frank Kermodé, *The Sense of an Ending* (London, New York: Oxford, 1967), p. 39.
11. Weil, *First and Last Notebooks*, trans. Richard Rees (London, New York: Oxford, 1970), pp. 295, 296. Simone Weil was born in Paris in 1909 and died in England as a war exile in 1943. She was one of the most remarkable religious writers of her generation—her best-known book, *Waiting for God*, was published in 1950.
12. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 320.
13. Weil, *Notebooks*, p. 130.

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1. J. O. Lindsay, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 7 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1957), p. 241.
2. Kathleen Walker MacArthur, *The Economic Ethics of John Wesley* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1936), pp. 35-36.
3. Lindsay, *Modern History*, p. 245.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46.
5. MacArthur, *Economic Ethics*, p. 44.
6. Oscar Sherwin, *John Wesley: Friend of the People* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1961), p. 41.
7. *Works*, 7, pp. 205, 353. Cf. William R. Cannon, *The Theology of John Wesley* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1946), pp. 250, 252.
8. *Letters*, 2, p. 376.
9. John Locke, "Of Property," *Two Treatises on Government* (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1947), pp. 133-34.
10. *Works*, 7, pp. 308-9.
11. *Ibid.*, 6, p. 136. For further information on Wesley's concept of property and its implications, see MacArthur, *Economic Ethics*, pp. 123-24 and Sherwin, *Friend of the People*, p. 41.
12. *Works*, 6, p. 376.
13. For Wesley's exposition of this "economic formula," see *Works*, 6, pp. 127-34. This sermon was published in 1760.
14. *Works*, 6, p. 376.
15. *Notes*, p. 409, Acts 4:32. Cf. note on Acts 4:35.
16. The Bennet Minutes of the first Conference, as quoted by Richard M. Cameron, *Methodism and Society in Historical Perspective* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1961), pp. 69, 70.
17. As quoted by Wearmouth, *Working-Class Movements*, p. 203.
18. As late as 1760, a pamphlet sought to dissuade Methodists from "their

- Notion of the Community of Christian Men's goods" (p. 33). Alexander Jephson, *A Friendly and Compassionate Address to All Serious and Well-disposed Methodists*, as quoted by Wellman J. Warner, *The Wesleyan Movement in the Industrial Revolution* (London: Longman's Green Ltd., 1930), p. 156. The conviction that Methodism stood for such a notion persisted so strongly that Thomas Coke, after the death of Wesley, was forced to issue an official denial.
19. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 142-43.
 20. *Works*, 1, p. 285.
 21. MacArthur, *Economic Ethics*, p. 123. See, for example, the following rejections of such a position: *Letters*, 3, p. 122; *Works*, 3, pp. 71, 367; 4, p. 180; 7, p. 1. Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, contends that the logical deduction from Wesleyan thought would follow the lines Weber suggested, but that Wesley refused to make the deduction (p. 161). On the contrary, it would seem that Wesley's thought does not lead, logically or otherwise, to Weber's interpretation.
 22. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Mentor Books, New American Library, 1961), p. 161.
 23. *Letters*, 5, pp. 352, 354. Apparently he referred to the enclosure movement.
 24. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1961), p. 70.
 25. *Works*, 2, p. 415.
 26. Maldwyn Edwards, *John Wesley and the Eighteenth Century*, 3d ed. (London: Epworth Press, 1955), p. 148.
 27. *Works*, 2, pp. 269-70; 3, p. 482.
 28. *Works*, 11, pp. 53-59.
 29. *Letters*, 5, pp. 349-51.
 30. *Ibid.*, pp. 351-54. Cf. MacArthur, *Economic Ethics*, pp. 106-8.
 31. *Letters*, 6, pp. 175-76.
 32. Sherwin, *Friend of the People*, p. 113.
 33. *Works*, 6, p. 132-33.
 34. Sherwin, *Friend of the People*, p. 38.
 35. See, for example, *Works*, 1, p. 506; 3, p. 61; *Letters*, 3, p. 26. Cf. Simon, *Methodist Societies*, 3rd ed. (1952), p. 178; MacArthur, *Economic Ethics*, p. 124; Sherwin, *Friend of the People*, p. 45.
 36. Sherwin, *Friend of the People*, p. 110.
 37. *Works*, 7, p. 31.
 38. Sherwin, *Friend of the People*, p. 132.
 39. *Ibid.*; *Works*, 2, pp. 17, 81; 3, p. 270; Edwards, *Wesley and Eighteenth Century*, p. 154; MacArthur, *Economic Ethics*, pp. 115-16.
 40. *Works*, 4, p. 296.
 41. *Journal*, (London: Epworth Press, 1916, reprinted 1960), 8, p. 49.
 42. *Works*, 4, pp. 85-86.
 43. John Snell, "The Political Thought of Adam Ferguson," *The Municipal University of Wichita Bulletin* (May 1950), pp. 10-11.
 44. Edwards, *Wesley and Eighteenth Century*, p. 184. For MacArthur's

evaluation of Wesley's economic position, see *Economic Ethics*, pp. 111-12. In commenting on Wesley's economic views, J. A. Faulkner, *Wesley as Sociologist, Theologian, Churchman* (New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1918) says, "It only touches the surface of a condition that needed severer remedies—remedies that none in England then proposed and few now propose" (p. 12).

