

Modernization and the Search for a New Image of Man

The invitation to present this essay carried with it the suggestion that it deal with questions roughly in the area of "the new humanity" and consider them in the light of the revolutionary character of our times—as experienced particularly in my part of the world—and the missionary task in the new world. In writing the essay I decided that perhaps the best way to carry out my assignment would be to deal with some aspects of the search for a new image of man resulting from the requirements of the modernization process in Asia and then consider some of the implications of a doctrine of the new humanity for this search. Such a project would illustrate one way of doing the missionary task in the developing world of Asian societies, namely, to involve the significance of Christian faith in the creative thrusts of social change.

Robert Sinai in his book *The Challenge of Modernization* (1964) makes two pertinent observations about Asian societies. The first is this: "None of these societies have ever known what spring is: they have never experienced a sense of refreshment and renewal. . . . Asian history is the history of inert being, without sufficient resilience to defy destiny." The other is this: "In Asia, man has always been part of a group, at all times subordinated to ends larger than himself, willing to lose himself in something immense, in a horde or in a dynasty, in a pyramid or a Nirvana. Asia never found what Europe discovered—man—individual, self-conscious, expansive; seeking, acquiring, and tor-

MODERNIZATION AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW IMAGE OF MAN

mented."¹ These two observations are now in the process of being falsified. Asian societies are now launched in the process of revolutionary change which can mean their rejuvenation and renewal. Moreover, the process of rapid social change itself is breaking up the hard and immense collectivities in which man has been lost, driving him to assert openly and defiantly his freedom, dignity, and creativity.

Modernization in Southern Asia

I will use the term "modernization" to interpret the social change now in process in Southern Asia. The term "development," which is very much in vogue today, is also useful, but its stress falls on economic and technological factors, and I wish to emphasize equally the social and cultural. In using the term "modernization" I mean to indicate at least three characteristics of the revolutionary ferment in South Asian societies. The first is its *total* thrust.² Beyond any doubt, economic and technological progress is decisive in any conception of modernization, and it is possible to emphasize only this factor. But the modernization process goes beyond this. It involves nothing less than the struggle for a new social order, a new "cultural ethos," and a new conception of man.³ The second feature of the revolutionary ferment in Asia which I wish to indicate by the term "modernization" is its *direction*: it is from tradition to modernity.⁴

¹ Robert Sinai, *The Challenge of Modernization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), p. 46.

² Wilbert E. Moore, *Social Change* (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India [Private], Ltd., 1965), p. 89: "What is involved in modernization is a 'total' transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the 'advanced', economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World." Cf. C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1966), p. 6.

³ Cf. M. M. Thomas, *The Christian Response to the Asian Revolution* (London: SCM Press, 1966). Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, 3 vols., (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

⁴ Cf. A. B. Shah and C. R. M. Rao, eds., *Tradition and Modernity in India* (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965); Robert N. Bellah, ed., *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Thomas, *The Christian Response to the Asian Revolution*. Black defines modernization "as the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowl-

C. E. Black writes:

When one considers modernization as a process . . . one thinks of it as a continuous series of changes accompanying the growth of knowledge and its effects on man's ways of getting things done. As a means of bringing a degree of order to the great complexity of human affairs, one may think of traditional societies as a pattern of inherited institutions or structures that is relatively static at the time that modern knowledge makes its initial impact on it. The effect of modern knowledge is to change the functions that traditional institutions must perform, and this in turn affects the institutions themselves. It is in this sense that the impact of modern functions on traditional institutions lies at the heart of the process of modernization.⁵

M. M. Thomas explains the movement from tradition to modernity as a movement from (1) "an ethos with a vision of an undifferentiated unity to the contemporary awakening which recognizes differentiation leading to a heightened sense of individuality," (2) from the concept of world-as-nature to that of world-as-history, and (3) from a sacred to a secular ethos.⁶ Finally, the term "modernization" also indicates the radical and rapid nature of the change that is called for. The contemporary South Asian who is awake to the possibilities of development demands change and improvement not merely within his lifetime but actually within the next few years.⁷

Perhaps it is useful at this stage to speak briefly of the motivations that are stimulating social change in the societies of Southern Asia. To do this I have chosen to consider the goals or ideals of the modernization process as understood by these societies. Before mentioning them, a few comments by way of preface are in order. It is to be noted that most—if not all—of these goals or ideals of modernization are largely Western in origin and conception. They are in fact cherished traditions of

edge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution," *The Dynamics of Modernization*, p. 7. Cf. the definition given by Moore, *Social Change*, p. 89.

⁵ Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, p. 55.

⁶ M. M. Thomas, "Modernization of Traditional Societies and the Struggle for New Cultural Ethos," *The Ecumenical Review*, October, 1966, pp. 426-39.

⁷ Cf. Maurice Zinkin, *Development for Free Asia* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), p. 3.

the modernized societies in the West where they were first conceived and achieved. It is precisely on the irresistible authority of achievement that they are at present making a revolutionary impact upon the traditional societies of Southern Asia, although their initial influence occurred under the coercive framework of colonialism. (See K. M. Pannikar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, 1959) But although these goals have come as external and powerful influences, they are, nevertheless, being appropriated by, and adapted to, the societies of Southern Asia. It is within the tensions brought about by this process of appropriation that there has arisen the search for a new image of man in Southern Asia. The process by which this adaptation is happening has been described by Gunnar Myrdal.⁸ First they formed a decisive part in the ideologies of the liberation movements which won political independence for many of these countries. Then they were incorporated into the organic laws or constitutions of the new states, thus according them the privileged status of national goals and endowing them with the majesty of constitutional law. The governments based on these constitutions are thus under mandate to implement them. Then they became the official goals and primary models of the development plans of the various countries.⁹ They have also been adopted as the platforms or programs of government or political parties. They are often rehearsed in policy speeches, in leading articles, in academic debates, and in public discussions. They have also become a decisive part of the ideology of nationalism.

