

HUMAN RIGHTS, VOCATION, AND HUMAN DIGNITY

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I

One of the most important developments in law and morality during the twentieth century was that the idea of *human rights* became the universal language of political ethics. In the aftermath of two world wars, the notion that every person is entitled to certain basic human rights became the touchstone by which the actions of individuals and nations could be evaluated.¹ These rights include classic Enlightenment entitlements such as freedom of religion, freedom to form your own ideas about politics and government, the protection of life and liberty, and protection against persecution because of religion, ethnicity, or origins. In addition, the twentieth-century concept of human rights includes rights to the resources that make a free and secure life possible—fair wages and decent working conditions; basic needs for food, shelter, and health care; and access to education and opportunities that make a free and secure life meaningful.²

These requirements are summed up in the concept of “human dignity.” Human beings, as such, deserve respect that goes beyond mere obedience to rules and sets them above the other things we

value. Persons cannot be subordinated to ideologies, sacrificed for causes, or destroyed by the workings of markets, movements, or laws. They cannot be reduced to what they can produce or valued in terms of their place in a social hierarchy. The most basic political idea in an age of human rights is that persons as such must be protected and respected, by governments, and by other institutions and individuals.³

These ideas have been especially important since they were made central to the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Since that time, governments have been obliged to explain themselves in terms of these rights, whatever their aims or political philosophies might be. Regimes have had to pay at least lip service to them, even if they had no intention of honoring them in practice. Minimal respect for human rights has become a criterion for acceptance in the international community. It separates rogue states and failed states from legitimate governments that are entitled to a place among the nations of the world.

In the concept of human dignity, there is an echo of the Christian belief that genuine love for God requires love for all our neighbors just because they are God's children and not for anything that they might do or believe. Religious participation was central to the formulation of these principles of human dignity that have become the basis for international human rights. Ecumenical Protestant social ethics began shaping these ideas into a coherent system in the 1930s, and the strategizing of American and British church leaders, especially, pushed these questions to the top of the crowded agenda of the new United Nations organization after the Second World War.⁴ They understood these political ideas to be deeply rooted in Christian tradition, but they also saw the importance of framing a *universal* declaration in broadly human terms, stressing the requirements of human dignity and minimizing claims about where those requirements come from and why they are authoritative. Thus, secular philosophers and political theorists were able to endorse the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and provide arguments for its validity. Even representatives of other religious traditions, though they were far less visible in that late-colonial era than they would be today, found reasons to support this document distilled from the key traditions of European religion and law. The

result was a practical agreement on the specified rights with no consensus on the underlying principles. The negotiators regarded this practical agreement amidst ideological differences as a remarkable achievement.⁵

II

The Universal Declaration and the thoughts that went into it remain central to the theory of human rights and to international law on human rights to this day. But the practice of human rights has become problematic. The more than sixty years since the Universal Declaration was adopted have been marked by violations on a vast scale and by carefully crafted exceptions that allow even the staunchest supporters of the *idea* of human rights to exempt their countries from particular provisions or to escape the jurisdiction of international bodies that might begin to make these provisions a reality. The United States, in particular, seems to have been committed across the last several administrations in both political parties to the conviction that international human rights doctrine could not possibly require our country to do anything that it was not already going to do anyway.

In view of this very mixed record, we must conclude that the agreement on a list of basic rights that the world community celebrated in 1948 has not had the practical effect that its authors hoped for and expected. With no shared principles by which to understand the Universal Declaration, it has become impossible to say what it would require, given the new realities of a globalized economy, international terrorism, failed states, and the end of the cold war.

In the face of violence and militant fundamentalist movements in many religious traditions, some also question whether religion deserves a place at the table when human rights are discussed.⁶ To these critics, the religious truth seems to require a kind of absolutism that makes it impossible to respect the rights of those who disagree or who fail to see the truth with the clarity that the true faith requires. From this point of view, it is best to get on with the creation of a purely secular system of law and rights. Archaic language

about persons being equal in the sight of God or receiving their rights as part of God's creation can no longer do any useful work, and people who use that language may undermine the human rights they claim to support. Moving forward with a purely secular system of law and rights may, in fact, require restrictions on public expressions of religious devotion or public display of religious symbols. From this perspective, it is time for the concept of secular, nonreligious authority that has been part of every modern system of government to develop into a genuine *secularism*. Religious beliefs and practices can still be acknowledged, but they must become completely private, no different from any other personal preferences, and if they survive at all, they must do so without public support or recognition.

