

praxis. Only a theology that is transformationist can do justice to the Christian doctrine of sanctification and to the quality of salvation which that doctrine seeks to express.

In a sense, this book is an exercise in theory and praxis. In the chapters that follow, the theory of sanctification criticizes the practice; and the new context of practice raises questions as to the adequacy of previous formulations of the theory. If in this process the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the tradition come to light, so much the better. Those committed to sanctification cannot afford to be content with the past.

Wesley's Doctrine of Sanctification From a Liberationist Perspective

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Using "liberation" as a transcription of the biblical concepts, which the theological tradition has usually rendered by "salvation" or "redemption," is not new and should not be startling. Nor is it new with regard to the Bible—though it may be new for a good part of the theological tradition—to understand the meaning of such liberation not merely in transcendent (mystical or eschatological) terms or in subjective terms, but also in the politicohistorical context. What *is* perhaps new is the theological attempt to think through the totality of the faith from that perspective.

Such an attempt did not originate primarily in the sphere of academic theology. Its roots must be sought in the experience of a growing number of Christians from different traditions, geographical areas, and sectors of society, who have begun to rediscover their faith as active commitment to the struggle for human liberation—sociopolitical and economic, as well as cultural and spiritual. As this active faith "seeks understanding" in order to deepen and purify and strengthen its commitment, some theological issues are bound to emerge.

Most of these issues have a long tradition; again and again they have engaged the thought of theologians. We must, therefore, interrogate the theological tradition. But a radical process of reconception and reformulation is necessary if such a quest is to have real significance, since the nature of the theological questions is determined by the

nature of the faith-commitment from which they emerge. For us, such commitment is lived in the area of politicohistorical processes that can be dealt with only in categories such as power, conflict, ideology, social formations and relations, and economic systems and processes, that are foreign to most of our theological tradition. A mere transposition from a totally different world of thought (the subjective/psychological, for most Protestant theology) could only hide or distort the issues. Consequently, in order to repossess the tradition, we must subject it to a thoroughgoing criticism, so as to lay bare not only its conceptual contents or its intention, but also its actual historical operation. Only then can the tradition be rethought and incorporated into our own theological response to the questions posed by our present faith-commitment.

One of the theological questions that has surfaced in this context relates to the old problem of understanding God's action—his saving historical deeds—both in its transcendent relation to our human actions, projects, ideologies, and conflicts, and in its immanence in them. If faith is to be lived in the realm of history, as history, we cannot imagine a "transcendental" self that would relate to God apart from a historical self that acts in history. Neither can we envisage a transcendental action of God that would operate in history outside of, or in the "gaps" between the chain of processes in which human beings are subjects.

Traditional Protestant theology—and much Roman Catholic post-Vatican II thought, which follows a parallel line—is so concerned with the prevention of any "sacralizing of human projects and ideologies" that it seems to some of us to result in emptying human action of all theological meaning. The God-reference seems to mean the relativization, the restriction, the limitation of any human project or achievement to the realm of the penultimate, and therefore,

whether explicitly or implicitly, to that which is perhaps dispensable, optional, or at least not "ultimately" significant!

It has seemed to me that Wesley's struggle with the doctrine of sanctification is one of the points in the theological tradition where this issue was discerned and seriously faced. In fact, I feel tempted to reread Wesley's famous discussion with Zinzendorf in 1741 about "inherent" and "imputed" holiness, in terms of our present debate with some of our European colleagues concerning the ultimate eschatological significance of human historical achievement and to confess with Wesley, "I believe, the Spirit of Christ works Christian Perfection [brings in the kingdom] in true Christians [in human historical action]."¹ But the very substitution of terms may be a *metabasis eis allo genos* which we cannot simply assume. Therefore, we must pursue this problem more systematically.

A Powerful Insight and an Ambiguous Achievement

I must disclaim any special competence in relation to early Methodist history and thought. The questions and suggestions I am about to offer are prompted by a very incomplete and amateurish reading of some material from and about Wesley and early Methodism. Each should perhaps be prefaced by the caveat, "If I have rightly read"! But it is possible that some conclusions might be valid and profitable even if "I have wrongly read." I feel somewhat protected by the fact that there is scarcely any point in Wesleyan interpretation on which respectable scholarship cannot be brought in as evidence for diametrically opposed points of view!