⁸ Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, I, 54-55.

⁹ A good example is the case of the Philippines. The Filipino official who was mainly responsible for the success of the self-sufficiency in the rice production program of the Philippines said this in a speech: "It is not surprising that in our efforts to solve our economic problems, we have patterned our program of action after the development programs that have proved successful in the modern industrial societies of today. We have emulated their techniques of production, their pattern of allocating national resources, their development projects, and their public investment programs. Our knowledge of the economic achievements of the industrialized world have had the salutary effect of saving us from the costly process of experimentation, which we would have experienced, had we been left to fend for ourselves. In addition, the apparatus of modern technology which has been developed by the industrial countries, is now at our disposal. It is an accepted economic fact that technology, properly harnessed, is the potent instrument of economic growth." "The Consequences of Development," in *The Manila Times*, May 12, 1969.

In view of all this, one can go as far as to say that they have become the "official creed" of these countries.¹⁰

Viewed against the background of the prevailing conditions in the countries of Southern Asia, the modernization ideals appear as new and radical and—to some—almost impossible of realization. The very effort to adopt them, understand them, and make them a decisive element in the social vision of Asian peoples—let alone succeed in implementing them—is itself unmistakable evidence for the radical nature of the change that is demanded in modernization. But the process of renewal has begun, and the Asians seem to want development badly enough to be ready to pay the price of it.¹¹

What then are the modernization goals? Gunnar Myrdal has put them together in summary fashion in his monumental book *Asian Drama*, where he uses them as value premises by which to evaluate the problems and prospects of modernization in Southern Asia.¹²

(1) Heading the list as a general ideal is *rationality*.¹³ This ideal demands that all courses of action or policy should be based on rational considerations. Inefficient traditional ways, superstitions, and fallacious reasoning must be abandoned. The scientific method must be applied and modern technology utilized to maximize production. The late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expresses adequately what is involved in this ideal of rationality:

But we have to deal with age-old practices, ways of thought, ways of action. We have got to get out of many of these traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of acting, traditional ways of production, traditional ways of distribution and traditional ways of consumption. We have got to get out of all that into what might be called more modern ways of doing so. What is society in the so-called advanced countries like today? It is a scientific and technological society. It employs new techniques, whether it is on the farm or in the factory or in transport. The test of a country's advance is how far it is utilizing modern techniques. Modern technique is not a matter of just getting a tool and using it. Modern technique follows modern thinking. You

¹⁰ Cf. Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, I, 54; cf. The Magna Charta of Socio-Economic Development of the Philippines adopted by the Philippine Congress, 1969.

¹¹ Cf. Zinkin, *Development for Free Asia*, p. 3.

¹² Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, I, 49-69; Vol. II, Part 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, I, 57.

can't get hold of a modern tool and have an ancient mind. It won't work.¹⁴

From this it can be seen that the ideal of rationality implies nothing less than a "mental revolution."

(2) Next are ideals that have to do with economic development. These include at least three things. First is the goal of development and planning for development, both of which flow directly from the ideal of rationality.¹⁵ Second is the need for increasing productivity, which is to be achieved primarily through improved techniques and intensive capital. Third is the ideal of raising the levels of living, which can be achieved partly by raising output per head. The improvement of levels of living is a necessary condition for higher labor input and efficiency and for those changes in abilities and attitudes requisite for maximizing productivity.

(3) Next are two ideals that deal with sociocultural change. One has to do with social and economic equalization.¹⁶ There is no doubt that great social and economic inequalities exist in Asia, and the situation is getting worse in some countries as in the Philippines. One of the aims of modernization is to reduce these inequalities. The appeal of socialism and communism derives largely from their alleged capacity to remove these inequalities and bring about a "socialistic pattern of society" or a "classless society." The other goal has to do with the need to modernize institutions and attitudes.¹⁷ The changes required here cover a broad area and are far-reaching in their implications. Perhaps we can best grasp what is involved in the modernization of social institutions if we envisage the sort of social order that is the goal of the modernization process. Myrdal indicates this:

What is envisaged is a united and integrated national community within which there is solidarity and "free competition" in a much wider sense than the term implies in economic analysis. In such a national community the barriers of caste, color, religion, ethnic origin, culture, language, and provincial loyalties would be broken down, and property and education would not be so unequally distributed as to

¹⁴ Cited by Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, I, pp. 57-58, n. 3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-62.

represent social monopolies. A nation with marked social and economic equality, high social as well as spatial mobility, and firm allegiance of the whole population to the national community is visualized.¹⁸

What is required in the modernization of attitudes is indicated by the qualities that should characterize "the new man," who would be the citizen of the new social order in Southern Asia. The list of characteristics as given by Myrdal includes the following:

- (1) efficiency;
- (2) diligence;
- (3) orderliness;
- (4) punctuality;
- (5) frugality;
- (6) scrupulous honesty (which pays in the long run and is a condition for raising efficiency in all social and economic relations);
- (7) rationality in decisions on action (liberation from reliance on static customs, from group allegiances and favoritism, from superstitious beliefs and prejudices, approaching the rationally calculating "economic man" of Western liberal ideology);
- (8) preparedness for change (for experimentation along new lines, and for moving around spatially, economically, socially);
- (9) alertness to opportunities as they arise in a changing world;
- (10) energetic enterprise;
- (11) integrity and self-reliance;
- (12) cooperativeness (not limiting but redirecting egoistic striving in a socially beneficial channel; acceptance of responsibility for the welfare of the community and the nation);
- (13) willingness to take the long view (and to forgo short-term profiteering; subordination of speculation to investment and of commerce and finance to production, etc).¹⁹

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60; cf. M. M. Thomas, *The Christian Response to the Asian Revolution*, pp. 35-65.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

As will be indicated in the next section, the realization of these qualities would involve a thorough overhaul of the traditional image by which the average Asian understands himself.