Others see the same developments, but they read the signs of the times quite differently. It is not the rise of militant religion that disturbs them but the failure of secular politics. They are increasingly inclined to treat the traditions of secular democracy as morally bankrupt and incapable of supporting the respect for persons that is supposed to be the distinctive contribution of democracy to political life.⁷ "Human rights" for these thinkers is one of those dangerous Enlightenment abstractions against which Bishop Willimon warns us.⁸ An earlier generation of theologians who devoted such energy to framing universal declarations about human rights was simply confused. They had mistaken Enlightenment individualism for a narrative that can actually form a moral community. Persons have identity and responsibility in that kind of community, and they cannot really respect one another on the basis of a list of disembodied "rights."

Theologians who question the language of rights do not support the new forms of religious militancy emerging in various parts of the world. In fact, they tend to be pacifists who want to draw a sharp line of distinction between the community of faith and any community that is held together by power and created by violence. But they claim to be able to explain why liberal democracy seems unable to get a hold on the imagination of people around the world who see their identity primarily in religious terms. People who define their identity in religious terms do not think of themselves as individuals possessed of abstract rights that they look to a secu-

lar government to enforce, nor can they frame whatever hopes they have for global community in terms of a set of universal rights to which everyone is entitled. If they are to become supporters of peace and dignity, it will have to be in terms drawn from their traditions of faith.

The result is a world of religion and politics that is quite different from the world the religious activists after the Second World War expected us to be living in by the beginning of the twenty-first century. The theologians and church leaders who pressed for a Universal Declaration of Human Rights supposed that by the beginning of the twenty-first century, democratic governments based on respect for individual rights would be ascendant everywhere. They expected that rational religion would be the natural ally of these democratic governments, lending moral seriousness to their political efforts and shaping an international order in which human rights would provide a neutral standard against which every political system might be measured. Those midcentury Christian activists were optimists, but they were not utopians. They expected that the extension of human rights into more traditional societies would be controversial and that the assertion of human rights against authoritarian governments would be resisted. They expected the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to serve as the starting point for a long historical development in which declared rights would become global realities. What they did not expect was a world in which Christian theology would be divided over whether the language of human rights makes any sense as a starting point for political ethics.

Nevertheless, that is where we find ourselves. The commitment to human rights that was supposed to be the starting point for a new international order now marks a point of division, both within and between theology and politics.

III

For those of us who see the questions in theological terms, the disputes at the beginning of the twenty-first century seem oddly reminiscent of controversies within sixteenth-century Protestantism.

Christianity has been around for a long time—far longer than the systems of modern politics—and it seems that whenever the conditions of politics change fundamentally, we are forced back to some basic questions about how faith relates to power. Today, the issues of globalization and the future of the nation-state raise for us all over again a dispute that was played out at the beginning of the modern era, when the church had to figure out its relation to emerging secular politics for the first time. In that controversy, the new Protestant movement was internally divided between those who wanted to accept secular authority on its own terms and those who thought that Christians should distance themselves from it as much as possible. It is a difference expressed most clearly in the conflicts between Luther and the Anabaptists. Luther's followers saw themselves bound to society by a common need for peace and order. The Anabaptists saw Christian peace as a distinctive kind of order, which creates its own distinctive communities.

If you learned your church history as long ago as I did, you probably learned a version of the story in which Luther, Calvin, and what is sometimes called the “magisterial Reformation” triumphed, and the Mennonites, Brethren, and others who made up what is sometimes called the “radical Reformation” lost. They became a minority report within the European and North American Christianity that developed subsequently.