Biographers of Wesley have contended over the relationship between the struggles and resolutions of 1725 and the experience of 1738. It seems to me that the unity and

convergence of the two, rather than their contrast or discontinuity, may be the clue to Wesley's ministry and theology. In 1725, Wesley was agonizing over the question of *the active Christian subject*—the true and suitable partner of God in the "covenant." In terms of the specific contents of such active Christian life, he does not seem to have invented a great deal, but rather has synthesized the ascetic, philanthropic, and devotional exercises that the best literature of his time could provide. He did not substantially alter those contents, which he bequeathed to future Methodist generations—both for their profit and for their misuse! But in 1738, a deeper and more decisive answer became existentially true for him—the old Pauline and Protestant insight that it is God himself who creates his true and suitable partner; that the active Christian subject is a gift.

It is, indeed, Luther's answer—but it is his answer to Wesley's quest. Wesley is not concerned with how "to please a wrathful God" but with how to be totally dedicated to him. Consequently—if I may be permitted a theological license—Wesley gained from Luther a doctrine of "sanctification by grace through faith." Holiness, for him, continues to be the goal both of redemption and of the Christian life. Faith must be preached because there is no other way to enter this realm of sanctification. This progression is present, as I see it, in all Wesley's great sermons.

It would not be difficult to document the intention of the Reformers to reject all dichotomies between justification and sanctification. One might quote Calvin: "As Christ cannot be divided, so these two blessings which we receive together in him, are also inseparable: righteousness and sanctification."² Although Luther was less consistent in formulation, he was equally convinced of this unity. But the Reformers were unable to build the defenses that could prevent a subsequent gliding, which by Wesley's time led to

such a solifidianism that an unsuspected witness such as Karl Barth cannot help saying, precisely in relation to Zinzendorf, that "in this monism the necessity of good works may be maintained only lethargically and spasmodically, with little place for anything more than rather indefinite talk about a life of forgiveness."³

Barth himself raises the question of the nature of this unity and whether an "order"—a *prius* and *posterius*—can be established in this relationship, not in temporal terms, certainly, but in terms of theological correlation. His typical answer is that "in the *simul* of the one divine will and action justification is first as basis and second as presupposition, sanctification first as aim and second as consequence; and therefore both are superior and both subordinate."⁴ This is excellent as theological formulation. Wesley could easily agree that justification is prior in the order of execution. But in the dialectics of his piety and his preaching, the all-consuming concern is with the grand plan—the order of intention. And here sanctification holds an undisputed primacy. God intends the creation of a holy people, and this intention becomes an actual, experienced, visible reality when men and women turn to him in faith. This is good news!

It was, indeed, good news for the poor of the land—the miserable masses of uprooted people crowding into the new industrial and mining centers, caught in the crises of the birth of modern industrial capitalism—helpless victims of social *anomia*. They were not merely accepted by God, but they could be made anew—given an intrinsic, measurable, effective worth and power. They could become the conscious and active subjects of a new life. Their works counted; their will was set free. In a society for which achievement was the meaning of life, here was a realm of the highest possible achievement, accessible to everyone through faith!

The exact weight and direction of the social consequences in English society of the Methodist awakening continues to

be debated. A certain consensus, nevertheless, seems to be emerging from the discussion, and it can best be summarized in Semmel's words.

Modern society requires the transformation of large masses of men from the relatively inert passivity which characterizes their state in a traditional society to one in which their personalities are sufficiently strong to enable them to emerge from a state of subordination to one of relative independence. . . . In the eighteenth century, England proved able to make this transformation relatively peacefully. . . . I shall examine how the special character of the "new man" envisioned and to some extent created by Wesley's evangelical Arminianism *might* have helped—that is all we can safely say—to bridge the gap between the traditional and the modern orders without tumultuous upheavals, *while at the same time promoting the ideals which would be most useful to the new society* [final italics mine].⁵

One may question the decisive role that Semmel gives to the peculiar Arminian tenets in this process. Moreover, one may be tempted to ask whether "counterrevolutionary" might not be a better description of the process than the "revolutionary" that Semmel uses. But the important fact remains that, at this symbolic level of (religious) ideology, ethical guidance, and form of expression, the Wesleyan revival seems to have played a significant role in the new social and political relations that were emerging in England with the consolidation of a new mode of production.

Once we have recognized the validity of Wesley's basic theological concern and the significance of his achievement, it seems necessary to point out that both are open to serious questioning. It is not important to pass judgment on Wesley's theology or to vindicate or deplore the social consequences of his movement, and it would be utterly unfair to blame him for ignoring theological or sociological insights that would emerge a century or more after his time. But it may be profitable to try to lay bare the limitations and

weaknesses in his theology and in his general understanding of man and society, which may have led to such ambiguity.