(4) Finally, there are a number of ideals connected with political modernization. The first of these is the ideal of national consolidation, which has to do with the development of a sense of national community and the establishment of "a system of government, courts, and administration that is effective, cohesive, and internally united in purpose and action, with unchallenged authority over all regions and groups within the boundaries of the state."²⁰ The need for this is easily demonstrated when one realizes that within most of the countries in Asia there exists a variety of races, languages, cultures, and religions, and that the peoples are separated by physical barriers such as long distances, mountains, and bodies of water which have not been bridged by effective infrastructures of communication. The second goal of political modernization is national independence and sovereignty. This ideal is most firmly asserted and constitutes the cornerstone of militant nationalism in Asia.

There is a debate going on whether political democracy should be held up as an ideal of modernization. Certainly most of the countries in Southern Asia started out with the ambition of being democratic nation-states, governed by the rule of law through representative assemblies constituted by free elections and universal suffrage. They guaranteed civil liberties and human rights. But early in their careers, these countries were thwarted in their democratic ambitions by internal strife and economic dislocation. Today we have substitutes for democracy in Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, Cambodia, and until recently, Thailand. However, most of the countries who have found it necessary to resort to more authoritarian forms of government as an alternative to anarchy make the promise of eventual return to political democracy. Moreover, there is the experience of some countries tending to show that political democracy does not necessarily form an integral part of the system comprising the ideals of modernization. As Myrdal found out, "national independence, national consolidation, changes in institutions and attitudes, equalization, rise of productivity, rise and redirection of consumption, and, more generally, planning

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

for development can be attained by an authoritarian regime bent on their realization."²¹ But if there are doubts whether political democracy should be regarded as a part of the system of ideals of modernization—and Myrdal is convinced that it should not²²—the idea that as broad a segment of the population as possible should become involved in the acceptance of the modernization ideals and thus secure popular cooperation and responsibility in their implementation is universally aimed at. Such popular acceptance and cooperation is necessary for generating the kind of social discipline and even austerity in living that are necessary for the effort of development to be rewarded with success.

The Image of Man Required in Modernization

It would now be useful for our purposes to indicate the lines and hues of the image of man that is required by the modernization goals or ideals and to point out some of the difficulties in their realization arising from the traditional ways in which man has been understood in Southern Asia. Our reasons for doing this are twofold. To begin with, modernization in Asia will depend much on the emergence of a modernizing *elite* who are committed to these goals and reflect the image of a modern man in Asia. In addition, the resistance of the traditional culture converges precisely at the point of the understanding of man, provoking a ferment that has given rise to the search for an image of man for contemporary Asia. The illustrations I use are drawn mainly from the Philippines, which I know best.

(1) To begin with, modernization requires a type of man who knows how to live with the fact that change is the normal state of reality, including man himself, and that he must use change to his advantage and not be a mere victim of it. Man in the West has by and large learned to cope with change. He knows that nature evolves, that the form of human life is historical, that society can be changed not by divine visitation but by human effort, that reality responds to human purposes and activity, and that man has the knowledge, power, and tools to become a participant in the creative process of change.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 65, n.2.

One cannot say the same things without qualification about man in Asia. Observers of the Asian scene are almost unanimous in the opinion that the traditional Asian values stability more than change. His model for nature is the land, and the land is always there—stable, unchanging, and indestructible. His model for the movement of time and, therefore, of life and history, is the eycle of seasons—of planting and harvesting. What happened in the past is what is happening in the present, and it is what will happen in the future. The *new* is not expected at all. His model for society is the village—and the Asian village has always been the same through all millennia—knit together by kinship bonds that run through many generations and by customs and traditions hallowed by the spirits of ancestors and the sanctions and rewards of religion. He views reality and himself with it as ruled by inexorable fate, and it is a fate that is not friendly to his interest and is not finally amenable to his feeble attempts to alter it. The image of the traditional Asian is that of a poor, emaciated, sluggish, but contented cow—a patient and pathetic victim of circumstance. If the Asian wants modernization and development—and there are unmistakable signs that he wants them—he must pay the price of letting this image of man go and develop the capacity to live with change and be innovative. Maurice Zinkin believes rightly that creative innovation is a requisite for development:

Nothing is more vital to development than a high propensity to innovate, a high level of willingness to accept and initiate change. The underdevelopment of Asia has to a considerable extent been due to its low propensity to innovate; the Asian peasant learnt how to grow his crops under the conditions of his village two thousand years ago. From then until this generation any experiment he might make was far more likely to end in crop failure and starvation than in riches. Naturally, therefore, Asia puts a heavy emphasis on custom and the ways of one's ancestors, naturally too the road to success has normally been through growing old in conformity. It is important, therefore, for the development of Asia that the capacity to innovate, especially the capacity to absorb and apply technological knowledge, must be given a higher place than it has been hitherto.²³

(2) Modernization requires a type of man who is rational and pragmatic. C. E. Black rates the accumulation of knowledge and