But if you learned Christian ethics more recently than that, you know that the pacifist perspective of the radical Reformation has been renewed in the work of contemporary authors like John Howard Yoder, who found the prevailing ideas of the magisterial Reformation an unsatisfactory compromise between the demands of the gospel and the requirements of political expediency.⁹ So the issues of the sixteenth century are alive in a new way at the beginning of the twenty-first, and while the disagreements are not as violent as they were in the original controversy, it is almost as difficult to find common ground between the two positions. As often happens in theological disputes, Methodists can be found on both sides of the question, arguing their cases with equal vigor, and with equal conviction that their position represents the central values of the Wesleyan tradition.

Wesley himself might find the whole argument somewhat confusing, since his political theology tended to be drawn more from the relationship between royal and religious authority in the Anglican establishment rather than the sharper controversies between church and secular authority in continental Protestantism, and this not so much out of strong conviction as from his tendency to continue Anglican ways of thinking except where he saw a specific need to change them. As the Methodists became more clearly separated from the Church of England, Wesley had to defend their rights to preach, hold worship, and maintain chapels, but these were legal claims particular to the provisions of English law that did not elaborate themselves into a fully developed Methodist political theology.

Beyond his interest in rights that he thought he was legally entitled to claim for his societies, Wesley was certainly no advocate of modern ideas of natural rights, or what the French Revolution would shortly call the "rights of man."¹⁰ He acknowledged the slave's claim to freedom as a "natural right," but he focused on the irony of slaveholders and slave traders who claim their own rights while denying freedom to others. Nor was the other Wesley wordsmith, brother Charles, any more inclined toward these political ideas. In a humorous poem "To Dr. Boyce," Charles asks the musician William Boyce to assist with the musical education of his son, describing his plea as "a petition of natural right."¹¹ The literary occasion was lighthearted, but the language is nonetheless revealing. The Wesleys knew the language of natural rights. It was all around them. But they made little use of it unless they were being humorous or ironical, or inveighing against someone else's moral contradictions. Certainly, their idea of rights was not theological.

Wesley strongly opposed slavery, not because he believed that "all men are created equal," but because he believed that the slave, like everyone else, has a soul that can be addressed, claimed, and redeemed by God.¹² Thus the slave, like everyone else, needs the freedom to respond to the word of grace proclaimed. The equality that Wesley understood was evangelical, not political, and he probably would have understood claims to human dignity on behalf of sinners in need of conversion as a positive hindrance to the reception of the gospel.

IV

Wesley sought to convert sinners rather than to make them acquainted with their rights. But looking back on the Methodist movement, we can say that one point where theology connects with sociology is that when you speak to people as though they were capable of having a relationship with God, they will indeed begin to enter into that relationship, and in very large numbers. No one at the beginning of the eighteenth century would have predicted from social facts of the time the transformation that religious revivals would make in the social fabric of Britain and her North American settlements. Indeed, what one might have expected was the deadening of the masses that was the first effect of the industrial and agricultural transformations in Britain during this time. One might have expected that working people, cut loose from ancestral homes and ancient customs, would suffer the fate predicted by Parson Malthus and be reduced to a level of subsistence living that made them mere instruments of the productive processes in which they labored. Or at least, one might have expected that to go on until it reached the point predicted by Marx, at which the impoverished proletariat would constitute so large a part of the population that the emerging capitalist system would collapse under its own weight.

But indeed what happened instead was the emergence of a relatively prosperous working class, which in due time became the Victorian middle class.¹³ Economic forces made this social transformation possible, but the changes went along with personal and moral transformations that made that middle class more religious and more moral than the mass of the population had probably ever been before. People became more moral, more family-oriented, better educated, and better organized, and at least through the early part of the nineteenth century, you could summarize all those changes by saying that people became more Methodist.

In the process, they acquired in practice a dignity something like the personal discipline, capacity for decision, and self-direction that human rights doctrine attributed to them in theory.¹⁴ They might have been surprised to hear that this dignity was something that they just had, *a priori*, since many of them worked quite hard

to maintain the sober and industrious habits on which that dignity and their way of life seemed to depend, and they relied on God every day for that discipline; but they would probably have agreed at least that this dignity was not something that any *human* authority had given them or could take away from them.