Wesley seems to have read voluminously in the history of theology and piety. But his theological reflection remains captive of some rather rigid scholastic categories and logic dominant in post-Reformation theology. His thought moves, moreover, in the religious climate of the Pietist movement. Finally, his theology is dominated by the soteriological concentration of evangelical religiosity. These limitations operate in different areas of Wesley's theology, with distorting effects.

The first has to do with the understanding of the human subject. Wesley's anthropology seems to me incurably individualistic. This criticism may appear arbitrary in the light of his repeated assertions concerning the social character of the Christian life, his insistence on "a social holiness," his indictment of "a solitary religion," and his practical arrangements to ensure a corporate growth in faith and holiness. A careful exegesis of the contexts in which these expressions occur will show, I believe, that for Wesley, society is not an anthropological concept, but simply a convenient arrangement for the growth of the individual. It is the individual soul that finally is saved, sanctified, perfected. The fellowship is, in the last instance, an *externum subsidium*. The same external character applies to physical and objective existence: It is not to be despised or neglected (witness his concern for medicine, for instance). But still, man is a soul, in terms of both eschatological hope and religious experience. The drama of justification and sanctification takes place in the subjectivity of the inner life—although it seeks objective expression in works of love.

The inherited theological framework of the *ordo salutis* is a straitjacket that Wesley was unable to cast off. Whatever the original value and intention of that notion, in the hands

of Protestant Scholasticism it had become a rigid sequence of moments which, rather than helping to deploy the richness of the one, yet manifold, grace of God, forced Christian experience into a preestablished pattern. Soon the *ordo* was psychologized into a series of "spiritual awakenings, and movements, and actions and states of a religious and moral type."⁶ Wesley was caught in this web. Having left justification behind as a "moment," it was inevitable that he would fall into the trap of double justification—making a distinction between a "provisional" and a "final" salvation—thus endangering the very heart of faith. Justification, and even sanctification, in such a view becomes a series of almost disconnected moments, always precarious and threatened by sin. Both the unity of the human subject and the faithfulness and unity of God's grace are obscured and distorted. Wesley's formulation of sanctification and perfection becomes in this way psychologically untenable for us. Spiritually, it opens the way for either an unhealthful scrupulosity or an equally harmful petulance. That Wesley himself did not seem to fall into either simply proves that his spiritual life—as in the case of many other saints—was much better than his theology.

John Deschner has rendered an invaluable service in his study of Wesley's Christology. While he tries to read him "in the best sense he allows," and, although he largely presupposes, to prove that Christology is constitutive of Wesley's theology, Deschner points out several serious shortcomings. Two seem to me important for our subject. The first is Wesley's lack of interest in Christ's humanity as a concrete historical reality, reinforced by the rather abstract emphasis on law in relation to the prophetic office and by his difficulty in fully conceding the reality of his humiliation. The second (which for Deschner is not a weakness) is such a concentration on the priestly office that the prophetic and kingly offices are seen only in that

light. This is reinforced, again, by an almost exclusive emphasis on Christ's passive obedience as the cause of our justification.⁷

It seems to me possible and necessary to bring together the remarks just outlined concerning Wesley's anthropology and Christology, inasmuch as they tend to reinforce one another in portraying the radical dualism of the theological framework and categories which condition Wesley's reflection on sanctification. There is a "spiritual human subject" that corresponds to Christ's divinity—a "soul" with a reality of its own—only externally and circumstantially related to an earthly, social, bodily life. This idealistic conception operates also in Wesley's understanding of holiness. Although with a sound biblical and theological instinct he gives "love" as his basic and only definition of holiness, when he seeks for the practical outward operation of love (conceived as "motivation"), he seeks the mediation of "law" rather than wrestling with actual historical conditions. To put it in caricature, sanctification becomes the operation of a moral and spiritual self through the mediation of a divine moral code. Again we can admit gladly that Wesley's pastoral dispositions and counseling and even his codification of rules are much more historically relevant—much more concerned with actual life and the condition of the people—than his theology would justify. He did not find a theology worthy of his practice.

For us today, the ideological freight carried in this theology and anthropology is suspect. It is the idealistic dichotomy that justifies and sacralizes social relations in the capitalist bourgeois order that was beginning to emerge in Wesley's England: a free "political subject" who moves in a realm distinct from his existence as an object in the labor market; an autonomous democratic state in which those who control economic power function as neutral umpires in conflicts that will affect their interests; a religion that operates in the individual inward life, without meddling

with the corporate political and economic relations of the outward and social self.