²³ Zinkin, *Development for Free Asia*, p. 8.

the methods of rational explanation by which it has been achieved as central to the growth of the modernization process.²⁴ And Richard Dickinson points out that development is possible only on the basis of a rationalist ethos:

The development concept is fundamentally rationalist, based on an implicit faith in the capacity of reason ultimately to unravel the knots which snarl progress. On a small scale the symbol of the development ethos is the Five Year Plan. It implies faith in the physical sciences to help man master nature, faith in the social sciences to help man to understand human relationships and to arrange them to promote human welfare, and faith in men to act morally and rationally to build a more just and rational society.²⁵

Again, it is not far from the truth to say that man in the West by and large typifies this image. It is he who has brilliantly succeeded in developing scientific methods of acquiring knowledge of nature, man, and the universe and has learned to apply effectively the vast knowledge he has accumulated to control his environment, conquer space, and improve the material conditions and cultural expressions of his life. As a result science and technology have revolutionized the ways in which man runs his affairs and the values he lives by. The social upheavals that are exploding in our cities and universities occur as a consequence of the confidence that man can produce a better world with the knowledge and power and tools at his disposal.

This dimension of rationality in the image of modern man challenges some of the traditional ways of thinking in Asia. The challenge can perhaps be illustrated by the average Filipino's mental makeup and its relation to science. One of my compatriots has looked into this matter, and she has come out with some very interesting conclusions.²⁶ Of these I will mention three. The first is that the average Filipino is not much interested in and lacks the ability to handle ideas profitably.²⁷ In this sense the Filipino mental makeup typifies an aspect of the Oriental mind

²⁴ Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, p. 11.

²⁵ Richard Dickinson, *Line and Plummet: The Churches and Development* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1968), p. 33.

²⁶ Josefina D. Constantino, "The Filipino Mental Make-up and Science," *Philippine Sociological Review*, January, 1966, pp. 18-28.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

which "is a deifying and worshipping mind."²⁸ Nature for the Oriental mind is still enchanted with ancestors, spirits, and gods, and this prevents it from being analyzed and known and controlled in a scientific way. Secondly, the Filipino shares the Oriental disposition toward harmony and integration. Josefina D. Constantino says: "Nature and person . . . are made integrally one, harmoniously one with his natural surroundings."²⁹ As a consequence, the Filipino is not disposed to analyze, to distinguish, to identify and objectify—all of which are important in ordinary scientific work. Finally, the Filipino mind—like a typical Oriental—"has a strong myth-making power."³⁰ This is closely related to the Filipino's sense for the immediate and the concrete, for the here and now, but without the training for abstract and conceptual generalization which again is important in scientific thinking.³¹

If what is said here is by and large typical of the Asian mind, it is not easy to develop the sort of rationality conducive to development and modernization. The typical Asian today is more interested in the finished products of science and technology than in the conceptuality and method of thinking, which constitute the essence of science and technology. It is easier, of course, to import scientific services and technological goods than the whole system of thought and values which lies at the core of a scientific and technological culture.

(3) Modernization requires a type of man who includes in his idea of goodness the values of material riches and tangible achievement. Matter is good, and its humanization is a means for the refinement of the human spirit. Money and resources are to be conserved and used for productive rather than consumptive purposes. The businessman is to be regarded as equally useful in society as the scholar and the saint. Manual activity and material achievement are values equally as good and useful as intellectual pursuits and spiritual or religious exercises.

These values have been partly responsible for the technological advance and economic affluence of the Western societies. Because they are regarded as a necessary condition for the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

modernization of Southern Asia, their adoption by the average Asian is urged vehemently by the modernizing elites such as the economists, the politicians, and the intellectuals. The shrill insistence with which they are urged upon the people is an indication of the strong resistance of the traditional indigenous culture.³² For the Southern Asian traditionally regards matter as illusory, if not outright evil, and its subjection to human ordering is not regarded as particularly ennobling to the human spirit. Traditionally the average Southern Asian does not save much—for there is little or nothing to save in a subsistence economy—and the little he saves he spends on religious ceremonies, social festivals, and jewelry for his wife.³³ He does not think well of profit—to pursue it systematically even at the expense of good personal relations is to have a distorted sense of values. The businessman is usually associated neither with hard work nor with honesty. As Maurice Zinkin rightly observed, “the admiration of Asia still goes to goodness rather than to success.”³⁴ The effect is that less effort is put on being successful without perhaps increasing the effort at being good. Manual work is not regarded as dignifying, and the farmer, the factory worker, the mechanic, the laborer are without social prestige. In short, the culture of Asia has made a virtue out of poverty!

It is clear that for economic development to be sustained in Southern Asia, some of its noneconomic values must be changed in favor of those that make for increased productivity such as those in the West. At the same time, however, there is in Asia a nervous fear of Westernization arising out of the logic of nationalism and the desire for cultural identity. This dilemma underscores the urgency of the search for a new image of man in Asia.

(4) Modernization requires an image of man which underscores the view that man is an individual personal self who is free to make decisions for himself in his manifold relations based on reason and conscience, and has certain rights which have to be recognized and guaranteed. As a person he is to be valued and distinguished from the world of things and functions (i.e.,

³² Cf. Robert N. Bellah, *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*; Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, I, pp. 71-125.

³³ Cf. Zinkin, *Development for Free Asia*, pp. 5-33; Bellah, *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, pp. 34-38.