This dignity was also, for many of them, closely related to a sense of vocation. God had not only summoned them to conversion but had sent them back into life with a calling, with unique responsibilities and obligations that had more to do with making a faithful response to God's mercy than with meeting social expectations. These callings reflected both a unique, personal relationship to God and the more fluid nature of social relationships in the rapidly changing world of the eighteenth century. Methodists were not called to a fixed place in a social hierarchy, like the medieval "estates" or the Lutheran "orders" that defined one's vocation as a member of a class of persons with permanent, unchanging duties and limitations. Methodists had the more open-ended calling to earn all one can, save all one can, and give all one can, beginning in the particular place in life where God has found one. Living up to that calling demanded constant effort and great self-discipline, but it might well take one to a place in society quite different from where one started.¹⁵

Perhaps most important of all, this dignity included the capacity to create the institutions necessary to sustain it. Methodists on both sides of the Atlantic were famous for their *religious* organization, for class meetings, circuits, and conferences. But all of these religious organizations developed their characteristic forms of social support, emergency assistance, and political training too. Methodists went on to establish publishing houses, orphanages, schools, and colleges. Often these were founded—and continue to this day—with an explicit connection to the church, but Methodists as individuals were also highly skilled in forming business, civic, and cultural organizations that gave form and permanence to their visions of the possibilities God had opened to them.

Methodists, non-Anglican "dissenters," and other evangelicals were perhaps the most effective participants in the social changes that took place over nearly two centuries from the English Revolution of 1688 through the American Civil War, as well as

their greatest beneficiaries. It is worth remembering that they accomplished these things largely outside the established channels of political and economic power. These politically and socially marginal people on both sides of the Atlantic found ways to make themselves wealthier, better educated, and more effective in their philanthropy than the elites who initially regarded them with such suspicion. By the time they began to join those elites, they had their own ideas about what made a good society. Where Luther and the magisterial Reformation had emphasized the importance of order in times of dissolution and conflict, John Wesley emphasized practical collaboration on shared goods that helped people be virtuous as well as orderly. If the initial logic of the Radical Reformation favored withdrawal from the wider society, Wesley thought it was essential to the Methodist calling that “the providence of God has so mingled you together with other men.” In that way, “whatever grace you have received of God may through you be communicated to others; that every holy temper, and word, and work of yours may have an influence on them also.”¹⁶ Methodists had a strong sense of how much they had in common with other sober and industrious people and how much they had to offer to those who were neither sober nor industrious.

These marginal Methodists eventually became part of the social center, but the ways they lived their faith continued to provide those on the margins with tools for understanding their situation, exercising some control over their lives, and even influencing the direction of the wider society. This was especially true in America, where quite beyond the intentions of the now mainstream Methodists, and in some cases against their active resistance, the institutional models that Methodists had created became available to the very groups that some of their descendants tried to exclude, expel, or control. African Americans after the Civil War, European immigrants in the late nineteenth century, and women in the early twentieth century all found the model of local organization, personal accountability, and a commitment to mutual assistance to be the key to a better life and, ultimately, the key to political empowerment. African American churches, colleges, and businesses replicated, in their distinctive ways, the successes of the early Methodists a century before.

Keeping this historic social vocation of Methodism in perspective is important. The story of Methodist discipline and prosperity now has to be seen in a global context. The discipline may have been Methodist, but the prosperity depended in part on systems of colonial and postcolonial exploitation. Methodists were carrying away their wealth from some of the same people to whom they were carrying the gospel.¹⁷ The fact that they did not fully understand the economics of this relationship may excuse them of hypocrisy, but it does not change the reality of the relationships. It also does not excuse us in the North Atlantic world from responsibility for understanding what our ancestors could not, and for dealing responsibly with the long-term results of the realities they created.