Wesley's relation to this ideology is a complex and contradictory one. His dominant concern for "sanctification in concrete forms" led him inevitably into the consideration of existing social and moral conditions and even the economic realm.⁸ His wide curiosity about political events, as well as his direct concern for social causes, has been amply attested and researched and need not be repeated here. Once this has been said, though, we must remind ourselves of the fact that, historically, Methodism seems to have served to incorporate significant sectors of the emerging British proletariat into the liberal bourgeois ideology that undergirded the consolidation of the capitalist system and reinforced its imperialistic expansion. Why?

Aside from the objective economic factors that led to this development (and which Wesley himself pointed out in warning of the temptations that accompany the upward mobility of people in his societies), two inadequacies in Wesley's own thinking may help to explain what happened. In the first place, he was not able to develop a theology of sanctification in which the unity of creation and redemption could be the center of articulation. Had he done so, his concern for human life in its entirety, and for social conditions, would have become integral and not subsidiary to his doctrine of sanctification. But the grip of a pietistic religion and an idealistic anthropology was too strong. It has thus been easy for Methodism—and its various offshoots—to seek refuge in a "spiritual," subjective, and otherworldly holiness, whenever their interests or the intractable realities of the outward world advised them to do so.

The other inadequacy is equally important but almost inevitable: Wesley was unable to see the structural nature of the social problems with which he was trying to grapple. "Thoughts on the Present Scarcity of Provisions," which

has been much discussed recently, is a good illustration of this point.⁹ Here Wesley makes an attempt to identify and relate the causes of the economic crisis that gripped England in the early 1770s. His vivid portrayal of the miserable condition of the poor reminds us of Engel's systematic description, less than a century later, of "the condition of the working class in England in 1844."¹⁰ Wesley's prophetic tone of denunciation is at times arresting. His attempt to work with hard data—statistics, prices, and market conditions—is extraordinary for a religious leader. But when he attempts to find causes and remedies, he remains totally within the premises of the mercantilist system and completely unaware of the structural causes of the crisis. He cannot see in it the birthpangs of a new mode of production and organization of society, and consequently he cannot see that the poverty he describes and denounces as the "selling of flesh and blood" is the inevitable sacrifice that the gods of the new order demand.

It would be absurd to blame Wesley for this failure. Adam Smith was working on his *Wealth of Nations*, which would appear three years later. David Ricardo had been born the previous year. But the social class that would pay the initial price for the wealth of the nation was already gathering. Some of them entered Wesley's societies; many more were indirectly influenced by his movement; the religious factor would become part of their consciousness; some of their leaders would be shaped by it. And the fact that Methodism was unable to disclose for them the reality of their condition as a class, but rather led them to accept their role in society and to improve their lot without challenging the rules of the game, was one element in the domestication of the working class in Britain. In the last decades of the century, when mounting exploitation and repression kindled the fires of revolt in some sectors of the working class—enrolling some Methodists in the struggle—the official ideology and stance were already fixed: Methodism

would be a force for order, acceptance, submission, and willing and responsible cooperation in the creation of the new society. Soon the human flesh and blood needed for the sacrifice would be bought abroad—the Empire was rapidly progressing—and the Methodists would be able to join in this new divine/human enterprise of spreading “not only our *merchandise*, but our *Missionaries*; not only our *bales* but our *blessings*,” as the great Watson, half a century later, would translate Wesley’s concern “to spread Scriptural holiness.”¹¹

The Theological Nuclei for a New Discussion

I have given most of my attention to the critical task because it would be very dangerous and misleading to lapse into an “enthusiastic” and “triumphalist” exposition of Wesleyan doctrine as the new social ideology for a supposedly Christian transformation of society. For us in the third world at least, Methodism as a social force is part of history—and in some ways part of the history of our domination and exploitation. The future belongs, under God, to the people—whether Methodists or Reformed or Catholic—of whom we are the servants, not the masters or manipulators. Whatever symbols, ideas, and representations will lead them in their struggle for liberation cannot be brought from outside (least of all from a foreign history), but must be begotten in the womb of the oppressed peoples. But this is not the only word that is needed. On the one hand, the consciousness of the people is not developed spontaneously and in isolation: It must be informed, challenged by theory, analysis, and interpretation. On the other hand, that consciousness has in many ways been shaped and conditioned by religion: *Its liberation also must involve a transformation of its religious awareness and self-understanding.*

It is at this point that the relationship between sanctifica-

tion and liberation becomes meaningful, just as the relationship between sanctification and enslavement has been significant for the people’s present condition. To clarify these relations is the main task that lies ahead of us. I do not intend to chart our way into it, but it seems to me that Wesley’s concern for sanctification—frustrated and distorted as it may have been by some shortcomings—underlines a basic theological question. Some of the theological nuclei around which he centered his defense of holiness are significant.