³⁴ *Development for Free Asia*, p. 11.

from the world of nature). The integrity of his otherness as an individual in community with others must be respected. His potentialities for selfhood and creative achievement and making a useful contribution to the improvement of the quality of corporate life must be given full play in their development and realization. This ethic of human dignity and personal self-realization is characteristic of Western civilization. Whatever may have been the excesses of Western individualism, the image of man as a free individual personal self existing in competition with others has been a powerful catalyst in releasing the tremendous human energy, venturesome spirit, and creative intelligence with which the West has been developed.

I suppose not many Asians would dispute the fact that such an understanding of man is also necessary in Asia if the potentialities for creativity which no one would doubt the Asian shares with men of other cultures are to be developed and harnessed for the purposes of modernization and development. However, in the process of appropriating such an image of man many in Asia have run up against considerable difficulties in some elements of the traditional culture. Man in Asia is not primarily an individual person radically distinct from, but rather an organic part of, nature, family, and tribe. He is moored inextricably to kin and village. These natural ties are further hallowed by the unquestioned authority of tradition and custom. And this authority is further reinforced by the sanctions and rewards of religion, which in Asia is a dominant force of conservatism, continuity, and stability in society. The interests of his kin and village are his primary loyalty, and he must conform to the values and standards of his primary group to the point of submerging his individuality and sacrificing his personal interests or ambitions. To illustrate this: There is a woman member of our faculty whom we had groomed to go to the United States for further studies in her field, which is music. She is thirty-one years old, single, and living with her parents. For two years we scrounged for funds for her travel, scholarship, board, books, and allowances. She had been given leave for two years and was set to go in August. Within a month of her departure her father came to inform us that he and his wife decided not to let their daughter go. We asked him why, and he could not give us a satisfactory reason beyond telling us that they were afraid she might get sick and lonely and no one would take care of her. I talked to

the woman and she told me she wanted very much to go. We of course encouraged her in this and asked her in so many words to assert her right as a mature person, that it is her life which she must live after all, etc. She wanted to do all this, but—as she put it—it is not easy to go against the decision of her parents. In a situation like this—and this is not an isolated or exceptional case—it is difficult for the individual to emerge into the full light of mature, creative, and independent selfhood.

(5) Modernization requires an image of man who participates in society as a responsible member. Modern man regards society not as something divinely given, nor fixed by nature, nor chained unalterably to tradition, nor bound completely to the status quo. He looks upon it as a human product, capable of being reordered not only on the basis of order and harmony but, as M. M. Thomas suggests, “of the relation between responsible persons, within the framework of a creative tension between order, freedom and justice and the conviction that social, political and religious institutions are made for man and for the fulness of his personal life in a community of persons.”³⁵ For this reason modern man has developed a civic consciousness beyond his family, village, and tribe and inclusive of the whole nation. He works at his job, serves in the civil service, or participates in political activity not merely to further his personal ambitions and promote his family interests, but to contribute to public welfare and nation-building. He knows that he is to be employed on the basis of qualification and not of good connections; he accepts the validity of evaluating performance in terms of competence and achievement and not in terms of smooth interpersonal relationships; he acknowledges the wisdom of applying impersonal criteria on a universalistic scale to eliminate nepotism and graft and to rationalize activity to cope with the demands of more complex and larger operations made necessary by an industrializing society.

These are attitudes and values which to some extent are new and not readily understandable to the average man in Southern Asia. Let me illustrate this in terms of the Filipino in his social world. The Filipino is born usually into a rather large family which consists of three segments: the nuclear family, the kinship family composed of relatives on both sides of the parents to the

³⁵ Thomas, *The Christian Response to the Asian Revolution*, p. 68.

nth degree, and the ritual family made up through the *compadrinō* system. Within this large family are roles, statuses, duties, privileges and rights which are defined and prescribed by custom. The Filipino's social world is thus primarily structured by kinship relations, and for the most part he never really gets out of this kinship structure. Thus, he approaches the wider social world on the model of the family. He feels obligated to employ a relative who is not qualified for a job. A great deal of nepotism and graft in public and business life has been traced to this factor.³⁶ An apparent lack of civic consciousness and concern for the national interest is partly due to narrow family and kinship loyalties. Moreover, the Filipino seeks social acceptance—a value he prizes highly—through a system of personalized methods. He seeks to transform nonfamily social relations into the patterns of family relations. To do this he is prepared to sacrifice values such as clarity in communication, honesty in expressing feeling or opinion, and the pursuit of definite results or achievement. He has difficulty distinguishing ideas from personal feelings, and he often confuses criticism of the former with the latter. He attempts to personalize what had better remain impersonal, such as legal procedures, objective norms, bureaucratic operations, administrative standards, and institutional structures. The results are often disastrous. To live effectively in a modernizing society, the Filipino obviously must learn to operate not only through personal relations but also through impersonal structures and incorporate into his norms objective standards of efficiency and competence. He must learn to rationalize his activity to achieve maximum results with a minimum of effort and cost.

I hope that what I have said so far illustrates the profound tension generated by the confrontation between the image of man required in modernization and the image of man in the traditional cultures of Southern Asia. It is this situation of conflict which has provoked the search for a new image of man in Asia. In the Philippines there is a great deal of public discussion on the “profile of the new Filipino.” In Singapore there is much talk about the image of the twenty-first century Singaporean.

The tension generated by this confrontation is reflected at various levels. Psychologically it is reflected in the split-leveling

³⁶ Cf. Ruben Santos-Cuyugan, “The Changing Philippines: A Problem of Cultural Identity,” *The Chronicle Yearbook*, 1961, p. 101.

of the psyche of most educated Asians. Consciously they affirm the values of modernization and the image of man it requires. Unconsciously, however, they still operate by and large on the basis of the values of the traditional culture and the image it entails. Culturally it is reflected in the juxtaposition of two cultural forms—the modern and the traditional. Often on the same narrow street are to be found a huge American car of the latest model and a horse-drawn vehicle, both fighting for the right of way in crowded traffic. Socially it is reflected in the existence of only two socioeconomic classes, the rich and the poor; and the alienation between them is getting worse. There is no middle-class nor a middle-class mentality in most Asian societies.