Precisely because these realities have created a quite different social world in Africa, parts of Asia, and in Latin America, we cannot use the historic Wesleyan models that I have described in any simple and direct way in those places. The worlds are completely different, as Bishop Mattos reminds us.¹⁸ Indeed, the worlds are completely different for us in the North Atlantic world too. In recounting the successes of the Wesleyan model in its own time and place, I would not want to be misunderstood as prescribing that we imitate it today. At least since 1932 in the United States and since 1945 in Britain, we have understood the relationship between persons and society and the social responsibilities of government in very different terms from those that prevailed in John Wesley's world, and the notion that we could solve today's problems with Wesley's economics is about as practical as trying to run a medical mission according to the advice found in his *Primitive Physic*. We would quite properly be shut down by the government for doing something similar today, and the fact that governments sometimes suggest churches could solve the problem of poverty illustrates that governments can be as confused as churches about the difference between strategy and understanding.

What we gain from the Methodist history of social transformation that is still valid today is not strategy but understanding. It is an understanding of the social conditions that make for human dignity and an understanding that we have a vocation to create those conditions with all those who share our society, whether or not they share our faith.

V

Methodism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when it was most influential and most effective, did not create a political theology, but it developed a substantial body of political experience that carries us beyond the oppositions of the Reformation era and reconnects us with the contemporary questions about the future of human rights on a global scale. What emerges clearly from the political experience of the Methodist movement is that human dignity is not an idea but a lived reality. It becomes possible to see persons endowed with unique dignity and possessed of specific rights that enable them to maintain that dignity once they have places where they can experience rights and dignity, and where other people who have eyes to see can observe the transformation at work.

Those who first attempted to create an international order based on human rights, beginning with the Universal Declaration of 1948, assumed that a consensus that was sufficient to establish a basis in positive international law was the main thing required to begin the process of making human rights available and effective on a global scale. In a world that had almost been destroyed by the power of modern states, it was perhaps inevitable that religious and secular leaders at the middle of the twentieth century would look to nations united by their various commitments to universal principles of human rights to create a different kind of world order. They were, in any case, operating with an idea of secular authority that Christians and others had largely accepted since the Reformation era, in which the authority of law, adopted for whatever reasons, is the starting point for order.

But the movements that created the modern democracies understood in practice that human dignity requires social reality before it can be made a political and legal reality. Their view of society was more pluralistic—not a dichotomy of church and state, Christian community and secular authority, but a variety of social settings in which Christians live out their callings alongside their neighbors. The variety of callings creates a pluralistic politics, in place of the dualisms of secular and spiritual, or public and private. Clive Marsh, in his explorations of contemporary Christology, has

written of the need to carry the reality of Christ into the diversity of social relationships—family, friends, work, and politics.¹⁹ That insight, drawn in part from the work of Faith and Order in British Methodism, is a reminder of the important role that earlier Methodists played in creating that diversity. Methodists have had less to say about church and state than some other Protestants because they have been busy creating a society that consists of more than just church and state.

This vocational pluralism assumes that agreement on particular human goods is possible apart from agreement on theology. Shared experience of evils overcome and goods sustained shows that moral meanings do not completely depend on a shared narrative of faith. People who want to fight disease, educate children, or make music together discover that they can do it across very different cultures and very different understandings of what the ultimate destiny of human life may be. They will sometimes stop doing it if religious or political authorities tell them that it is a bad idea, for theological or for constitutional reasons, but this vocational pluralism grew up very naturally, despite religious differences, and sometimes even in the face of religious hostility. The same experiences are repeated today on a global scale, across even larger gaps of faith and culture, and it is important to develop an understanding of politics that takes seriously these cross-cultural, cross-religious experiences. These experiences are the social realities that must precede political agreement on human rights.

This is the legacy of the Methodist movement to our contemporary understanding of human rights and human dignity. It is not a model for dealing with the more complex realities of global economics that we live with today. It is not a Wesleyan plan of action that we might try to imitate. Rather, what we receive from Wesley and those early Methodists is a pluralistic understanding of politics and society: human goods exist in the forms that people create and maintain in concrete social situations, in their interactions with one another across all the lines of race, religion, ethnicity, and class that initially divide them. There are various ways to understand these human goods in relationship to God, and various ways to order them by law, but they do not depend on church or state for their existence or for their meaning to the people who share them.