1. Wesley’s anthropology was worthy of human beings. Although he accepted in principle the inherited Protestant view of man, based on the perspective of original sin, his own experience and good British common sense led him to revise it by reviving the Augustinian idea of prevenient grace. Thus he could establish a responsible ethical and religious human subject, which could enter into a meaningful relationship with God. One century later, the Methodist theologian William B. Pope would begin to point out some of the anthropological and ethical consequences of this “optimism of grace,” which later Barth would carry through in the affirmation of “the universal relevance of the existence of the man Jesus, of the sanctification of all men as it has been achieved in Him.”¹² A christo-soteriologically founded anthropological optimism can help in an affirmation of human dignity that steers clear of the naïve populist acceptance of any *vox populi* as *vox dei*, and the manipulation that pretends to exalt the masses but actually despises them.

2. But we need to move beyond this level of generalization. Human beings—individually and collectively—engage in actions, conceive projects, give shape to history and to their own lives. Is this a merely human action, a sort of meaningless pantomime, while beyond and outside, another Actor writes and performs his own script until the day he finally sweeps clean the scene of history and inaugurates

a new, totally different drama? The terms of this question would seem to have been given a stock formulation, at least from the time of the Pelagian controversy: Whatever is granted to human initiative and achievement must be subtracted from God's, and vice versa—when God acts in his sovereignty and transcendence, man is excluded.

But Wesley sensed that this could not be the last word. He was not afraid of names. "By all I can pick up from ancient authors, I guess he [Pelagius] was both a wise and an holy man" who "very probably held no other heresy than you [Fletcher] and I do now."¹³ In the heat of controversy, Wesley tended to oversimplify. He was driven to it because he still worked within the traditional framework of two competing energies, or causalities—monergism versus synergism. We have not yet been able to overcome this dilemma, but we are becoming increasingly aware that it falsifies both the biblical perspective and the nature of a true Christian active obedience. Is God a substitute subject for men in historical action, or is he the where-from and the where-to, the pro-vocation, the power, and the guarantee of an action that remains fully human and responsible? If he is a substitute subject—however much we may try to explain it away—history is a meaningless game and man's humanity a curious detour.

3. A further step must be taken, in which Wesley leads the way in spite of his limitations: the concreteness of action. Sanctification is not merely a spiritual state. Wesley does not hesitate to spell out its meaning in specific actions, although his moralism seriously affects his views at this point. The believer is not left to pure ambiguousness—"Perhaps I am doing God's will!" We may, in our careful dialectics, recoil from Wesley's claim that Christians "know in every circumstance of life what the Lord requireth of them."¹⁴ But it is not boasting; it is faith's grateful acknowledgment (which somehow broke through an idealistic captivity) that we can confidently engage in a concrete

course of obedience as long as we faithfully seek to do God's will. It is only this conviction that can lend "enthusiasm" to the believer's life. Here works are not a concession that God allows us in spite of their present imperfection and their eschatological futility—they are needed for our salvation. Indeed, they are needed by God himself—they are the raw material of the new heaven and the new earth.

4. It is in this perspective that I would like to look at the Wesleyan doctrine of perfection. Our sanctification must not be measured by some idealistically conceived norm of perfection, or (this against Wesley) by some equally unreal purity of motivation, but by the concrete demand of the present kairos. There is an action, a project, an achievement that is required of us now; there is an action that embodies the service of love today, and in my condition: It is *perfection*—the mature, ripe form of obedience.

If I interpret him correctly, Wesley, at all these points, was not giving up the prior initiative of grace which had become the foundation of his existence since 1738; he was restoring the biblical perspective of a covenant. God cannot say "I am your God," as Barth points out, without at the same time saying, "You are my people." And this means also that we are given a specific task, without which the covenant would have no meaning and no purpose. We are constituted into valid, active partners. We are sanctified!

But Wesley's articulation in thought and practice of this insight lacked a deeper understanding of the nature of this human subject who is thus called and authorized and freed. The instruments with which he worked concealed the corporal and corporate nature of human life, and thus he was unable to see these dimensions as constitutive of the holy life and could only co-opt them in a peripheral and nonessential way. It is at this point that, in some ways, his effort miscarried. But the dynamic understanding of Christian life that he championed still challenges us in our task.