45. H. E. Luccock and Paul Hutchinson, *The Story of Methodism* (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1925) note that Wesley "saw the evils, and he made Methodism the kind of religious movement which expressed its sanctification by its devotion to the removal of those evils" (p. 210).

Chapter 6. Timothy L. Smith

1. Documentation for this, as for other points in this essay where the work is cited, appear in Timothy L. Smith, *Revivalism and Social Reform in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957), pp. 105, 116-17.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 181, 184-85. Cf. Donald Dayton, *Discovering an Evangelical Heritage* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 73-85; Donald G. Mathews, "Orange Scott: The Methodist Evangelist as Revolutionary," *The Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists*, ed. Martin Duberman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 71-101.
3. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *Lewis Tappan and the Evangelical War Against Slavery* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve Press, 1969), pp. 129-30.
4. Smith, *Revivalism*, pp. 104-5, 108-13; Dayton, *Evangelical Heritage*, pp. 15-24, 35-43.
5. Wyatt-Brown, *Tappan*, p. 131.
6. Charles G. Finney, *Lectures to Professing Christians* (New York: John S. Taylor, 1837), nos. 17, 19, 20. This work has appeared in many subsequent editions.
7. George M. Marsden, *The Evangelical Mind and the New School Presbyterian Experience: A Case Study of Thought and Theology in Nineteenth-Century America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 59-87; Nathaniel W. Taylor, "The Revolution in the Presbyterian Church," *The Quarterly Christian Spectator*, vol. 9 (December 1837), pp. 597-646, a little-noticed article in which Taylor equated New School doctrine with the New England Theology and raised the slavery issue (p. 629); Smith, *Revivalism*, pp. 26-27, 185-87.
8. Taylor, "Revolution," *Christian Spectator* (December 1837), pp. 599, 604-17. Sidney E. Mead, *Nathaniel William Taylor, 1786-1858: A Connecticut Liberal* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), underplays the perfectionist ethics in Taylor's theology.
9. Robert Merideth, *The Politics of the Universe: Edward Beecher, Abolition, and Orthodoxy* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), pp. 73-84.

10. Edward Beecher, "The Nature, Importance, and Means of Eminent Holiness Throughout the Church," *The American National Preacher: Or Original Sermons—Monthly*, vol. 10 (June and July 1835), pp. 193-94, 197, 203. Merideth, *Politics of the Universe*, pp. 91-101, shows the relationship of these sermons to Beecher's friendship and alliance with abolitionist Elijah P. Lovejoy, from 1834 to Lovejoy's death at the hands of a mob in October, 1837.
11. These articles in *The Christian Spectator*, vol. 7, appeared unsigned, as did all the others of which I presume Taylor to be the author: "Man's Dependence on the Grace of God, for Holiness of Heart and Life" (March 1835), pp. 76-89; "The Nature and Application of Divine Influence in the Salvation of Man" (June 1835), pp. 301-21; "An Inquiry into the True Way of Preaching on Ability," pp. 223-57; "The Scriptural View of Divine Influence" (December 1835), pp. 591-97, in which the discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit (pp. 595-97) seems to me to lay down the basis in logic for Charles G. Finney's later use of the terminology "baptism of the Holy Ghost."
12. William Ellery Channing, *The Perfect Life, in Twelve Discourses* (Boston: Roberts, 1873). I have recently discovered that the "Dr. C." to whom Charles G. Finney refers in his *Memoirs* (New York: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1876), pp. 356-57, is identified in the manuscript version (Oberlin College Archives) as William Ellery Channing.
13. Wyatt-Brown, *Tappan*, p. 131.
14. Aileen S. Kraditor, *Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics in Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 59, 79-82.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91. Cf. pp. 24-25, showing Garrison's agreement with the New Divinity and hence, with Finney and Mahan, on the nature of depravity and of free will, a context for Garrison's thought of which Kraditor is largely unaware.
16. Philip Bruce, "An Extract of a Letter . . . to Bishop Coke, dated Portsmouth, Virginia, March 25, 1788," *The Arminian Magazine* [American], vol. 2 (November 1790), pp. 563-64, came to my attention through my student, Thomas C. Johnsen. Cf. the idea of sanctification as liberation from sin through love, "the inward law of the gospel, the law of the Spirit of life," in a sermon by "Dr. Cutworth," vol. 1 (September 1789), pp. 444-45.
17. George Claude Baker, *An Introduction to the History of Early New England Methodism, 1789-1839* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1941), pp. 37-38, 45-82; Smith, *Revivalism*, pp. 154-59, 169-72, 184-85; letter from James B. Finley, Dayton, Ohio, December 3, 1819, to the editor, *The Methodist Magazine*, vol. 3 (January 1820), pp. 34-40, quoting statements by Indian chiefs praising the liberating power of the "good Spirit" from addiction to whisky; "State Legislation on The Temperance Question," *The A. M. E. Christian Recorder* (August 17, 1854), p. 70.
18. Norris Magnuson, *Salvation in the Slums: Evangelical Social Work,*