In the search for a new image of man, it is quite clear that the traditional image has to be altered, without—it is hoped—giving away some of the values it has found essential for human life and dignity. It is also clear that the modernizing image of man will not be swallowed hook, line, and sinker, not only because the response of the indigenous culture has been for the most part selective but also because this image of man is itself changing under the pressure of a quest for a meaning of life deeper and more ennobling than mere material affluence. But it is not clear what the new image of man will finally be. Perhaps it is not too much to say that it will include at least such things as personal freedom, social justice, higher standards of living, and a sense of personal purpose and national identity in a responsible society.

Relevance of a Christian Doctrine of the New Humanity

It seems to me the church has a contribution to make in the revolutionary ferment in Asia. Among others, it can do two things. First, it can help push the modernization process further along. Second, it can help provide a sense of direction for it. This means that it should repudiate the traditional role accorded to religion in Asia, namely, as a force for sociocultural conservatism, stability and order, and a sanctifier of traditional values. It must rather become an agent of social innovation and renewal on the basis of its message and mission—a role it has not consciously sought so far. It can serve this function partly by interpreting the Christian message in all its scope in such a way as to help step up the process of social change and provide

creative thrusts for it. I take this to be the function of Christian theology today in Asia.

I should like to illustrate how this might be done in terms of one aspect of the Christian faith, namely, the doctrine of the new humanity. I realize that this aspect of Christian doctrine has remained rather underdeveloped to this day. Leslie Dewart remarks in his book, *The Future of Belief*, that Christian theism has suffered underdevelopment in the history of theology. This judgment applies also—though for different reasons presumably—to the doctrine of the new humanity. But it has become crucial for our time, not only for us in Asia. As evidence for this, many of the themes recommended for study from the various sections of the last Assembly of the World Council of Churches seemed to converge precisely on the theme of the *humanum*. I do not promise to do here what has remained undone all these years. All I can do is to show how a doctrine of the new humanity can encourage the search for a new image of man in Asia and perhaps indicate some of the elements that can help shape it. I will attempt this at two levels.

The first is at the level of common humanity. When we speak of the new humanity it should be clear that there is only *one* human nature shared by both the old and the new man. In Romans 5: 6-21, Paul draws a sharp material contrast between the First Adam and the Second Adam.

A point to note in this contrast is that one man represents the many in sin and alternatively one man represents the many in grace. There is a common human nature shared formally by Adam and Christ, although there is a sharp contrast in the material content of each. This one human nature formally identical in Adam and Christ is not destroyed or changed by sin. This means, as Barth suggests,³⁷ that "man is at once an individual and . . . at the same time . . . without in any way losing his individuality, he is the responsible representative of all men." The essential structure of human nature is that each man is for all men and all men are in each man.³⁸ For this reason Paul can speak of Adam as the type of the eschatological man, the one who is to come (Rom. 5:14). C. K. Barrett has suggested that Paul views history as gathering at "nodal points"—the points

³⁷ Karl Barth, *Christ and Adam*, *Scottish Journal of Theology* (Occasional Papers), 1963, pp. 43-44.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

being outstanding figures who are not only great individuals in themselves but also represent the human race or sections of it.³⁹ Following this lead I want to suggest some representative types of man in the Bible who can become significant for the search of a new image of man in Asia.

First of all, there is the image of the man of faith who lives toward the future between promise and fulfillment. This type is represented by Abraham. There are two points here which I want to stress. For one thing, Abraham represents the man who desires to found a *new* nation in a *new* land and for a *new* purpose in world history. He can only do this by abandoning his primal ties with family, kindred, and country and, therefore, also of the culture and world view of his own people. What Abraham did is exactly what every Asian has to do: to abandon family, tribe, religion, culture, and the past in search of a new social order, a new form of human life, a new purpose for history. Furthermore, Abraham sought the *new* as a promise in the future. For him the future is framed between promise and fulfillment, and life toward the future between promise and fulfillment is precisely the pilgrimage of faith. It is this orientation toward the future as emerging from between promise and fulfillment and making room for creative effort which can break the traditional temporal consciousness of the average Asian and transform it from a cyclic to a historical one. As already indicated earlier, the average Asian views time as moving in cycles. The past as the deposit of experience is the dominant category for interpreting the future which does not bring anything essentially different from the past. This view of time has veiled the future as a horizon of infinite possibilities. It has bred in the Asian a combination of the attitudes of fatalism, escapism, and improvidence which has crippled his ability to alter the existing state of things by personal initiative, rational planning, and purposive activity. Changing reality by creative effort is not yet an article of his credo. The future as promise breaks the cycle of time in a threefold way. It does this—as Moltmann suggests—by first contradicting the past by revealing to it something new which has not yet happened. The word of promise is always a judgment on the poverty of the past in the light of the possibilities of the future. Second, promise opens up the future and shapes it

³⁹ C. K. Barrett, *From First Adam to Last* (New York: Scribner's, 1962), p. 92.

with a definite content in terms of which it can be grasped in anticipation. Promise reveals the future as a definite possibility awaiting realization, something new which the past does not have because it has not yet happened. The future then becomes more important and challenging than the past. It calls forth the daring and creativity of freedom. Finally, promise creates a time-space between present promise and its future fulfillment. This time-space between promise and fulfillment is the time of opportunity, the time of creative work, the time of changing the status quo and remolding it into the possibilities of the future, the time of translating a dream into reality. Into this time-space are released the possibilities from the future, and they must be grasped by faith and turned into reality by hard work. Promise, therefore, besides breaking the cycle of time, creates two important attitudes which enable one to live in the time-space it opens up. It creates faith, which repents of the past and hopes in the future; it creates a sense of responsibility in the present, which drives one into hard work by which reality is altered. Time now moves not only from past and present into the future, but also in reverse—the future comes to constitute the present and fill the past with new meaning. Time ceases being cyclic—it becomes historical time.