- 340-41; *Letters*, 5, p. 264. Cf. Peter Brown's essay on "Human Understanding," which Wesley reprinted as an appendix to his own *Compendium of Natural Philosophy*, vol. 2 (New York: Bangs and Mason, 1823): "Divine metaphor is the substituting our ideas of sensation, which are direct and immediate with words belonging to them, for the things of heaven, of which we have no direct idea, or immediate conception. . . . The words, figuratively transferred from one thing to another, do not agree with the things to which they are transferred, in any part of their literal sense" (pp. 436-37). To be sure, this stricture does not apply to "revealed truth." But theology as such is always an admixture of revelation and human analogy and metaphor and therefore an inexact science at best.
67. Cf. *Works*, 9, pp. 513-14. Wesley was also aware of the human tendency to project, and the inadequacy of those projections, e.g. Peter Brown's comments in Wesley's *Natural Philosophy*: "The multiplying and enlarging our own perfections in number or degree only, to the utmost stretch of our capacity, and attributing them so enlarged to God, is no more than raising up an unwieldy idol of our own imagination, without any foundation in nature" (p. 434). Cf. Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p. 81.
68. *Works*, 5, p. 46.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
70. *Ibid.*, 11, pp. 366-446.

Chapter 2. José Miguez Bonino

1. *Journal*, 2, p. 488 ff.
2. "Sicut non potest discerni Christus in partes, ita inseparabilia sunt haec duo, quae simul et coniunctim in ipso percipimus; iustitiam et sanctificationem," Calvin, *Institutes*, 3: 11, 6. (The English translation quoted leaves out the last words, "justice and sanctification," which I have added in the text.)
3. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 4:2, p. 504.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 508.
5. Semmel, *Methodist Revolution*, p. 8.
6. Barth, *Dogmatics*, 4:2, p. 502.
7. John Deschner, *Wesley's Christology: An Interpretation* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1960), p. 78. I disagree with Deschner's implicit presupposition that an evangelical theology must make justification the absolute norm. This forces Deschner to decide on a question Wesley would not allow and thus tends to distort the perspective of the evaluation.
8. This is how G. C. Berkouwer summarizes Wesley's concern in the discussion with Zinzendorf in *Faith and Sanctification* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1952), p. 51. Berkouwer himself is in sympathy with Wesley at this point. At another point, he gives a good characterization of his own position with the same emphasis:

- "Sanctification, if it is to be at all, must not take place merely on some underground level of psychic life, quite in defiance of all outside disturbance, but must be the redemptive touch of our faith on all of life" (p. 13).
9. *Works*, 11, p. 53 ff.
 10. Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962). The original German was published in 1845.
 11. Quoted by Semmel, *Methodist Revolution*, p. 162.
 12. Barth, *Dogmatics*, 4:2, p. 520.
 13. *Letters*, 4, p. 158; 6, p. 175.
 14. *Works*, 6, p. 2.

Chapter 3. Rupert E. Davies

1. *Works*, 5, p. 60-61.
2. Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 15.
3. Cecil Cone, *The Identity Crisis in Black Theology* (Nashville: AMEC, 1975), pp. 92-122.
4. James Cone, *Black Theology and Black Power* (New York: Seabury Press), pp. 138-52.
5. *Works*, 7, p. 347.
6. James Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1970).

Chapter 4. John Kent

1. Semmel, *Methodist Revolution*. Cf. R. R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution*, vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 466.
2. See, for instance, Thompson, *English Working Class*, 2nd ed., (1968). Also Perkins, *The Origins of Modern English Society 1780-1880* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).
3. When he visited England in the 1840s and 1860s, Finney did not seem to be particularly interested in social reform, as it is said that he was in America (see ch. 6 and 7 in this volume).
4. Cf. Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men* (London: Wiederfeld & Nicholson, 1964); also his "Methodism and Threat of Revolution," *History Today*, pp. 115-24.
5. Sarah Hennell and her brother Charles, together with Charles Bray (an ex-Methodist), were the center of the group of Coventry rationalists who helped to educate the young George Eliot. The passage quoted is from Hennell's *Thoughts in the Aid of Faith* (London: G. Manwaring, 1860).
6. William Reginald Ward, *Early Victorian Methodism: The Correspondence of Jabez Bunting* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 303, 309.