Marginal Christianity learns to build on that shared experience rather than wait for legal authorization or withdraw into the security of a confessional community. It gets things done rather than waits for authorization. It prefers to ask for forgiveness, rather than permission, to quote a favorite strategic axiom of the marginalized. It helps people accomplish what they seek rather than demands the enactment of its own program. Only later do those who have been helped find that their own expectations have been transformed, and the whole order of social possibilities has been altered.

All of this is unsatisfactory, theologically and politically, to those whose politics is still framed in Reformation terms. Those whose politics is descended, however remotely, from Luther's separation of secular authority and sacramental community get nervous when people start talking about secular action in terms of their Christian vocation. The secular-minded often approve of the results, but they find the method difficult to square with their expectation that if people can agree on what they want, they ought not to risk that consensus by using too much religious language to say why they want it. The radically separate Christian witness, by contrast, seems to be perplexed or angered by the strategic successes of marginal Christianity. Living the faith within society is not supposed to work, for theological reasons. So if it appears to work, the most likely explanation is that someone has been unfaithful, and what matters is faithfulness, not effectiveness.

Bishop Willimon has warned us against the dangers of proclaiming a gospel that depends too much on worldly successes.²⁰ The good news of salvation, he insists, is not a compendium of good advice about family relations, financial success, or positive thinking about ourselves and our situation. He is quite right, of course, about the importance of preserving the integrity of the gospel, but we must be careful not to confuse integrity with separation. A gospel that is about incarnation cannot draw too sharp a line between sacred and secular, between what is truly divine and what is merely human.

If you set the problem of church and society in the Reformation-era terms that still dominate much of Protestant thinking at the beginning of the twenty-first century, if there is only secular authority or spiritual, only politics or faith, then the Christian

choice will lie with faith, and politics will be at best a kind of disagreeable service undertaken on behalf of one's neighbors. But if there is a politics of the workplace and of the school and of the museum, alongside the politics of church and state, if there is, in short, a kind of politics for every vocation that people share, then it seems to me that it is very much a part of the Christian vocation to make these things work. Our goal is to be both faithful and effective. Wesleyan Christians insist that effectiveness in creating shared human goods is a witness to our faith. Wesleyan Christians insist that the tragic choice between faithfulness and effectiveness is itself a sign of structural evils that must be addressed and, if possible, overcome. To accept the choice between faithfulness and effectiveness as a given is to deny our vocation.

To serve the present age and fulfill our calling, we must join with others, wherever we find ourselves, to create the conditions under which we can experience what human dignity means. Only then can our governments and our international institutions formulate declarations of human rights that will be effective in human life. And if we accept that calling and fulfill it, this will not just be a service to our neighbors but a working out of our own salvation. It will not be just an application of the gospel of Jesus Christ to a separate, secular reality but a way of understanding how the love of God fills all things and reaches every person.

4. "The Adamic law . . . required that man should use, to the glory of God, all the powers with which he was created. Now, he was created free from any defect, either in his understanding or his affections. His body was then no clog to the mind. . . . Consequently, this law, proportioned to his original powers, required that he should always think, always speak, and always act precisely right, in every point whatever. . . . he was well able to do so." Wesley, *PACP*, 79.
5. *Ibid.* Again and again in *A Plain Account of Christian Perfection* Wesley equates Christian perfection with the renewed image of God, and this image itself with love. See, for example, 28, 32, 51, 55, 60, 81, 91.
6. *Ibid.*, 59.
7. The reference is to Charles Wesley's hymn, "Come, O Thou Traveler Unknown."