Another type of man which can very well become a part of the new image of man that Asia is seeking for is Adam as the steward or trustee of creation. Paul of course uses the figure of Adam as the representative of sin and disobedience. But in the priestly tradition of the Old Testament man is given the vocation of ruling over the created order, the animals, and the earth. His function is to rule, to subdue, and to procreate. Nature is man's dominion. The gods and spirits and cosmic powers which have reigned in it are usurpers. They have to be driven away and nature cleared of their alien presence and freed from divine qualities so that it may be restored to its true proportions as a creation of God and as the rightful domain of man as a steward of God. In contrast to the Greek view as expressed in the myth of Prometheus who had to steal fire from the gods in order to have the authority to conquer nature, the biblical view pictures God as giving to man this authority. Man is given the privilege to develop the means whereby he may "subdue" nature and care for it. He does not have to be punished for exercising this privilege as though it were an evil deed, as in the case of Pro-

metheus who was chained to a rock in the Caucasus by Zeus to become a victim of the elements. On the contrary, man's commission to be the subduer and tiller and keeper of nature is part of the meaning of creation as good.

Man's calling to dominate nature has to be seen in the context of the ambiguous relation between man and nature. On the one hand, man is clearly subject to the powers of nature. He is a part of it. He is nurtured by it not only in his body but in his spirit. Nature not only provides man with a habitat and food; it offers him aesthetic delight and meditation, companionship, consolation, and inspiration. Man is also threatened by nature. The average Asian is literally aware of this truth. A great deal of his profound feeling that the universe is hostile comes from his experience of the terrors of nature, from typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, famine, and disease. But the fact that he is subject to the powers of nature constitutes precisely the challenge to subdue it, and the history of civilization indicates that the threat of nature has played no small part in compelling man to control nature and to humanize it.

On the other hand, man transcends nature and has the capacity to exercise dominion over it. The biblical view of man is quite clear about man's distinction from the rest of creation. He appears as the crown of creation in Genesis 1. Of all the creatures, he alone is made in the image of God. He alone is given the vocation to reflect God's sovereignty through his dominion over nature. For in man self-consciousness, rationality, moral sense, creative freedom, and all the ingredients of personhood have made their appearance in reality. In man nature has ceased to act merely naturally and spontaneously and unconsciously. In man nature has begun to act freely and intelligently and responsibly. Man therefore is no longer bound to act merely naturally. He must recreate nature in order that it might become the work not only of God's hand but also of his hand. He must know it, for only when he knows how nature behaves and under what conditions will he learn to work, not only *with* it, but also *upon* it and thus to control and reshape it. Thus, he can fertilize the soil, increase the varieties and quality of plants (such as a new breed of rice which is causing what somebody has called "the green revolution" in Asia), improve the stock of animals and preserve their species, produce food and medicine, and make a trip to the moon.

The amazing fact of it all is that nature of which man is a part responds to human scientific investigation and technical control. The unconscious ends of nature are now subject to man's conscious planning and guidance and transformation. This is the great turn in the history of evolution: man who is the product of nature's evolution has now the knowledge and the power and the technique to guide not only nature's but his own evolution.

There is no doubt that man's destiny to dominate the earth is increasingly being fulfilled by means of science and technology. The contemporary Asian will certainly avail himself of this means. Speaking theologically, there ought to be no contradiction between Christian faith and science and technology, although the historical connection has been indirect. Christian faith clears nature of its sacred qualities and commissions man to know and master it through his creative freedom. Man is a fellow worker with God in the ongoing creative process. From this viewpoint, Christian faith provides a theological perspective for the Asian's desire to master his environment through science and technology.

But the perspective must be more than merely supportive; it must also be critical. For technology is not an end in itself. It asks for goals which can endow it with meaning and direct its processes. Moreover, man's destiny is not simply to control nature. He has a responsibility for developing himself and his community. What he does with nature affects him considerably, for ill or good. For through man's interaction with nature, human culture develops. Because human culture is of man and for man, its meaning lies in man and his growth toward more humanity. In this connection, it is necessary to ask whether the kind, aims, and consequences of the technical domination which man exercises over nature do honor not only to his vocation as a trustee of creation but also to his being as a person in community with other persons.

This leads us to consider briefly another type of man—the liberator and the legislator represented by Moses. The Exodus from Egypt, the house of bondage under the leadership of Moses is a paradigm of all liberation movements. It stands for the fact that human dignity consists in freedom. In this sense each man must be his own Moses, restlessly seeking his freedom to be himself by overthrowing any shackle of oppression and indignity. For freedom is not simply the absence of any

objective situation of oppression. It is not only freedom of choice. It is freedom to be human. Being man and being free are identical.

But Moses and his horde of wandering Hebrews discovered that freedom can be lost in anarchy and chaos as well as in tyranny. The peoples and nations of Asia are learning this lesson, too. Freedom can thrive only in some form of community and order maintained by the discipline of justice and law and the reconciling power of love in the dynamic framework of an open and responsible society. Discovering the shape of such a society and establishing it remain the task of contemporary Asia, as indeed of all the world.

The point of all that I have said so far about man is that our common human nature impels us all to seek its future possibility, to fulfill its part in the creative process, and to secure its freedom to be itself. Man in Asia cannot do less if he is to remain human. To the extent that this happens our common humanity prefigures the man who is to come, the *true* man. For nothing in true human nature is alien to the new humanity. As Barth says, "What is Christian is secretly but fundamentally identical with what is universally human."⁴⁰ But we know that we do not fully succeed in this enterprise. Man falls short of his possibility; he abuses his stewardship of creation; he misuses his freedom and loses it in anarchy or tyranny, or slavery of various sorts. The type of man the sinner—helpless, godless, sinful, and an enemy of God, subject to judgment, condemnation, and death—must too become part of the new image of man that Asia is seeking for, qualifying every other element that goes into its making. To the extent that this happens, the new image of man in Asia will have need of the man who is to come, the *new* man.

The next thing I want to say is that there is something in the new humanity which is much more than the mere formal sharing of the same human nature between the First and the Last Adam. Paul's phrase "how much more" in Romans 5 points to a sharp material contrast between Adam and Christ, between human existence in Adam and human existence in Christ, and between man in sin against God and God being for man in Christ. The contrast is summed up in the statement that

⁴⁰ *Christ and Adam*, p. 43.

"where sin increased, grace abounded all the more, so that, as sin reigned in death, grace also might reign through righteousness to eternal life through [the one man] Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. 5:20b-21 RSV). The difference is between death and life. Put in another way, what is involved in the "how much more" is spoken of by Paul in terms of "new creation" (II Cor. 5:17; Gal. 6:15; cf. I Cor. 7:31).

The language of "creation" is certainly inclusive, and we cannot pretend we can deal with all that it means or implies. In Paul it is certainly connected with man: If any man is in Christ, he is a new creation. For a man to be "in Christ" amounts to a new beginning, not just for the individual but for the whole human race precisely because Jesus Christ is truly and fully man in the sense that he is the one man who is for all men and is all men in the one man. He is fully and truly an individual man and at the same time fully and truly a corporate man. Moreover, he is both these in the true relations of being human—in relation to God, to himself, to nature and culture, and to fellowman in society. Furthermore, he lives truly and fully what is required in all these relations. But the beginning in Christ is as primordial as the old one, and it sets one in the horizon of the hope of sharing the glory of God. The event that begins the new creation and the new humanity in it is the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead.⁴¹ The resurrection of Jesus constitutes a fundamental alteration in the character and movement of history; it is the beginning of the end; it is the dawn of a new age.

To begin anew in Christ means to begin to be what God intends man to be, namely, to be in his image, i.e., to be truly and fully man. It is not proper to look for God's image in man, for it is not God's image which is in man. Rather, man is in the image of God. And the image of God is not some human quality or capacity such as reason, or conscience, or answerability. The image of God is Jesus Christ (II Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15). He is the one man who lives human nature truly and fully as God has intended it to be from the beginning. Precisely as true man he reflects God truly. For man to be in Christ is to be "conformed" to Christ, i.e., to become what he already is and will yet become in Christ by all the means and in all the

⁴¹ Cf. Robin Scroggs, *The Last Adam* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 92.

relations and with all the life at his disposal. The Christian and the church represent the new humanity in Christ.

Now, if it is true that Jesus Christ is the true man and that his resurrection is the new beginning for all men to become true men in him, what is there in the man Jesus Christ which man can now begin being and doing? In what sense is the man Jesus true man which the resurrection vindicates? I cannot give a full answer here. But I can give you the answer of Jesus to John the Baptist. When John the Baptist sent two of his disciples to inquire of Jesus whether he was in fact "he who is to come," the reply of Jesus was: "Go and tell John what you have seen and heard: the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, the poor have good news preached to them" (Luke 7:19-22 RSV). If Asia is looking for the image of the true man, then it is in some such activity which the true man did that it may yet find the answer.

Prayer and Action

For many people today there could hardly be a greater antithesis than that between a man of prayer and a man of action. Prayer seems to be an incredible kind of private exercise—a one-way conversation with someone who, at least in a literal sense, cannot be supposed to hear the words we are addressing to him, still less to continue the conversation. To many, prayer seems at best an imaginative exercise, at worst self-deception—at any rate, far removed from getting things done.

If the farmer wants a good crop of apples, is it not more sensible to spray fertilizers than to promote prayers? As for the labors of men, another theme of Rogationtide prayers, does not our best hope lie in improving collective bargaining and setting up a commission of industrial relations? If we want to be kept safe on a plane journey is it not best to check on metal fatigue, to insist on a pilot's reliability tests, and to get the meteorologists to check for turbulence and thunderstorms, rather than to say a prayer as the plane starts to move? From another direction, does not the practice of prayer, by contrast with other ways of getting things done, only underline the church's practical ineffectiveness? Or worst still, there is the idea that prayer may be some kind of magical incantation to be used when all else fails. The doctor says to the patient: "I've done all I can; I know of no other practical possibilities. I suggest that you pray—it can't do any harm." Quist remarks significantly in a comment which links together these preliminary reflections:

Among those who do not pray or pray little or badly, there are to be found some who do not believe in prayer, thinking that activity alone is more urgent and more useful. There are some others who look upon prayer as a magical incantation and hence they use it to satisfy all their needs and wants, even the most overtly material ones. There are