7. Human Rights, Vocation, and Human Dignity

1. Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 529–33.
2. David Hollenbach, *The Common Good and Christian Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 159–64.
3. Michael Perry, *Toward a Theory of Human Rights* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 33–36.
4. John Nurser, *For All Peoples and Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 143–71.
5. Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 76–80.
6. Sam Harris, *The End of Faith* (New York: Norton, 2004).
7. Stanley Hauerwas, *After Christendom? How the Church Is to Behave If Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991).
8. See "What If Wesley Was Right?" in this volume.
9. John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971).
10. The definitive analysis of Wesley's understanding of "natural," as opposed to legal or "civil," rights is found in Theodore R. Weber, *Politics in the Order of Salvation: Transforming Wesleyan Political Ethics* (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 2001), 303–52.
11. ST Kimbrough and Oliver A. Beckerlegge, eds., *The Unpublished Poetry of Charles Wesley*, vol. 1 (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 1988), 279. The 2007 Oxford Institute of Methodist Theological Studies heard a performance of "To Dr. Boyce," set to music by Mary Jackson, as part of its celebration of the three hundredth anniversary of Charles Wesley's birth.
12. Wesley, *Works* (Jackson), 11:74–76.
13. Herbert Schlossberg, *The Silent Revolution and the Making of Victorian England* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000), 28–46.
14. Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 31–34.

15. Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The De-Moralization of Society* (New York: Knopf, 1995), 143–44. Donald B. Marti, “Rich Methodists: The Rise and Consequences of Lay Philanthropy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in *Perspectives on American Methodism*, ed. Richey, Rowe, and Schmidt (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 1993), 265–85.
16. John Wesley, *Sermons* (Abingdon Press), 1:537. Bishop Hope Morgan Ward made this the theme of her sermon to the Oxford Institute of Methodist Theological Studies on August 19, 2007.
17. See Ivan Abrahams, “‘To Serve the Present Age, Our Calling to Fulfill’: A Different Church for a Different World,” Chapter 5 in this volume.
18. See Paulo Ayres Mattos, “‘The World Is My Parish’—Is It? Wesleyan Ecclesio-Missiological Considerations from a Contemporary Latin American Perspective,” chapter 8 in this volume.
19. Clive Marsh, *Christ in Focus* (London: SCM Press, 2005), 185–86.
20. See Will Willimon, “What If Wesley Was Right?,” Chapter 2 of this volume.

8. “The World Is My Parish”—Is It?

1. John Wesley, “Causes of the Inefficacy of Christianity” in *The Works of John Wesley* (hereafter *Works*), ed. Albert C. Outler, 4:87, 90, 93, 95, 96.
2. John Wesley, eds., Frank Baker, Albert Outler, Franz Hildebrandt, Oliver A. Beckerlegge, Gerald R. Cragg, W. Reginald Ward, and Richard P. Heitzenrater (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1984); *Works*, 25:616.
3. John Wesley, *The Works of John Wesley* [hereafter *Works* (Jackson), ed., Thomas Jackson (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996), 8:310.
4. John Wesley, *Larger Minutes of Several Conversations, Minutes of the Methodist Conferences from the first held in London, by the late Rev. John Wesley, A.M., in the year 1744* (London: John Mason, at the Wesleyan Conference Office, 1862–64), 1:446.
5. Albert C. Outler, “Do Methodists Have a Doctrine of the Church?” in *The Doctrine of the Church*, ed. Dow Kirkpatrick (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1964), 11–28.
6. David Carter, *Love Bade Me Welcome: A British Methodist Perspective on the Church* (Peterborough, U.K.: Epworth Press, 2002), vii. R. Newton Flew, ed., *The Nature of the Church: Papers Presented to the Theological Commission Appointed by the Continuation Committee of the World Conference on Faith and Order* (London: SCM Press, 1952); Colin Williams, *John Wesley’s Theology Today* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960); Reginald Kissack, *Church or No Church? A Study of the Development of the Concept of Church in British Methodism* (London: Epworth Press, 1964); Frank Baker, *John Wesley and the Church of England* (London: Epworth, 2000); Geoffrey Wainwright, *Methodists in Dialogue* (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 1995); *The Ecumenical Moment: Crisis and Opportunity for the Church* (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1983); “Methodism’s Ecclesial Location and Ecumenical Vocation,” in *One in Christ*, vol. 19, no. 2 (1983), 104–34; David Carter, *Love Bade Me Welcome: A British Methodist Perspective on the Church* (Peterborough, England: Epworth Press,